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Abstract
It is one of the key insights of economics that markets always adjust. Any 
change in law will change the way the game is played; the market has no obligation to 
accomplish the aim of the law, it will attempt to maximize interests within the 
constraints of that law. This thesis will focus on three areas of corporate law: 1) 
minority rights, 2) secured credit and 3) insolvency.
Minority Rights. This chapter argues that a) there are valid reasons for 
concentrated ownership and b) a much better indication of the control afforded by 
corporate law is the control premium. Control confers a premium under any system; in 
a dispersed shareholding, it falls to the managers, in a concentrated shareholding, to 
the majority shareholders. The legal method for controlling majority shareholders is 
through derivative suits, or in the UK, unfair prejudice suits.
Secured Credit. The academic literature in the field has cast doubts on the 
efficacy and desirability of secured credit (particularly the seminal article by Bebchuk 
and Fried). This chapter argues that most arguments against secured credit are flawed, 
excepting perhaps the case for the priority of tort creditors.
Insolvency. This chapter analyses the changes to UK insolvency law ntroduced 
by the Enterprise Act 2002. This chapter argues that the changes do little to change the 
UK into a “rescue culture” although it can perhaps be argued that the changes do 
weaken the liquidation bias. It concludes that the current UK insolvency regime 
appears to shift the balance of power in the direction of unsecured creditors.
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M arket  D y n am ics  in  Co r po ra te  Go v e r n a n c e : L e sso n s  fr o m  
R e c e n t  D e v e l o p m e n t s  in  E n g l ish  Law
Chapter 1 
Introduction
To some, the corporation has emerged as the last super-villain. These days, it 
need not even machinate; its executions can be committed in plain sight. Possessing 
unnatural powers, potentially immortal, certainly immoral, the corporation is the 
bedrock of all that is wrong with Westernized civilization. Walk the shelves of any 
bookstore and, in the business section, slightly beyond the display shelf of 
inspirational biographies of retired CEOs, adjacent to the shelf containing parables of 
animal displaying sound business attitudes, you will find a selection of volumes 
(suspiciously written by what looks like only a handful of people) accusing 
corporations of taking over democracy, impoverishing the Third World, and infecting 
the general moral countenance of the world. The fundamental argument is the same: 
separate legal personality and limited liability have made for a system that produces 
creatures without moral restraints, driven only by greed. (As one early anti-corporatist 
put it: corporations have no soul.) Legal witchcraft has produced the closest thing we 
have to flesh-eating zombies (or, if  you like, legal technology has produced the real 
killer tomatoes).
However, those books mentioned above share their space with Micklethwait 
and Wooldridge (2003: xv) who state in their history of the company, without much 
reservation, that “[t]he most important organization in the world is the company: the 
basis of the prosperity of the West and the best hope for the future in the rest of the 
world.” There is no necessary conflict between these two viewpoints. The corporation 
has, from its very inception, been recognized as a necessary evil. The creation of a
5
“fictional”, legal personality has always seemed a little, as it were, inhuman and the 
notion of limited liability has always seemed somewhat perfidious. The corporate 
form is tolerated primarily because it is so profitable. The corporate form appears 
more prone to attack now because recent scandals have illustrated how internal 
conflicts in the corporate form itself can impair its profitability.
A strand of academic thinking has attempted to describe the company as a 
“nexus of contracts”, however, I would suggest that the company is best understood 
by examining precisely how it differs from a collection of individually negotiated 
contracts. A sales contract in a bazaar requires no “corporate governance” because it is 
conducted between two principals, and consummated instantaneously. Nearer to the 
company, we have closed-end investment funds, that state clearly the limitations on 
future funding, the return to each investor and the fund managers, as well as the scope 
of the investments. Even with the corporate form, there are venture-capital funded 
companies, which are tightly controlled by the venture-capitalists (VCs are the 
ultimate institutional investors), again with strict limitations on management activity 
and future funding. With the availability of so many alternative forms, we are left with 
the rather unsatisfying conclusion that there must be some kind of efficiency to the 
corporate form, despite its loose rules concerning management conduct, shareholder 
rights, and uneasy relationship with creditors.
The General Theme
Markets adapt. Markets compensate for whatever restrictions are put on them, 
continuing to maximize profit, if  not necessarily welfare, to their participants. But it is
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facile, perhaps even misleading, to speak of “markets”. What we are really talking 
about is people. Given the right incentives, people can be very ingenious in solving 
problems. Economics is strongest when it is dealing with easy problems (e.g. open 
markets, sufficient parties, clear property rights, enforceable, simple contracts): it is 
weakest when it has to deal with innovation. (Ingenuity is hard to predict.) What the 
economic process at its most interesting comes down to, though, is ingenious people 
solving difficult problems.
This is how Friedman generalizes the Coase theorem: “If transaction costs are 
zero- if, in other words, any agreement that is in the mutual benefit on the parties 
concerned get made- then any initial definition of property rights leads to an efficient
outcome”.1 A strong (perhaps too strong) corollary of this would be: the main 
impediment to the proper functioning of markets is unclear property rights and 
uncertain contract enforcement. However, one can point out that there is one standard 
solution to this problem: use strong rights to compensate for weak rights. We can cite 
two examples of this in action:
Example. Libertarian economists, such as David Friedman and Robert Ellickson 
have produced several books and articles arguing that it is possible to 
have an efficiently working society even without government.
Friedman (1984,1989) describes a system of private enforcement in 
Iceland in the Middle Ages, where order was imposed by the institution 
of bounty hunting. Ellickson (1991) describes rules generated in 
communities where learning the law is too costly, leading members to
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invent their own informal norms, with their attendant punishments. In 
both cases, people can use their own limited enforcement abilities 
(hiring bounty hunters in Friedman’s case, social ostracism in 
Ellickson’s case) to emulate legal solutions.
Example. A more mundane example would be Islamic banking. Islamic financing 
is distinctive because it needs to overcome restrictions in the Koran, 
principally the prohibitions against riba (interest) and gharam 
(excessive risk). The prohibition against riba means that most 
conventional forms of debt-financing are not possible. Islamic 
financiers, however, have use three forms of financing to overcome 
these impediments. Islamic debt is structured in three ways: 1) 
murabaha, a type of hire-purchase agreement, where the financier buys 
the equipment, leases it to the borrower, and accepts payment, with a 
“profit” (characterized as a payment for risk), at the end of the 
specified period, 2) ijiara, or leasing and 3) istisna, a contract where the 
financier builds (or hires someone else to build), typically an 
infrastructure project, such as bridges and buildings, for the borrower, 
who then pays for it, with a markup. (Maurer 2005)
However, in most of these cases, there will be limits to how far the “strong” 
rights can be made to compensate for the “weak” rights. The interesting questions 
concerning these types of structures are: 1) What are the limits to the compensation?




conventional rules? 3) How does the necessity of having to use these “innovative” 
schemes distort the incentives of market participants?
Or, to phrase the question another way, what are the deadweight costs of using 
such structures? The analogy is, of course, to monopolies. A simple understanding of 
monopoly is that any loss suffered by the consumer is offset by the gain to the 
monopolist. However, economic analysis would suggest there is a deadweight cost, as 
the monopolist has an incentive to produce lower amounts of the good than would be 
socially optimal. In the same manner, one can ask about economic systems that have 
some “weak” and some “strong” property and contract rights: what types of projects 
will not be funded, what projects would be inefficiently funded, and, in general, how 
would incentives be skewed under that system?
Example. Some recent work has argues that even though China has weak law
enforcement and property rights, projects can still be funded because of 
the strength of the ‘guanxi’ (personal connection networks). (Wang 
2001) However, as many studies on China report, such a system is not 
conducive to arms-length financing, which impedes the development of 
stock and bond markets. As McGregor (2005:125) puts it: “Guanxi, the 
oft-cited Chinese word for relationships or connections, is overrated, 
temporary, nontransferable, and resides in the hands of the individual 
that has it. Never, ever put your business in the position where you are 
dependant on one individual for access to government officials.” This 
system also makes it difficult to develop an entrepreneurial culture, as
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such a system requires the entrepreneur to have significant social and 
political capital before she can obtain financial capital.
Most studies of corporate governance follow a simple format: they will specify 
a set of criteria for “good” governance/corporate law, ranging anwhere from 5 
measures (La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 1998) to 86 measures 
(Cheung, Connelly, Limpaphayom and Zhou 2005), and then correlate this with 
measure for a “strong” equity or debt market, usually measured by ownership 
concentration, debt/equity ratios, stock market capitalization (as a percentage of GDP) 
or public (that is, bond) debt ratios. The problem is that it is not simple to specify what 
is a “good” law and it is equally difficult to describe a “strong” market. Take for 
example, strictness of corporate laws: it has been argued that in jurisdictions where 
minority shareholders are likely to be disadvantaged, corporate law should require that 
nearly all corporate decisions require supermajority (Black 2000), however, it has also 
been argued that a reason for the vibrancy of the corporate form in America is ability 
of companies to choose the elements of corporate governance they find most 
appropriate (Romano 1999). Is restrictive corporate law a “good” or a “bad” thing? It 
is clear that the appropriate choice of law would depend highly on the specific 
situation.
There are simply unavoidable internal conflicts within the corporate form, 
especially in public companies. These are worst in companies that exemplify “arm’s 
length” investment: dispersed shareholders as well as dispersed bondholders.
Corporate governance, at least “financial” corporate governance (as opposed to a 
“stakeholder” concept that may include employees, suppliers and customers, among
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others) can be characterized in terms of three conflicts: 1) managers against 
shareholders, 2) majority shareholders against minority shareholders, and 3) creditors 
against shareholders (we can also include a fourth that usually occurs in bankruptcy:
4) unsecured creditors against secured creditors).
In this thesis, I will examine corporate and bankruptcy laws across a number of 
jurisdictions and attempt to answer two questions; 1) How should corporate and 
bankruptcy laws be characterized as “weak” or “strong”? and 2) Given that the market 
can adapt to relative weakness in certain rights, what effect does that arrangement 
have on financing in that jurisdiction? This thesis, then, extends the current literature 
in corporate governance by moving the question: “Does strong corporate law lead to 
strong financial markets?” to a detailed exploration of the question: “What, in fact, 
constitutes a strong law or a strong market?”. This thesis is meant for policy makers, 
as it intends to complement the current literature with two additional concerns: while 
it is surely desirable to improve all types of laws and rights, given that resources are 
limited and existing structures can adapt and often are already adapted to overcome 
certain problems, what problems exactly does a country with a weak set of certain 
laws face? What laws should it concentrate on improving?
This thesis will examine these corporate governance issues in three substantive 
sections:
1) What does it mean to have “weak” corporate laws? Which corporate laws 
are important? How are they important? It is widely argued that standard 
methods of compensating for “weak” corporate laws are ownership
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concentration and the use of debt. How does the widespread use of these 
two methods affect the financing pattern of that economy? Are there 
businesses that are inadequately funded?
2) What does it mean to have “strong” secured transactions laws? These is a 
current academic debate on the proper scope for secured transctions. It is 
clear, at least, that strong secured creditor rights do not necessarily benefit 
all parties. Who benefits from secured transaction rights? How does this 
affect financing in an economy?
3) What is “strong” insolvency law? There are scholars arguing strongly on 
both the side of Chapter 11 type insolvency law and “liquidation-prone” 
insolvency laws. Who benefits under each type of system? How does the 
market adapt to the insolvency regime? Specifically, how is capital use 
affected by the insolvency regime?
Methodology
Corporate law is often a delicate matter. Legal analysis requires making 
extremely minute distinctions between situations. As such, it is difficult to make 
meaningful empirical studies of corporate law, as the level of aggregate data necessary 
for scientific plausibility often requires these distinctions to be glossed over. 
Econometrics is frequently, and rather frustratingly, too clumsy a tool for the study of 
corporate law. This thesis is an attempt at clarity. It is an investigation into the nature
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of how capital markets and capital users (i.e. companies) adapt to changes in corporate 
and insolvency laws. This thesis presents a middle way: while it recognizes that it is 
simplistic to categorize most corporate laws as either “good” or “bad” (corporate laws 
shift the deployment of capital is certain directions), it also takes the view that these 
laws may also distract capital from its most valuable use.
As Diamond (2005: 17) puts it, when “confronted with the problem of 
acquiring reliable knowledge without being able to resort to replicated controlled 
experiments”, then: “A frequent solution is to apply what is termed the “comparative 
method” or the “natural experiment”- i.e. to compare natural situations differing with 
respect to the variable of interest.” Because natural experiments are extremely rare 
and social experiments in general are too complex to be replicated in a laboratory 
setting, economic argumentation tends to be inductive. That is, we have little choice 
but to draw analogies between situations that we think we understand and attempt to 
apply the conclusions to novel situations. To maintain a level of rigor, these 
arguments should be empirically testable, however, to quote Sutton (2000: 92):
the bulk of empirical work in economics is not concerned with theory-testing 
as such. Rather, such work is investigative in nature. The aim is to try fitting 
some model with a model with a view to uncovering the mechanisms that are 
driving outcomes in a particular data set. A to-and-fro process may develop 
between such investigations and the development of theoretical models.
This thesis is part of a “to-and-fro”-ing process. It takes the current available 
empirical research and searches for alternate explanations that may be more powerful 
than current hypotheses can provide. Most of the argumentation takes econometric 
corporate governance studies and asks if qualitative studies of the relevant laws may 
yield deeper or subtler insights into how these results were reached. Many parts of this
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thesis are calls for further research and collections of additional data that may provide 
deeper insight into these questions. As such, some parts of this thesis may seem 
speculative. This viewpoint is expressed splendidly by Nozick (2001: 114):
The fact that our theories reach farther than our data shows how far extended 
the reach of our theories is- a cause for celebration, not for lament. To be sure, 
the further we reach, the more our theories become susceptible to being wrong 
or being overthrown in new ways. (Recall, though, that the observational data 
presuppose the regularities and incorporate the theories that evolution has 
instilled.) However, the further we reach, the deeper our understanding goes. 
This deeper understanding also points toward new obtainable data that, when 
gathered, makes less shaky some previous moves beyond the then existing 
data.
Corporate Governance: an overview
Before we begin a discussion of the three main conflicts, it must be mentioned 
that all three conflicts can be mitigated by greater disclosure. Appropriate action can 
only be taken if the affected parties are informed. Disclosure, however, is not a 
panacea; adequate remedies must also be available.
1. Managers and Shareholders.
This is the standard Berle/Means (1933) problem: with dispersed 
shareownership, it is difficult to unite sufficient shareholders to constrain managers, 
whether through voting or lawsuits, effectively giving control of the company to the 
managers. In the US, this has been the dominant type of conflict in recent scandals. 
However, many of the reforms (including the Sarbanes-Oxley Act) may be focusing 
on the wrong aspects of corporate governance reform.
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A. Board composition. Several studies have shown board 
composition to have minimal correlation with firm performance. 
(Romano 1999) In facts, most books on board design recognize 
that there is an necessary tension in board composition: the 
board must a) understand the business and b) maintain a cordial 
relationship with management. The main issues in board 
composition are then practical and personal, rather than legal 
and structural. (See, for example, Carter and Lorsch (2004), 
Garratt (2003), MacGregor (2000).)
B. CEO compensation. While excessive CEO compensation has 
received intense criticism, in most cases the level of CEO 
compensation does not affect the performance of the company. 
This is not to say that the issue should not be addressed. In their 
masterful discussion of the topic, Bebchuk and Fried (2004: 
210-213) argue for reforms in corporate law and securities 
regulation that would allow shareholders more power in 
selecting and removing directors. (Note, however, Raj an and 
Wulf (2004) which finds that many managerial perks can 
genuinely be explained as improving managerial productivity.)
C. Director liability. The most obvious legal solution to any 
problem is to make those deemed responsible legally liable for 
any misconduct. However, in the case of director liability, this 
has proven ineffective. In a study of four common law countries
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(Australia, Canada, Britain and the USA) and three civil law 
countries (France, Germany, and Japan), Black, Cheffins and 
Klausner (2005) found that, despite the varying standards of 
liability between these jurisdictions, directors rarely have to pay 
out-of-pocket. (In jurisdictions where liability is often found 
against the directors, i.e. the USA, they are protected by 
insurance.)
However, this does not mean that all corporate governance measures are 
irrelevant to firm performance. Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2004) have proposed an 
“entrenchment index” which they demonstrate have significant negative impact on 
firm valuation. The entrenchment index is composed of six provisions (staggered 
boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, supermajority requirements for 
mergers, supermajority requirements for charter amendments, poison pills and golden 
parachutes). They find that the provisions contained in this index are the only 
provisions in the broader (24 provision) Institutional Investor Research Center (IRRC) 
index that economically and statistically significantly affect firm valuation and stock 
returns.
It could then be that instead on focusing on rigid rules on board composition or 
compensation, or legal actions against directors, corporate governance reform should 
focus on making boards more responsive to shareholders. A good starting point would 
be to weaken provisions that insulate boards from removal.
2. Majority and Minority Shareholders
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Minority shareholders are unable to use the voting procedures of corporate law 
to protect their interests. As such, majority controlled companies are prone to majority 
shareholders extracting private benefits of control, that is, benefits that are not shared 
with the minority shareholders. This can be viewed as a trade-off. Majority 
shareholders have the power and incentives to closely monitor management so there is 
less risk of manager expropriation. (Holdemess and Sheehan 2000: 165) This is again 
a necessary evil: managerial control can fall either with managers or the majority 
shareholder; the advantage of it falling with the majority shareholder is that the 
majority shareholder has stronger incentives to create value for the company.
Gilson and Gordon (2003) provide a useful taxonomy of private benefits of 
control. They separate the means of obtaining benefits into: a) benefits from operating 
the company, b) sale of control at a premium and c) freezing out of minority 
shareholders. Chapter 1 of this thesis will deal in depth with the issue of regulating 
private benefits o f operating the company.
3. Shareholders and Creditors
Creditors can exercise control over a company in two principal ways: a) ex 
ante- by selectively lending only to companies that meet specific criteria and b) 
through the threat of bankruptcy. Bankruptcy law can distort investment incentives. 
For example, the American Chapter 11 system is said to favor debtors, which should 
raise the cost of debt capital. Any study of bankruptcy has to keep in mind, however,
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that bankruptcy systems basically come in only three forms: a) auction, b) third party 
controlled administration and c) debtor controlled administration.
No system is demonstrably superior to the others. So far, there has not been 
any cross-jurisdictional studies detailed enough to compare these systems 
satisfactorily. A series of papers (Eckbo and Thorbum 2000, 2004, Thorbum 1999) 
has argued for the Swedish auction style system, but Bris, Welch and Zhu (2004) 
would seem to indicate that in the US, Chapter 11 (debtor-led administration) is more 
efficient than Chapter 7 (auction). Chapter 3 of this thesis provides an analysis of 
recent reforms in UK insolvency proceedings.
4. Unsecured Creditors and Secured Creditors
These two groups come into conflict primarily in bankruptcy. While there is a 
nearly universal trend to expand the scope of security, a substantial academic 
literature has developed questioning the desirability and efficiency of secured credit. 
Chapter 2 of this thesis argues that secured credit is, for the most part, efficient and 
argues further that attempts to weaken secured credit should be very selective.
This thesis is motivated by the combination of three strands of thought: 1) the 
structural causes of the Asian crisis, 2) the sequence of papers produced by La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny explaining the causes and consequences of 
financial structure around the world and 3) recent theoretical developments in 
corporate and insolvency law. Particularly, this thesis aims to apply insights from the 
theory of corporate and insolvency law to issues raised by the Asian financial crisis,
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and in so doing, demonstrate that many econometric studies, such as those by LLSV, 
are misleadingly simplistic.
The Asian Crisis
The last decade has been a busy one for macroeconomists. First a succession 
crises in Latin America (the ‘tequila’ effect) then a contagious meltdown of the entire 
East Asian region (previously the darling of economists). The perplexing part of the 
Asian crisis is, however, the fact that it cannot be explained in terms of common 
macroeconomic variables. Notably, pre-crisis, all of the so-called Tiger economies 
had balanced budgets, a budget surplus, and decent to ample foreign reserves 
(Corsetti, Pessotti and Rubini 1999, henceforth referred to as CPR). The Asian crisis 
pointed to the fact, while not exactly novel to macroeconomists, at least one not 
previously studied in depth, that macroeconomic crises could have micro causes and 
that these causes are strongly related to a field often mentioned but rarely explicitly 
studied in economics: the infrastructure of an economy.
The superficial cause of the Asian crisis is clear: rapid exodus of capital from 
the region triggered by a devaluation of the exchange rate. In the early days following 
the crisis, two main explanations were put forth: the contagion theory, which held that 
investors, not fully rationally perhaps, were alarmed into reacting drastically, 
escalating the event into a crisis (e.g. Sachs and Radelet 1998) and the ‘soft rot’ 
theory, which pointed out that there were many fundamental problems with the region 
that were due to be addressed by an outflow of capital and the crisis was simply an 
unavoidable, albeit extreme, result of fundamental flaws in the East Asian economic 
system (most clearly expressed in CPR). More recently, both sides of the economic
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debate have reached a kind of compromise, as Sachs summarizes: ‘the crisis was built 
on national weaknesses that were greatly magnified by a flawed international financial 
system’. (Sachs and Woo 2000)
Even before the crisis, a small minority of economists were already warning 
that East Asian growth was bound to wane. Studies by Alwyn Young (Young 1992, 
1995), popularised by Krugman in Foreign Affairs (Krugman 1994), argued that 
growth in Asia came largely from increased inputs, that is more mobilisation of 
natural resources, labour, and capital, and that actual productivity growth had actually 
been rather low, no higher than in developed countries (or in the case of Singapore, 
dramatically lower- 0.2%). As inputs cannot increase indefinitely, Young and 
Krugman warned, Asian growth will eventually have to slow. This becomes 
dramatically apparent upon examination of data from the crisis period. Hussain and 
Radelet report that export growth slowed significantly in 1996-1997 in all of Tiger 
economies (except the Philippines). (Hussain and Radelet 2000) One main reason for 
the export slowdown was an erosion in cost competitiveness caused at least in part by 
rising wages. As Hussain and Radelet put it: ‘if productivity gains lag behind wage 
hikes, firms will begin to lose their competitive position, and neither export growth 
nor job growth can be sustained.’ In general, though, the problem with Asian 
economies in the period directly preceding the crisis was, concisely: high growth, low 
productivity. According to Lewis: ‘In much of the Asian manufacturing sector, 
profitability levels were below the real cost of capital, and some were in decline.’ 
(Lewis 2000) Such growth is clearly unsustainable as new projects cannot pay for 
themselves but are instead funded by previous profits.
20
How did this situation develop ? Or to put it in economic parlance, how could 
the market allow such inefficiencies to happen ? If we address the question of 
misallocation of resources in detail, we have to note that the Asian situation prior to 
the crisis consisted of two related, but separate factors: a) excessive and imprudent 
lending by financial institutions and b) poor corporate governance.
Weaknesses of the financial system. The East Asian financial system was 
basically a relationship-based system (therefore undisciplined by the market) further 
driven by the perception of government support (moral hazard).
Financial systems can broadly be distinguished into two types: market-based 
(arms-length) or relationship-based. Market-based systems are characterised by 
significant portions of the financing in the economy coming from a vibrant capital 
market, e.g. the US and UK. Market-based systems work with investors acquiring 
information regarding the company from extensive mandated disclosures enforced 
(usually) by securities commissions. Relationship-based systems are characterised by 
a reliance on bank-financing, with limited recourse to capital markets, e.g. Germany 
and Japan. (There are, however, significant differences in German and Japanese 
financing structures. These will be explored later.) In relationship-based systems, 
banks act as information gatherers and therefore usually have nearly exclusive 
financing relationships with their clients.
East Asian economies are markedly relationship-based. Following the crisis, 
coming at a time of American economic triumphalism, this has come under increasing 
criticism. As the Economist mentions: ‘One of the most striking features of the past
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decade is that most of the arguments in favour of German or the Japanese models of 
corporate governance seem to have vanished.’ However, there are sound reasons for a 
relationship-based system. Aoki argues that relationship systems are better at a) 
acquiring tacit information about a business and b) enforcing contracts extra- 
judicially. (Aoki 1998) Banks play a part in assessing tacit information not readily 
digestible by markets even in the US. In economies where disclosure is not reliable, 
however, and courts are not trusted to enforce contracts, relationship systems may be 
inevitable. Rajan and Zingales point out that major weakness of relationship systems 
is the absence of mark-to-market price signal information, which means capital may 
be allocated by banks in an inefficient manner because it does have the market to 
monitor its lending. (Rajan and Zingales 1999, henceforth referred to as RZ) The 
argument, therefore, is that pre-crisis, when capital was abundant and relatively cheap 
(due to fixed exchange rates), Asian banks, because unmonitored by the market, were 
led into lending where perhaps more prudence was called for.
This leads to the moral hazard argument (put forward strongly post-crisis by 
Krugman among others)- that banks lent easily because they perceived that 
governments would not let them fail. (Krugman 1998) East Asian governments 
certainly had a record of bailing out major banks in previous bank failures. Even in 
cases where banks had been allowed to fail, as in Thailand, rapid pre-crisis growth 
led the government to lend tacit support to borrowings from foreign currencies via the 
Bangkok International Bank Facility (BIBF) by promising full banking licenses to 
foreign banks based on the volume of BIBF lending. (Hanna 2000) According to this 
viewpoint, the perception of being ‘too big to fail’ coupled with poor prudential norms
22
throughout the region led banks to overextend themselves, in particular by risky 
investments in real estate. (Roy Ramos, 1999, Clarke 2000)
Another aspect of overextension arises from nearing bankruptcy or being 
undercapitalised. If agents (in this case banks) perceive that they have little to lose or 
their previous commitments are unsound and are likely to bankrupt them, they have an 
incentive to take high-risk projects, that is, projects that have a high, but unlikely, 
payoff, as they stand to gain if the project succeeds but do not have much more to lose 
if the project fails. (Goodhart, Hartmann, Llewellyn, Rojas-Suarez, and Weisbrod 
1998: 48-50) Sachs neatly summarizes the situation in a discussion of Latin American 
banks:
Under-capitalised banks have incentives to borrow abroad and invest 
domestically with reckless abandon. If the lending works out, the bankers make 
money. If the lending fails, the depositors and creditors stand to lose money, but the 
bank’s owners bear little risk themselves because they have little capital ties up in the 
bank. Even the depositors and the foreign creditors may be secure from risk, if  the 
government bails them out in the case of bank failure. (Financial Times, July 30,
1997)
RZ speculate that one of the causes of the Asian crisis was that investors 
accustomed to arms-length systems invested in relationship-based systems without 
full awareness of the differences between the system. As the discrepancies in 
disclosure and accountability became apparent, investors fled back into the safety of 
their arms-length systems. (RZ 2000)
Weaknesses in corporate governance. Rohwer wrote, pre-crisis ‘The biggest 
flaw in the success stories of modem Asia- including Japan- has been their failure to 
develop the transparent and objective public institutions needed to run the more
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sophisticated societies and economies that their fabulous economic growth is 
producing.’ (Rohwer 1996: 18) Scott, in a study of corporate governance in East Asia, 
reached the conclusion that the major flaws were twofold: a) a weak or nonexistent 
notion of fiduciary duty and b) inadequate disclosure. (Scott 1998) There are two main 
types of corporate governance problems: i) managerial agency problems and ii) 
outright tunnelling.
Managerial agency is probably the fundamental problem arising from the 
separation of ownership and control, put simply, the interests and incentives of the 
people who run the corporation and the people who own the corporation are different. 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976) Fundamentally, the problem is that managers do not 
necessarily act in such a way as to maximize shareholder value, instead using 
company resources for their own purposes, such as managerial perks (e.g. the 
proverbial corporate jet) or empire building (increasing the size of the company or 
department with no regard for profitability). The problem is exacerbated when 
shareholders are dispersed and uncoordinated, therefore leaving control of the 
corporation firmly in the hands of managers. (Berle and Means 1933)
In East Asia, ownership of corporations is concentrated. Studies have shown 
that, perhaps because concentrated ownership (where the majority owner is also the 
manager of the corporation) limits the managerial agency problem, concentrated 
companies tend to be valued higher than dispersed companies in East Asia.
(Claessens, Djankov and Lang 2000) However, this only holds in the first decades of 
the company; as the company matures, concentrated ownership tends to hurt share 
value (this could be due to limits to growth or the problem of succession).
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Concentration does not mean that the company is without managerial agency 
problems. In concentrated companies, the majority owners do not have any incentive 
to protect minority interests. Majority owners have two ways to benefit: they can 
increase share price, in which case they will have to share the gains with minority 
holders (which might still be worth it) or they can exclusively benefit from their role 
as managers. Empirical data shows the more the mismatch between control and 
ownership (cash flow) rights, the lower the firm is valued. (Claessens, Djankov and 
Lang 2000) CPR notes- ‘as suggested by the head of research in a Thai brokerage 
house: “there is in practice no clear divide between investment and consumption in 
Thailand... For example, one very clear example of overinvestment has been in five- 
star or equivalent hotels. Every family business empire feels it just has to have one, 
and to out-do its friends or enemies in outfitting it luxuriously.”’ (CPR 2000)
‘Tunnelling is defined as the transfer of assets and profits out of firms for the 
benefit of their controlling shareholders.’ (Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and 
Shleifer 2000) Tunnelling could be said to be an extreme form of the corporate agency 
problem. The transfer of assets and profits out if the firm can be both legal and illegal. 
Legal systems that do not have strong protection of minority shareholders or creditors 
can actually allow legal tunnelling, e.g. the issuance of new shares at a discount to a 
select group or a sale o f company assets at a discount.
One explanation for the suddenness (magnification) of the crisis is the fear of 
tunnelling. The reasoning is that, while the firm is profitable and these gains are 
reflected in the share price, owner/managers have an incentive to keep increasing firm 
profitability, however, as the economy downturns, there is an increasing incentive for
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owner/managers to gain privately at the expense of the firm. (Johnson, Boone, Breach 
2000) Therefore, companies are fine when the going is good, but bad effects (loss of 
profitability) are exacerbated because investors fear tunnelling. Note also that agency 
effects also apply if  a firm nears bankruptcy. As for the case of banks, 
owner/managers have little to lose when a company nears bankruptcy and therefore 
have an incentive to take high risk/high return projects.
A study by Mitton supports the case that corporate governance played a 
significant role in the Asian crisis. In a cross-firm (rather than just cross-country) 
study, Mitton found that corporate governance, as measured by three factors, 
disclosure quality, ownership concentration, and diversification, had a clear impact on 
the extent to which companies were affected by the crisis, with companies with better 
governance of course showing much better stock performance both during the crisis 
and recovering from the crisis. (Mitton 2000)
In summary, one can say the Asian crisis was caused by imprudent banks 
lending to irresponsible companies. However, it is clear that one cannot simply blame 
the managers of these banks and companies or even simply point to Asian business 
culture as the culprit. Many of the infrastructural defects (ownership concentration, 
high debt, inadequate prudential norms, susceptibility to tunnelling) were due to 
institutional underdevelopment, most of which, it will be argued in this paper, can be 
traced to the legal framework.
Disputing LLSV
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As happens when two established branches of learning meet, law and 
economics have always had uneasy relations. Doctrinal legal scholars, in keeping with 
implicit tradition, assume omnipotence for the law. Neo-classical legal scholars, 
assuming equal omnipotence for the (free) market, regard law as usually merely a 
reflection of the market (Posner) and, when not, a hindrance. This is of course a 
caricature of the situation, but one, unfortunately, not far from the truth, at least as it 
stood a decade ago. Now, however, law and economics has become a rather prominent 
area of study and with more scholars trained in both disciplines, such lines are quickly 
dissolving.
Most of law and economics is an attempt to use economic logic to explain 
legal decisions. (See generally, Posner 1992 and Cooter and Ulen 2000) A rarer, but 
increasingly important field, is a study of how law affects economic decisions. Roe’s 
work on corporate governance is one of the key statements in the field. Corporations 
in most countries in the world have concentrated ownership; only the US arid UK have 
significant numbers of corporations with dispersed ownership (or Berle-Means 
corporation- Berle and Means 1933). Roe finds the explanation for the more or less 
exclusively American rise of the Berle-Means corporation in a (relative) peculiarity of 
US law, the Glass-Steagall act which basically prevents financial institutions from 
holding large blocks of shares and to a general suspicion of financial institutions in 
general. Arguing from cross-country data, Roe basically argues that evidently 
concentrated ownership is the norm and therefore it must be Glass-Steagall and other 
anti-financial institution laws that are dispersing ownership in the US. (Roe 1994)
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A clear influence on the Roe hypothesis was the interest of American 
corporate governance scholars at the time in German and Japanese governance 
systems. Part of the poor US economic performance was blamed on complacent 
managers who were not being adequately disciplined by shareholders because, so the 
argument goes, shareholders were too dispersed and therefore could not (because no 
one shareholder wanted to bear the cost of uniting the group) or had no incentive 
(because whatever gains one shareholder achieved would be shared among all 
shareholders) to group together to discipline the managers. Suggestions for 
improvement included increasing the influence of institutional shareholders and 
leveraged buy outs (LBOs) which would concentrate ownership and streamline 
cashflow. (Generally Jensen and Meckling 1976, more specifically Jensen 1993)
But, as many commentators pointed out at the time, while it was true that the 
US corporate governance system was flawed, it was not clear that the Japanese or 
German system was any better (an argument more than bome out by subsequent 
events). In fact, analytically, (such supporters argued) the US system made more 
sense. As corporations increase in size, individual shareholders become unable to 
afford large blocks of shares (as Berle-Means argue). From a neo-classical economic 
standpoint, most clearly stated by Easterbrook, such levels concentration would be 
costly because diversification reduces risk. Therefore, an efficient economy would be 
diversified. (Easterbrook 1997) The Easterbrook argument appears to be substantiated 
by the fact that American corporations have tended to be dispersed even after the 
removal of the Glass-Steagall provisions. Another interesting counter to the Roe 
argument is the fact that while the UK does not have a Glass-Steagall act, it still has 
dispersed ownership (though less than the US).
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Probably the most significant papers in the field in recent years have come 
from a team of economists. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 
(henceforth referred to as LLSV) have published a series of papers demonstrating the 
importance of legal rights to corporate financing. Their basic methodology, as set out 
in LLSV 1997 and 1998a, consisted of grouping countries according to their legal 
origins (common law, French, Germanic and Scandinavian), rating the countries 
according to a basket of rights deemed to be protective of minority shareholders and 
creditors, and correlating them with data on ownership concentration, initial public 
offerings, and valuation of the capital markets (while controlling for population, GNP, 
and GNP growth). They found common law systems most protective of both 
shareholders and creditors and countries of French legal origin least protective, with 
German and Scandinavian origin countries in between. They also found correlations 
between a) the depth and breadth of capital markets (as measured by market 
capitalisation and IPOs) in these countries and b) ownership concentration and the 
protectiveness of their laws, with countries with better investor protection having 
deeper and broader capital markets and less ownership concentration. (LLSV 1998a, 
1999, 2000) These studies have been quite influential, with researchers extending the 
basic framework into the emerging Eastern European states (Pistor 2000) and using 
the LLSV legal ratings to explain comparative developments in financial 
intermediation (Levine 2000).
The LLSV conclusions that legal origins affect current levels of investor 
protection that in turn affect capital markets are more or less undeniable. But the 
empirical side of the LLSV studies is not nearly as rigorous as could be desired.
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LLSV methodology. Admittedly, law and corporate governance is a relatively new 
field and therefore not very well defined. This, however, causes serious trouble when 
empirical research is done, as exemplified by the LLSV studies.
- Legal origin groupings. The demarcation between different legal families is 
not very clear-cut, not least because many countries adopt laws from more 
than one source. LLSV do not distinguish different sources of law. LLSV 
‘classify a country on the basis of the origin of the initial laws it adopted rather 
than on the revisions’. (LLSV 1998a: 1119) But even this is problematic. For 
example, LLSV classifies Thailand as a common law origin country, 
explaining (in a rare case where explanation is actually given) that ‘Thailand’s 
first laws were based on common law but since received enormous French 
influence’. Which far understates the case. Thailand is today a civil law, 
statute-based country with most of its commercial laws modelled after German 
and Japanese codes. The common law influence is negligible. A proper 
grouping of legal origins cannot be so general and would have to identify the 
origin each particular law in a country with the added caveat that that law 
might not necessarily be applied in the same way as in its country of origin.
LLSV construct two legal indexes: what they call a) anti-director rights and b)
creditor rights.
- The anti-director index. The anti-director index is a sum of the following (that 
is, the presence of any of the following adds one to the index): 1) one-share,
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one-vote, 2) voting by mail, 3) registration of shares before voting, 4) 
cumulative voting or proportional representation, 5) litigation against 
management or the option to sellback shares to the company in certain 
circumstances, 6) pre-emptive rights in a public offering and 7) 10% or lower 
percentage of shareholding to call an extraordinary shareholders meeting. 
LLSV do not justify the selection of these 6 factors as an indication of a 
country’s anti-director or minority protection stance. Note also that laws that 
allow companies to opt out of these requirements do not count toward the 
index. An argument can be made that, of the six, 1, 2 and 3 are unimportant. 
Also, because the factors are not weighed, it perhaps obscures the relative 
importance of certain factors. An odd absence from this list is also the issue of 
voting requirements for corporate decisions. Black and Gilson (1998) make 
voting requirements the essence of their proposals for a corporate law 
protective of minority rights and it does make sense that the most direct 
measure of how protective a law is for minorities or shareholders against 
managers is what decisions the management can undertake without consulting 
the shareholders.
The creditor rights index. The creditor rights index is a sum of the following:
1) a company cannot file for reorganisation unilaterally, 2) there is no 
automatic stay on secured assets in a bankruptcy or reorganisation, 3) secured 
creditors can enforce security before all other creditors and 4) compulsory 
ejection of management in a reorganisation. Again, the selection of these four 
factors is not rigorous justified. LLSV themselves point out that 2 and 3 are 
extremely rare. It is not very clear why 4 would be a definite right in favour of
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the creditor (it is certainly a right against the debtor, but could count against 
the creditor as well). Wood (1997) provides a much more detailed analysis of 
comparative creditor protection (and discriminates jurisdictions more finely: 
traditional English, American common law, mixed Roman/common law, 
Germanic-Scandinavian, mixed Franco-Latin/Germanic, traditional Franco- 
Latin, emerging jurisdictions, Islamic, and unallocated) and characterises 
jurisdictions by its approach to the pari-passu rule in bankruptcy. Jurisdictions 
where courts are more likely to disturb security in a bankruptcy are pro-debtor. 
The LLSV factors do not take into consideration- a) how likely or how 
effective a reorganisation is in a jurisdiction and b) how security is to be 
treated (pace Wood) in the event of a bankruptcy except to extent of factors 2 
and 3 which are rare.
LLSV (1998a) also mention ‘conspicuous omissions’ from their data set: 1) 
merger and takeover rules, 2) disclosure rules, 3) security exchange regulations, and 
4) banking and financial institution regulations. It is odd that LLSV have claimed so 
much explanatory power for their thesis when these four arguably important factors 
have been excluded from their study (and indeed other have argued that these four 
laws are more important than the commercial laws, as will be mentioned in greater 
detail).
On a more fundamental level, the LLSV reasoning from laws to corporate 
governance runs: ‘Because legal origins are highly correlated with the content of law, 
and because legal families originated much before the financial markets have 
developed, it is unlikely that laws were written primarily in response to market
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pressures. Rather, the legal families appear to shape the legal rules, which in turn 
influence financial markets.’ (LLSV 1999a) This in itself is a questionable argument. 
If we assume, as LLSV do, that laws were transplanted ‘through a combination of 
conquest, imperialism, outright borrowing, and more subtle imitation’, then we could 
say that if that law was transplanted because of a) conquest or imperialism, it is clear 
that colonisation brings with it much more than a legal system- it is certainly not much 
of a stretch to imagine an entire social and economic system was transplanted along 
with the legal system or b) borrowing or imitation, then presumably the transplanting 
country must have reasons for choosing that particular set of laws, not least of which 
could be the underlying financial conditions. Not to mention a much more interesting 
question is- why would a country retain a set of laws that damage its economy ?
LLSV results. LLSV measure the effects of law on the following measures: 1) market 
capitalisation, as measured by average percentage of common shares not owned by the 
top three shareholders in the ten largest domestic firms in a country (a questionable 
measure), 2) initial public offerings in the period 1995-1996 (not a representative data 
set) and 3) debt in firms.
- Market capitalisation. LLSV report their result as ‘common law countries 
provide companies with better access to equity finance than civil law 
countries’. (LLSV 1998a: 1137) More accurately, however, common law 
countries provide companies with a higher percentage of external financing 
than civil law countries. External market capitalisation is not a measure of 
access to equity finance. A better measure would be cost of equity- that is, the 
price at which a company can issue equity relative to its value (which, even
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then would be an incomplete measure). If, as LLSV claim in a later paper 
(LLSV 1999a), the data shows instead ‘that countries with poor investor 
protection typically exhibit more concentrated control of firms than do 
countries with good investor protection’, it must be pointed out that 
concentration of control has as much to do with the level of concentration that 
is required for control as it is with the benefits of control (which would 
increase with poorer investor protection).
Initial public offerings. The data set is clearly not representative. Different 
countries go through phases of high initial public offerings (for example, 
Germany in 1998-9 experienced a high IPO during the launching of the Neuer 
Markt).
- Debt financing. LLSV could not find a systemic difference in debt financing in 
countries of different legal origins. They reach the conclusion that Targe 
publicly traded firms get external debt finance in almost all countries, 
regardless of legal rules’. This conclusion, however, ignores several 
considerations: a) is there a difference in the level of collateral in different 
jurisdictions ? b) is there a difference in the rate of interest (cost of capital) in 
different jurisdictions ?
Enforcement. LLSV also report that two of their measures, efficiency of 
judiciary and rule of law, are also strongly correlated to legal origin and to 
market capitalisation. ‘Efficiency of judicial system’ is ‘assessment of the
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“efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it affects business, 
particularly foreign firms” produced by the country risk rating agency 
Business International Corp. It “may be taken to represent investors’ 
assessments of conditions in the country in question”.’ ‘Rule of law’ is 
‘assessment of the law and order tradition in the country produced by the 
country risk rating agency International Country Risk (ICR)’. There is no 
explanation for the methodology by which either measure is arrived upon. 
Also, rule of law, which is quite a strong part of the LLSV argument 
(particular in LLSV 1999) because it is strongly correlated with market 
capitalisation, does not appear to have a direct bearing on commercial 
practices in a country. In other words, a country with weak government could 
have a low rule of law rating. There appears to be no intrinsic link between 
rule of law or efficiency of the judicial system and legal origin and no 
argument is given by LLSV in support of such a link. (There is however a 
strong correlation between high GNP and good rule of law and efficiency of 
judicial system.) Any attempt to correlate rule of law and efficiency of the 
judicial system with legal origins should at least analyse the procedural rules 
of a legal system to see how they could impact the rule of law or efficiency of 
the judicial system.
Reasons. LLSV (1999b) give two tentative reasons for why common law countries are
more protective than civil law countries.
First is the judicial or ‘smell test’ reason, which LLSV attribute to Coffee
(1999)- which is that common law judges are more likely to look beyond the letter of
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law to see the real impact of a corporate action and are therefore more likely to stop 
tunnelling. However, it is far from clear that common law judges are more pro­
minority shareholders than civil law judges, nor is it clear that they should be. Most 
civil law jurisdictions do have minority protection provisions and these provisions are 
not particularly narrowly written. In fact in the Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes 
and Shleifer (2000) article on tunnelling, they mention cases of minority v. majority 
shareholders that reach the courts in civil law countries but are ultimately rejected. 
What the examples demonstrated, though, was that in these countries laws did exist 
that allowed minorities to seek legal redress against majority shareholders and the 
decisions by the courts in favour of the majority shareholders was not based on a 
overly literal interpretation of the law, but an interpretation of the law that agreed with 
the defendant majority shareholders.
Second is the argument in LLSV (1999a) that states have a greater role in 
regulating business in civil rather than common law countries. This seems to be 
departing from the legal origin argument, as state involvement does not have to be 
intrinsic to a legal system. Not to mention it is an argument with a strong neo-classical 
economics feel to it. Even so, this is far from a general hypothesis, there appears to be 
no systematic correlation between state involvement and legal origin (or even 
colonialism). For example, Malaysia and Singapore, both British colonies and 
common law systems, have two of the most interventionist governments in East Asia.
Conclusions. The LLSV argument can be separated: 1) legal origins influence current 
law and 2) improved legal protection leads to better capital markets. The first 
conclusion, thus separated, is rather trivial. A rather more interesting question would
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be regarding the countries that do not follow (one could say transcend) the standards 
of their legal peers. If we take as granted (as LLSV do) the fact that legal standards 
were transplanted for no inherent reason, then an interesting result would be to 
identity countries that do not conform to the norm of their legal origins and identify 
reasons.
The second conclusion is rather more interesting. Note, however, that there is 
no necessary reason to link it with the first conclusion- it could be that good legal 
protection regardless of legal origin leads to stronger capital markets. LLSV 
methodology has two fundamental flaws, however- a) it is not clear which 
improvements really make a difference in capital markets- the method of summing 
precludes precision in causation and obscures which variables really matter and b) it is 
not clear that higher external market capitalisation indicates a healthier capital market, 
much less a stronger economy.
In general, it is the implicit assumptions in LLSV that damage their results. 
Regarding ownership concentration, LLSV assume that better minority protections 
(anti-director rights) would lead to more willingness on the part of minority 
shareholders to hold shares. However, this disregards one other fundamental factors of 
concentration- the level of concentration that is required for control. That is, in 
addition to the benefits of control (control premium), one has to factor in the levels 
required for control (which are again dictated by law- and totally ignored by LLSV). 
One would expect jurisdictions in which the shareholding requirement for control is 
high to have high concentration. Therefore, a better measure for minority rights would 
be the disparity between the price paid for controlling shares and minority shares, or,
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in other words, the control premium- and not the general level of concentration in a 
country. (Modigliani and Perotti 1998)
As for creditor rights, LLSV assume that better creditor rights would lead to 
increased lending in a country. However, it is not the amount of lending that would be 
affected by creditor rights, but the cost of the lending. Creditors will charge higher 
interest rates or require more collateral to compensate for the higher possibility that 
they will not be repaid. Therefore the measure of a country’s creditor rights should be 
measured by its cost of debt, not by its amount of debt.
A more fundamental disagreement comes from Easterbrook (and the Chicago 
School in general) who would argue that the less restrictive the laws the better. A 
market with LLSV rules would not run efficiently because it would restrict the options 
available to companies. But a compromise can perhaps be sought in Easterbrook’s 
statement:
‘When capital markets are efficient, the valuation process works better; when 
markets are less efficient, some substitute must be found- law, perhaps, or the 
valuation procedure of banks.’ (Easterbrook 1997: 29)
Other commentators point out that the LLSV argument appears in a historical 
vacuum. Coffee (2001) and Cheffins (2000) report that in the US and UK 
respectively, capital market development came when law enforcement was not 
particularly efficient. Rather, in both countries non-govemmental securities 
commissions arose that guaranteed a level of quality in the capital markets. Rajan and 
Zingales (2000b) mention that in the period before the First World War continental
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stock markets were more vibrant than the US stock market, and only went into decline 
following a period of controlling external capital flows (even though the commercial 
laws stayed more or less constant).
It is clear that other, non-legal, factors affect capital market developments as 
well. Coffee (2000) reporting on the relative success of the Czech stock market as 
compared to the Polish stock market, countries with similar commercial laws but the 
Czech with more stringent securities regulations, supports the thesis that capital 
market regulations and enforcements are more important than commercial laws. Rajan 
and Zingales (2000) believe the political structure in an economy is as important an 
impediment as any other structural impediment. Berglof and von Thadden (1999) 
point out that non-legal structures may develop to limit expropriation, such as social 
norms or worker participation.
While the LLSV papers have been important, it is clear that an analysis of the 
interaction between law and corporate governance requires a more detailed and 
nuanced conceptual structure.
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Appendix: Goals of Corporate Governance
What is the goal of corporate governance ? This very fundamental question has 
proven to be one of the most problematic in the entire field. One could say at its most 
basic corporate governance is about ensuring that a company is run properly. To 
determine this, however, one must have a view as to the goals of companies in the first 
place.
What does the corporation do ? Who does the corporation serve ? These are 
interlocking questions that need to be answered simultaneously. There are two main 
viewpoints in this matter: a) shareholders and b) stakeholders.
Shareholders
The classic economics answer. The firm serves the shareholders and its goal should be 
profit maximisation. The reasoning behind this is, if  current shareholders in the firm 
are not making the firm maximise profit, the firm would be worth more to people who 
will make the firm maximise profit. That is, the non-profit maximising shareholders 
should rationally sell the firm to profit maximisers. (See, for example, MasColell 
1995: 152-154.) Note, though, that this is a normative not a positive argument
The “only protection ” argument. Most economists have argued that the corporation 
should serve shareholders alone. The argument is that other stakeholders have their 
own specific devices for ensuring equity: for example, creditors have collateral and 
workers have unions. Shareholders, on the other hand, have no other way to ensure a
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return on their investment other than board representation (Williamson 1985, 
Grossman and Hart 1992).
Shareholder value. An addendum to this is what has been termed the “shareholder 
value” movement. Stewart argued in The Quest for Value that focusing on shareholder 
value (essentially returns to equity- as opposed to sheer profits) resulted in better stock 
price performance as well as better company performance in general. (Stewart 1990) 
This viewpoint has proved very influential. The push towards this perspective is a 
result of the general perception that American companies during the 1980s were 
focusing on increasing profits and market share without adequate concern for cost of 
capital (e.g. Jensen 1990).
The “implied contract” argument. As an argument for a single board (as opposed to a 
German dual board) system, these arguments are valid. Problems arise, however, 
when proponents attempt to extend shareholder-only protection to other corporate 
actions, such as takeovers, and insist that the legal system view corporate actions only 
from the viewpoint of shareholders (e.g. Shleifer Vishny 1998). While we could 
concede that the company board should maximise shareholder value, it is no so clear 
that the legal system should maximise shareholder value as well.
If we interpret the shareholder value argument to mean that shareholders, 
beyond their legal right to board control, should also have rights against company 
actions that prejudice them, then it is equally equitable that other stakeholders (e.g. 
employees) have an implied right in their contracts with the company as well. In other 
words, if  a shareholder has an “implied” contract with the company that the company
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will not allow itself to be acquired below a certain value, then one can at least claim 
employees have an “implied” contract with the company that the company will not 
allow itself to go bankrupt.
Shareholder value and short-termism. Another argument against the shareholder value 
approach is that it tends to push the company towards short-term behaviour. This type 
of behaviour is typified by leveraged buy-outs (LBOs), selling off assets to “improve 
the bottom-line”, employee layoffs, and reducing R&D. (Kennedy 2000) An 
important facet of shareholder value in practice is that it relies on the stock market as 
the measure of performance. The question of whether the stock market is an adequate 
measure of corporate performance is an important one and will dealt with in detail 
later.
Stakeholders
The stakeholder viewpoint takes a broader view of the company. It starts from 
a more general question: what is the role of corporations in a society ? A basic answer 
would be that it is a medium for different parties to interact. In this viewpoint, the role 
of the corporate board, in fact, the very reason for a corporate board, is to mediate 
between different interests (e.g. Blair 1997) Note that there is actually no overt 
conflict between this and profit maximisation. Interest mediation can very well be 
instrumental to company survival. (Fligstein argues that in practice, companies aim 
for survival, not value maximisation. Fligstein 2001) One could boil this down to a 
question of perspective- shareholder value as a stated goal tends toward more short-
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term while viewing the company as a interest mediator sets its priorities toward the 
long-term.
Bottom line: a divided company benefits noone. But- bottom line- a company 
beholden to everyone is beholden to noone. (Stiglitz 1990, Jensen 1999) We are back 
to the essential problem of corporate governance: agency. While it is clear that 
focusing on shareholder value is not the solution to all problems (at least in part due to 
inadequate definitions of “shareholder value”), giving management the leeway to 
entirely set their own agenda can lead to management abuses of company capital. 
However, while it is not advisable to group defences against managerial rent-seeking 
under the sole umbrella of “shareholder value”, many devices due exist to curb 
management excess. It is the interaction of these “constellations of interests” that 
control companies. (Scott 1998)
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Chapter 2:
Ownership Concentration and Minority Shareholder Rights 
Introduction
It is no longer fashionable to consider economies either socialist or capitalist. 
The trend has turned to distinctions between shades of capitalism. Scholars, however, 
persist in going beyond simple description and often offer judgments on the different 
systems, at times with an obvious bias. The current split can crudely be characterized 
as such: on the one hand those that believe the Anglo-American economic system best 
(or at least better than the rest) and those who believe that European (or at least certain 
European) and Japanese systems just as efficient as the Anglo-American system. 
These judgments are not without historical bias- it is the flourishing economy of the 
moment which tends to be touted as the “best” system. (Lester Thurow among others 
proclaimed the Japanese system superior in 1990; right on the cusp of its subsequent 
decline, one might note.)
Distinctions between economic systems can be made in many ways. Labour 
markets, sources of capital, degree of regulation, etc., all play their part in how an 
economy is organized. Of these however, one empirical element that stands out is the 
difference in the manner of shareholder ownership. One of the major differences 
between the Anglo-American economic system and virtually everyone else is the 
pattern of shareholder ownership. Anglo-American companies tend to have dispersed 
shareholders (roughly meaning shareholders holding insufficient shares to control the 
company) while companies in other systems tend to have block holdings, that is, 
companies have clear owners (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 1999). 
Scholars arguing for the superiority of the Anglo-American system often implicitly
44
and sometimes explicitly assume the efficiency and naturalness (one could almost say 
inevitability) of dispersed share ownership. They argue that, as diversification is the 
most efficient means of mitigating financial risk, shareholders- in a free, efficient 
market- would choose to have small holdings across many companies. Also, block 
holdings also impede liquidity- which is also a risk. Block holdings exist because: a) 
shareholders mistrust managers to the extent that it is in some shareholder’s interest to 
seek the power to control managers directly through share voting or b) block 
shareholders derive supra-normal profits (beyond other shareholders) from controlling 
the blocks (known in economic parlance as rent seeking). In other words, systems 
other than the Anglo-American suffer from inadequate shareholder protection in one 
or both of the two forms: either insufficient manager control or inadequate minority 
shareholder protection or both.
This discussion has been afloat for some years now and one of the strongest 
reasons proposed for the distinction has been that law is the decisive factor. The 
LLSV papers argue (or at least imply very strongly) that a) ownership concentration is 
a key distinguishing feature of economic systems and b) legal protection of minority 
rights is at the core of why this is so. This chapter argues that the LLSV reasoning and 
conclusions are too simplistic: a) LLSV does not devote enough attention to the 
causes of concentration (other than poor governance) and b) as a result of their 
methodology (as discussed above), LLSV adopt a view of law that does not take into 
account many of the realities of law.
Let me make it clear now that I do not dispute strongly the central argument of 
the LLSV papers- that there is a correlation between law and share ownership. Rather
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I am attempting to correct two misconceptions, which could prove vital in a policy 
context, that a) concentration is to be avoided and b) legal protection of minority 
shareholder rights is the solution.
What we shall also explore in this chapter is the dynamic response of the 
market to laws and their consequences. There are many plausible reasons for 
ownership concentration, aside from poor corporate law. Some of the proposed 
reasons, such as a young equity culture (it takes time for companies to acquire 
dispersed ownership) and taxes (some tax systems discourage sales of shares by 
majority shareholders), would lead to the conclusion that improving corporate law 
might not change ownership concentration at all. Even more complex is the question 
of causation: do failures in governance lead to calls for stronger corporate law (e.g. 
Enron and Sarbanes-Oxley)? That is, it is possible that economies that have developed 
their own methods for dealing with managerial wrongdoing (such as ownership 
concentration, bank control, state influence, or strong norms) rarely have cause to 
radically change their corporate laws. Perhaps most important of all is the question: 
what is the consequence of ownership concentration? The obvious negative effect 
would be that majority shareholders have increased opportunity to expropriate the 
minority. However, if this is the major negative consequence, shouldn’t we rather look 
at a direct measure of majority influence (such as the control premium)? At the end of 
this chapter, we will examine how high control premiums might be detrimental to an 
economy.
This chapter, then, is structured around three notions: (1) concentration is not 
necessarily a negative phenomenon. There are valid, efficient reasons why
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concentration should exist. As Berglof and von Thadden (2000) argue, the very fact 
that most countries do not have widespread dispersed ownership already casts doubt 
on the importance of their assessment of investors protection. Also, they point out that 
LLSV do not distinguish between types of capital providers, whereas in actuality, the 
type of block holder (whether family, institutional or foreign for instance) has a large 
bearing on its governing (or expropriating) function. (2) Legal protection of minority 
rights, when examined in detail, does not appear to be the panacea LLSV make it out 
to be. Minority lawsuits have been a subject of much legal academic skepticism over 
the years. (3) A much better test of shareholder protection than concentration is the 
control premium. However, high control premiums cannot be considered undesirable a 
priori. The conclusion of this chapter will be that shareholder rights must be examined 
from a broader perspective and strengthening shareholder rights might require more 
radical steps.
I) Is Law the Answer ?
Every financial investment involves one fundamental uncertainty: how much 
can the manager of your money be trusted ? No matter how one aligns the incentives 
of managers and shareholders, there always remains the possibility that managers will 
simply use the money entrusted to them for their own self-interest. The LLSV answer 
is that law is the central constraining influence. As Shleifer and Vishny (1996) write: 
“The reason we do not observe managers threatening shareholders and being bribed 
not to take inefficient actions is that such threats would violate the managers’ legal 
“duty of loyalty” to shareholders.”
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When investor rights such as the voting rights of the shareholders and the 
reorganization and liquidation rights of the creditors are extensive and well- 
enforced by regulators or courts, investors are willing to finance firms. In 
contrast, when the legal system does not protect outside investors, corporate 
governance and external finance do not work well. (LLSV 1999a)
Recent empirical work on legal protection of outside shareholders indicates better 
legal protection of outside shareholders is associated with (1) more valuable stock 
markets, (2) a larger number of listed firms, (3) larger listed companies in terms of 
their sales or assets, (4) higher valuation of listed firms relative to their assets, (5) 
greater dividend payouts, (6) lower concentration of ownership and control, (7) lower 
private benefits of control and (8) higher correlation between investment opportunities 
and actual investments (Shleifer and Wolfenzon 2000).
II) Does Poor Investor Protection Lead to Ownership Concentration ?
A central tenet of modem finance theory is the importance of 
diversification. Diversification reduces unique risk. Every company has risks unique 
to its own situation that may be avoided by investors by diversifying their investment 
portfolio (Brealey and Myers 2000). Every investor should therefore rationally have a 
diversified portfolio. This concept is closely tied to the notion of an efficient market.
In an efficient market, information about the company is (more or less) 
instantaneously incorporated into the share price, so there is no advantage to be had 
from any special arrangement with the company.
There are, however, two ways in which concentration can be profitable: (a) if  
it reduces agency costs or (b) if the concentrated shareholder derives private benefits 
of control.
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Limiting agency costs. One way of limiting agency problems when legal 
protection is deficient is by concentration of ownership. When ownership of shares is 
dispersed and legal protection is unreliable, shareholders face two connected problems 
when attempting to constrain managers: (a) the cost o f collective action and (b) free 
riders. It is difficult for any one shareholder to organize other shareholders together 
(collective action cost) especially when the gains from such actions are shared with all 
other shareholders (free riders). Concentration avoids these problems altogether by 
having a single shareholder with enough voting power to constrain management on its 
own and holding enough stake in the company to have an incentive to act against 
management.
Private benefits of control. Another result of poor protection o f shareholders 
that can lead to concentration is if the controlling shareholder can' derive benefits from 
that control. That is, controlling shareholders of the company may be able to use the 
company’s resources to enrich themselves to the exclusion of other shareholders. 
Bebchuck’s (1999a, 1999b) “rent-seeking” model has entrepreneurs retaining control 
of their company in a public offering in order to retain private benefits o f control.
In summary, Easterbrook (1997) writes: “With efficient markets, there is no 
money to be made by holding undiversified blocks in public corporations.
Competition bids down the price of securities so that the excess risk created by the 
lack of diversification is not compensated.” He continues: “We should therefore 
expect nations with more efficient capital markets to have less concentration of 
ownership, and this is exactly what occurs.”
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II.1) Reasons for Concentration.
This characterization of concentration is too negative. There are, in fact, 
several efficient reasons why corporations should be closely held. It seems more than 
a little unfair to characterize corporations everywhere in the world but the US and UK 
(and quite a few in the US and UK) as a result of a failure of the capital markets.
Attenuation of Agency Costs. Agency costs exist in every economy. In the 
US itself, there are advantages to concentration. US studies have observed an inverse 
U-shape correlation between share price and concentration. That is, compared with 
similar companies, companies with a wide discrepancy between ownership and 
control have depressed share prices. Companies on either end of the spectrum, that is, 
low concentration or high concentration are treated similarly by the market (see, for 
example, McConnell and Servaes 1990 and Morck, Shleifer and Vishny 1988). This 
would seem to indicate that even in the paradigm case of LLSV, the United States, 
concentration is regarded by the market to reduce agency costs.
Information Asymmetry. More generally, it is a well-established tenet of 
finance theory that external equity is the most expensive form of financing (Myers and 
Majluf 1984). A common explanation of this is that external equity involves the 
greatest information asymmetry. In an external equity offering, the best informed 
party (the managers) are offering the least informed investors (unlike banks, they do 
not have the opportunity for due diligence) a stake in the business. External investors
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should then rationally discount the value of the equity offered to take into account the 
risk from the information asymmetry.
Empirically, one phenomenon that appears worldwide is the underpricing of 
shares in an IPO (initial public offering). That is, shares sold in an IPO are usually 
sold at a lower price than what they are worth. While academic explanations of this 
are as yet not wholly satisfactory (see the discussion in Jenkinson and Ljungqvist 
2001), one possible interpretation is that a system that focuses on more direct 
communications, such as relationship banking, might provide for lower cost of capital, 
especially in businesses where information asymmetries are acute.
Acute information asymmetry appears naturally in two instances: (a) early in 
the firm life cycle and (b) in developing countries. It is a well-established empirical 
fact that entrepreneurs typically get financing from internal sources (e.g. friends and 
family) (Myers 1999, Van Osnabrugge and Robinson 2000). This is because an 
entrepreneur has no track record he can prove to investors and, at the early stages, no 
revenues to indicate the prospects of the business. This is related to development as 
firms in developing countries are, almost by definition, earlier in their life cycles than 
firms in developed economies. Khan (2000) reports that family businesses were 
necessary for capital accumulation in the early stages of Asian economic 
development. Reliance on the family form could, however, (and to some extent, has) 
become a liability later.
Empirical findings corroborate the necessity of concentration in developing 
countries quite strongly. Firms with higher ownership concentration had better
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performance during the crisis (Mitton 2000). However, this concentrated ownership 
had to be external, that is, unrelated to management. Subsequent country specific 
studies seem to confirm this: in Thailand the presence of controlling shareholders is 
associated with higher performance (note: not share price, but business measures such 
as return on assets and sales-assets ratios). Again, however, there is a negative effect 
when the controlling shareholder is involved in management (Wiwattanakantang 
2001).
Integration. Another possible cause of concentration is the control of a 
company by another, that is, corporate integration. A standard reason for ownership is 
when the performance of management is not observable (or, more generally, non- 
contractible) (Williamson 1985, Hubbard 2001). The classic instance of this is the 
‘make or buy’ decision, where a firm has to decide whether it should rely on a 
company on its value chain (e.g. its supplier or its distributor) or whether it should 
engage in that activity itself. The prevailing wisdom is that when contractual 
arrangements may not be sufficient for the company to trust its supplier or distributor, 
the company should pursue that activity itself, which might involve merging or 
acquiring the supplying or distributing company.
Path-dependence. Even if  we consider dispersed ownership more efficient 
than concentrated ownership, there might be other incentives besides incompetence 
and self-interest which keeps ownership from becoming dispersed. In contrast with a 
simple economic model that systems move towards “efficiency”, it is worth noting 
that some economists believe that some less ideal structures have a tendency to persist 
in the real world. Economic decisions are made to maximize efficiency at that
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moment, not to maximize efficiency as a general standard. In the context of 
governance systems, even disregarding rent-seeking behavior, it is possible that sub- 
optimal systems persist simply because it is efficient for economic actors to maintain 
them that way, that is, the gain from changing the system is not worth the cost 
required to change the system (Bebchuck and Roe 1999, Roe 1996).
Political Economic Reasons. Coffee (1999b) hypothesizes that causation 
might be even more straightforward. It could simply be, he argues, that some countries 
have laws that are designed to resolve conflicts between majority and majority 
shareholders and other countries are more geared towards resolving conflicts between 
managers and shareholders. Naturally, firms would gravitate towards the form that is 
better protected in their system. An explanation for this is that different countries are 
politically controlled by different interest groups seeking to entrench its own agenda.
Roe (1994) argues that, in America, managers have influenced the political 
system to prevent shareholders from acquiring power. This influence is seen 
generally, where there are laws that discourage block ownership (such as laws that 
limit shareholding by banks and financial institutions) and more specifically when 
(particularly during the 1980s) managers were mostly successful in campaigning for 
laws that would make takeovers more difficult.
On the other side of the coin, Pagano and Volpin (2000) suggest that European 
political systems might have contributed to high worker protection and low investor 
protection. In their model, entrepreneurs strike deals with workers to ensure 
employment protection in return for low external investor protection. The political
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side of the argument is (a) in a society where most of the population gain income from 
work rather than equity holdings, there is a stronger political will for employment 
protection than shareholder rights and (b) a deal between entrepreneurs and workers is 
more likely to emerge in countries with coalition governments than countries with a 
two party system, because a coalition is more likely to occur between parties 
representing entrepreneur and worker interests than one of two competing parties both 
aiming to capture a general consensus. In an Asian context, Claessens, Djankov and 
Lang (2000) raise the possibility that these dominant families become so powerful in 
Asian economies, they influence the political system to act in their favor (in part by 
preventing laws that could diminish their dominance, such as minority protection).
Taxes. A interesting anomaly to the LLSV argument is the case of Canada. 
While Canada and the US are very similar institutionally, Canada has a much higher 
degree of concentration. Brown, Mintz, and Wilson (2000) argue that part of the 
reason could be that Canadian tax law encourages firms to stay private, as capital 
gains taxes are higher in Canada (a disincentive to sell shares) and privately held 
companies receive retained business income tax treatment.
Investor Preference. Others factors retarding the extension of securities 
markets can be found when examining the underdevelopment of corporate bond 
markets. In a study of East Asia, Shirai (2001) found that the major problems were (a) 
underdeveloped government bond markets and (b) underdeveloped institutional 
investors and (c) risk-averse households. It is the latter two that are of interest to us. It 
could be that households in less-developed economies simply cannot afford to take 
risk and therefore prefer to hold their savings in banks. This in turn leads to the
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absence of institutional investors who are primary participants in capital markets both 
in the US and UK.
Excessive Minority Protection. Directly contrary to the LLSV hypothesis, 
concentration could occur because legal conditions are too protective of minority 
shareholders. That is, if  controlling shareholders are impeded or are excessively 
forced to share gains with minority shareholders, then an optimal choice for an 
entrepreneur in a public offering might be to limit external shareholding to a socially 
suboptimal minimum (Bebchuck and Zingales 1996).
II.2) Is Concentration Undesirable ?
It has also been argued that, besides being a reflection of poor protection of 
shareholders, concentration in itself can also be detrimental to an economy.
Economies with high ownership concentration are likely to have underdeveloped 
stock markets, as shares are not as liquid as economies with dispersed ownership. This 
has two effects: (1) firms are more likely to be bank-financed than equity financed 
(because equity financing is harder to access) and (2) firms are not able to rely on 
stock market signals (whether their shares go up or down) to assess their decisions.
Problems with bank-financing. Bank financed systems tend to have 
‘relationship lending’, where banks have long term exclusive relationships with the 
firms they finance. However, it is precisely these relationships that may have 
contributed the Asian Financial Crisis because the banks were insufficiently alert to
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problems inherent in the companies. “Essentially, the arm’s length capital was lent to 
a relationship-based system that did not have the adequate price signals to deploy the 
massive inflow of capital properly.” (Rajan and Zingales 1999)
Absence of m arket signals. Proponents of the market-based system (such as 
Rajan and Zingales 1999) would state two major strengths of a system where the 
capital markets evaluates a company (through share price): (a) firms can use the 
market as a gauge of the soundness of their business decisions (as the market is a 
strong tool for aggregating information) and (b) having a share price that reflects 
company value allows for incentive systems strongly tied to firm value (such as stock 
options).
In fact, one argument (which could be read as a corollary to the Easterbrook 
argument) is that systems are starting to converge toward an Anglo-American 
(dispersed) model (see, for example, Gilson 2000, Coffee 2000, Hansmann and 
Kraakman 2000a, Coffee 1999a). Hansmann and Kraakman (2000a) believe the 
principal reason for such convergence is an emerging normative consensus of the firm 
as a shareholder value maximizing vehicle. This consensus has been propelled by the 
spread of academic discipline of economics and finance, the gradual diffusion of 
ownership in developed countries and the influence of capital providers from the US 
and UK. Interestingly, Coffee (2000) and Gilson (2000) argue that such “functional” 
convergence could appear without convergence in the local law (“formal 
convergence”).
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An alternative viewpoint that has not been pursued much in the literature 
(oddly, considering concentrated ownership is the rule rather than the exception) is 
that it is dispersed ownership rather than concentrated ownership that requires 
explanation. One, previously mentioned, is that of Roe (1994) that argues that 
dispersed ownership in the US might have arisen as a result of interest groups that 
sought to (a) reduce the power of banks and financial institutions and (b) entrench 
managers. Another argument is that dispersed ownership could be a check on any one 
group of shareholder dominating the corporation (Bennedsen and Wolfenzon 2000)
How Much Concentration ? One problem with the entire hypothesis that 
concentration would be higher in countries with worse investor protection is the issue 
of the amount of the concentration required for control is ignored. This problem is 
particularly perilous in empirical work (see, for example, Lamba and Stapledon 2001), 
where the researcher attempts to demonstrate that the worse the investor protection, 
the higher the concentration. Whether the thesis to be proven is the ‘agency cost 
attenuation’ thesis (LLSV) or the “rent-seeking” thesis (Bebchuck), what has been 
ignored is that the entrepreneur only has to retain sufficient shares to retain control 
(what Scott (1997) terms ‘minority control’). The level of share-holding retained has 
less to do with the level of private benefits but rather the amount required for control. 
“The lowest level of shareholding at which minority control becomes possible is 
dependent on the way in which the remaining shares are distributed. Where a minority 
shareholder is confronted by other minority shareholders who can mobilize a 
countervailing block of shares, their minority control is precarious or non-existent; but 
if all the remaining shares are widely dispersed among a large number of small 
shareholders, the minority shareholder is less likely to face any serious opposition.”
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(Scott 1997). In other words, the more dispersed share ownership is, the smaller the 
block required for control.
II.3) Results of Concentration
But ultimately, concentration must be evaluated on its effects. This can be 
observed on two levels: (a) on a intra-country level, by comparing between the 
performance of companies with dispersed and concentrated ownership and (b) by a 
cross-country comparison.
Intra-National Comparisons. On a theoretical level, there is a tradeoff in 
ownerships structure- highly dispersed corporations are susceptible to managerial 
misconduct and concentrated corporations are susceptible to majority expropriation. 
As mentioned above, Mitton (2000) and Wiwattnakantang (2001) find that 
concentration improves performance in Asian countries. In the USA, Demsetz and 
Villalonga (2001) find no significant relation between ownership structure and firm 
performance. This study confirms the hypothesis of Demsetz (1983) and Demsetz and 
Lehn (1985) that ownership structures are endogenous, that is, firms select the 
ownerships structure that is most suited to their needs.
Bank vs. M arket Systems. Comparing performance results of entire countries 
is problematic. So many factors contribute to the performance of an economy, it is 
difficult, if  not impossible, to determine which factors are decisive to that 
performance. Studies have, therefore, been of two types, either of a theoretical nature 
or of a specific area of performance.
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Specific Comparisons. As a large part of corporate governance is the ability 
and willingness of shareholders to constrain management of companies, one proxy for 
the effectiveness of corporate governance is to test the correspondence between 
corporate performance and managerial pay or the speed in which management is 
replaced. Studies have shown, however, that sensitivity of pay and dismissal to 
performance is similar in the US, Germany and Japan (Kaplan 1994a,b).
Another comparison (which has bearing on the Asian Crisis) is the level o f risk 
found in different systems. Claessens, Djankov and Nenova (2001) find that firms 
countries that are less protective of investor rights and bank-based are riskier than 
firms in investor protective, capital market based countries (as measured by cash-flow 
volatility, leverage and liquidity, and interest coverage, in other words, bankruptcy 
risk). However, bank-based countries tend to have higher intertemporal smoothing, 
which offsets bankruptcy risk (that is, profits from good times are used to smooth 
losses in bad times), resulting, for example, in the oil crisis of the 1980s affecting 
Japan and Germany less than the USA (Allen and Gale 2000a). That is, the higher 
level of risk might be immaterial.
Perhaps some kinds of investments are possible only in capital-market based 
economies. Extrapolating primarily from the US experience, Gilson and Black (1999) 
argue that venture capitalism requires an active, extremely liquid stock market (though 
it has been pointed out that the UK stock market is similarly active to the US but lacks 
a corresponding venture capital industry- see Mayer 2001).
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Theoretical Comparisons. As mentioned above, proponents of capital-market 
based systems believe that one of the greatest strengths of capital markets is the 
market signals that could provide a guideline to managerial decision-making and 
managerial compensation.
But these benefits are questionable: (a) On the role of the market as an 
evaluator, Stiglitz (1994) writes: “managers do not look to the stock market to 
determine whether another blast furnace should be built, or whether further 
exploration of oil should be undertaken. The stock price is relevant- they do look to 
the effect of their decisions on the stock market price. But it does not, and should not, 
drive their behavior. It simply provides information that is too coarse to direct 
investment decisions.” (italics added), (b) As for share price performance as an 
indicator of management performance, Richards (1998) points out that share prices 
move, not in line with performance, but with “performance relative to expectations”. 
This is because share prices reflect shareholders’ expectations of a company. If a 
company expected to do extremely well merely does well, the share price will fall; 
similarly, a company expected to do poorly but manages to produce mediocre 
performance will have a rise in share price. “The obvious conclusion is that 
managerial reward should be based more on internal investment returns than on share- 
price performance.” (Richards 1998)
Moreover, it has been argued, it is this very adherence to market signals that is 
a defect in capital-market based economies. Markets can and are, quite often, wrong 
(for example, capital markets responded well to Marconi’s various high-tech 
acquisitions before their subsequent collapse two years later). Also, some academics
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believe that capital markets are motivated by a shorter-term focus. German and 
Japanese companies are also reputed (by some) to be better at long term focusing (see, 
for example, Clarke and Bostock 1995). (Although American commentators point out 
that US stock markets have taken to biotech companies, which are not at all short term 
prospects.) And as argued earlier, it is optimal for companies which require higher 
trust or information flows to gain financing through tighter integration than a market 
system (Myers 1999).
II.4) A More Nuanced View
Current research seems to settling on a position that, in all financial systems, 
banks and capital markets both contribute in their own way to economic development. 
Neither is conclusively superior (see Allen and Gale 2000, and, generally, Demirguc- 
Kunt and Levine 2001). It is not enough to simply distinguish a system as a market or 
bank based system. One must examine more concretely what monitoring mechanisms 
are at work in that system.
Types of Owners. Even among concentrated owners, there are some that act 
as better monitors than others. Khanna and Palepu (1999) observe that in India foreign 
institutional investors are better monitors than domestic institutional investors, that is, 
companies owned by foreign institutions tend to perform better. They find additionally 
that groups (affiliated companies) are harder to monitor because of transparency 
problems. Khan (2000) points out that, among East Asian countries, even though 
Hong Kong and Singapore have large family dominated firms, these firms are strongly
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governed by the presence of banks and foreign investors (and in the case of Singapore, 
government presence).
Divergence of Ownership and Control. Perhaps instead of focusing on the 
fact of concentration, it is more fruitful to focus on the circumstances in which control 
occurs without any corresponding incentives toward value-maximization. This is the 
case when the controllers of the company, whether they are managers or owners, have 
such a limited stake in the company they have a stronger incentive to enrich 
themselves than the company. Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang (2000) find that it is 
the discrepancy between cash-flow rights and control rights that creates the strongest 
negative valuation.
Carlin and Mayer (2000) conjecture what may be the most reasonable 
conclusion we can reach on current data: “In high GDP per capita countries, growth of 
equity and high skill dependent industries is assisted by information disclosure, which 
encourages investment on R&D and through concentration of ownership, which 
provide commitments to other stakeholders. In contrast, in lower GDP per capita 
countries, banking systems are important in promoting bank finance dependent 
industries and dispersed ownership is required to control agency problems in skill­
intensive and equity financed industries.”
Ill) Shareholder Protection
What sometimes happens in a theoretical discussion of the effects of 
shareholder protection is we often lose sight of what, concretely, we are talking about.
62
What do we mean when we say shareholder protection ? There are two levels of 
protection: (1) protection of shareholders from managers and (2) protection of 
minority shareholders from the controlling majority. The LLSV thesis suffers from not 
making this distinction. On a theoretical level, we should expect to see ownership 
concentration is managerial control is weak in order to prevent managerial predation, 
however, if  minority shareholder protection is weak, we should expect concentration 
to be heavily penalized by the market and therefore more dispersed ownership. As 
things stand, the simple fact of concentration does not prove much in the way of 
shareholder protection.
To examine shareholder protection in more detail: Protection from managers 
commonly takes the form of (a) separate boards and (b) director’s duties. Minority 
protection takes the form of (a) voting rights, (b) higher disclosure standards and (c) 
derivative suits.
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III.l) The Importance of Legal Shareholder Protection
The problem with the notion that ‘law matters’ is: as investors should 
rationally punish firms they do not trust, corporations have an incentive to make 
themselves trustworthy. That is, even without legal support, corporations should be 
finding ways to present themselves as reliable investments to shareholders. 
Easterbrook and Fischel (1991) downplay the importance of substantive legal rules, 
raising the possibility for firms to opt out of the formal legal rules (though their 
particular example, that of using the corporate charter as a binding contract is 
somewhat suspect).
As LLSV (1999b) themselves admit: “Given the ambiguity of the theory, the 
answer to whether contracts, court-enforced legal rules, or government-enforced 
regulations are the most efficient form of protecting financial arrangements is largely 
empirical.”
If we examine each legal mechanism for shareholder protection in detail:
Independent Directors. Independent directors are believed to act as important 
monitors of management. Especially now following the Enron debacle, there are 
increasing calls to increase the number of independent directors on boards and to 
increase their influence. However, empirical evidence does not seem to unequivocally 
encourage this. This is how Romano (1999) summarizes the US experience: “No 
matter what variable is used measure performance, virtually all studies find no 
significant relation between performance and board composition”. Romano ascribes
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this to the “optimizing governance choice” hypothesis in which firms balance insider 
and outside directors to reach a balance between directors with requisite expertise and 
outsiders that can mitigate agency costs. Studying the result of shareholder activism in 
the USA, Romano (2001) finds that “shareholder proposals substantially directed at 
improving corporate governance by reforming board composition, repealing takeover 
defenses and altering executive compensation, confidential voting has no significant 
impact on voting outcomes.” In fact, one study even finds a negative correlation 
between performance and board independence after controlling for other governance 
devices (Agrawal and Knoeber 1996). This does not mean that board composition is 
irrelevant, however. Romano also reports that event studies appear to indicate that 
“outsider boards take greater charge in extraordinary event or crisis situations and 
enhance shareholder value”.
One fundamental problem with relying on independent directors is incentives. 
Independent directors are typically given a fixed pay. As they do not receive any gains 
when the firm does well and are not penalized when the firm does badly, there is little 
incentive for directors to try very hard to steer a company. In line with the Romano 
(1999) study, independent directors should only become serious involved with a 
company’s management when there is the possibility than an event may remove them 
from their directorship.
Voting Rights. Black and Kraakman (1996) proposed a system (based on 
studies of emerging capitalist economies) they call “self-enforcing”. This system 
focuses on corporate decision-making processes such as mandatory cumulative voting 
for the election of directors and strict levels of shareholder approval for the disposal of
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assets. If judicial intervention is not reliable, the argument goes, then a more effective 
form of control would be to make self-serving decisions difficult to execute in the first 
place.
This is, however, a rather radical solution, as such restrictions to voting could 
impede normal business transactions. Acquisitions, for example, would be very costly 
with the level of control required.
Accounting and Disclosure. Rahman (1998) demonstrates that accounting 
standards were not up to International Accounting Standard level in the countries 
involved in the Asian Financial Crisis. What is interesting though is that in the three 
countries most strongly affected by the Crisis, Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia, there 
were several companies that opted to disclose related lending and borrowing. Firms 
with better disclosure standards had significantly better stock price performance 
during the Crisis (Mitton 2000) The question should then be: why didn’t all firms 
adhere to a higher disclosure standard ?
Securities Regulation. Coffee (2001b) notes that legal rules, that is law in 
H.L.A.Hart sense of the term, are not necessary for the development of strong 
governing institutions. In fact, as he points out, the London and New York exchanges, 
which provide the backbone of the Anglo-American governance system, were largely 
self-regulated until quite recently. Roe (2000) even argues that the 1933 and 1934 acts 
in the US were little more than a codification of New York Stock Exchange practice. 
On the UK side, Cheffins (2000) corroborates this strongly, making the case that it
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was primarily the London Stock Exchange and the “shared values” of “ the City” in 
general that inspired trust in UK companies and not law as expressed by judges.
It could be that regulators (in this context, securities regulators) are more 
important than judges in governing companies (Glaeser, Johnson and Shleifer 2001). 
As mentioned above, strict securities regulators appear to have been more important in 
the development of the US and UK capital markets than judge-enforced law. A 
popular example of how this type of protection is this comes from the contrasting 
privatization experience of Poland and the Czech Republic. Even though Poland and 
the Czech Republic have similar corporate laws, upon privatization of state enterprises 
Poland instituted: (a) high disclosure standards, (b) an SEC-like agency, (c) disclosure 
of ownership of shares beyond certain thresholds, (d) a requirement that any 
shareholder acquiring more than a specified level of stock must bid for the remaining 
shares and (e) National Investment Funds (NIFs) which held controlling blocks of 
shares in the privatized companies. All of these, so the argument goes, prevented 
Polish companies from being taken over by rent-seekers who would then proceed to 
“tunnel” resources from the firm (which was the case in the Czech Republic) (Coffee 
1999b).
The positive impact of US securities laws is itself in question. There has been 
an ongoing debate among US academics whether mandatory disclosure had any 
significant change on the stock market (the argument begins with Stigler (1964) 
arguing that the law has no impact on returns and continues with, for example, 
Seligman (1983) disputing this result). The argument against the necessity of 
mandatory disclosure is that companies have an incentive to reveal information to the
67
public (to lower cost of capital) and, as the production of information has its costs, 
will drift towards an optimal level of information revelation on its own (see, generally, 
the discussion in Romano (1998)).
It is, anyhow, clear that a securities law is not sufficient for a well-functioning 
securities market. For securities market to flourish, many factors need to work in 
unison. Not only does there need to be strong regulators, there must also be strong 
supporting institutions: accountants, financial analysts, lawyers, investment funds, 
rating agencies, etc. (Black 2000) Needless to say, such institutions take time to 
develop.
III.2) Derivative Suits
The traditional judicial remedy for shareholders seeking redress against 
corporate officials is to bring a suit against management in the name of the 
corporation. This is called a “derivative suit” under American law because the 
shareholder derives the right to sue from the corporation and any recovery from the 
action accrues to the corporation (Klein and Coffee 1996). The English version of this
ry
is the rule in Foss v. Harbottle .
It has been alleged that derivative suits are quite difficult to bring in both 
American and English courts. Both courts appear to regard the possibility of nuisance 
suits (“strike suits” in American legalese) as an important concern. Legally, this is 
because the courts consider that legal recourse will be given to plaintiffs only if  there
2
(1843) 2 Hare 461
68
is reason why the corporation cannot solve the problem under its own devices. Under 
Delaware law (where most American corporations are incorporated), derivate suits are 
allowed only if  “demand is excused”, i.e., the board has been shown to inadequately 
respond to shareholder demands. In Foss v. Harbottle, Wigram VC stated that 
minority shareholders must demonstrate that they have exhausted any possibility of 
redress within the internal forum and, even more strongly, that the court will not 
intervene where a majority of shareholders may lawfully ratify irregular conduct. The 
logic (following Jenkins LJ in Edwards v. Halliwel f )  seems to be that, if  the company 
is the ‘proper plaintiff then the company should have the right to decide whether or 
not to bring the suit. As the law allows the majority to decide in the company’s stead, 
it follows that the decision to bring the derivative suit to court must first be ratified by 
the majority shareholders.
Under Delaware law, in order for shareholders to file a derivate suit against 
management of a company, the plaintiff must create a reasonable doubt that (1) the 
directors are disinterested and independent and (2) the challenged transaction was 
otherwise the product of a valid exercise of business judgment. Demand may be 
excused under Delaware law only if the plaintiff can prove that “the majority of the 
board personally benefited from the challenged transaction or was otherwise subject to 
a legally disabling conflict of interest” (Klein and Coffee 1996). A standard procedure 
for combating these allegations is to appoint independent directors to the board. An 
even more comprehensive and easier solution is to appoint a “special litigation 
committee” specifically to handle the matter. As presumably everyone on the 
committee is independent, demand has to be made to the committee and will not be
3
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admitted to court (see the discussion in Mitchell 2001). As Mitchell rather 
dramatically puts it: “We might as well not have fiduciary duty at all.” American 
economists appear to have far more confidence in the American legal system than 
American legal scholars do.
English law has similar barriers. Lord Davey in Burland v. Earle4 held that the 
‘proper plaintiff principle may be excused only where “the persons against whom 
relief is sought themselves hold and control the majority of shares in the company and 
will not permit an action to be brought in the name of the company” and “the acts 
complained of are of a fraudulent character or are beyond the powers of the 
company.” In earlier judgments, this test of ‘wrongdoer control’ was stated as at least 
51 percent of voting shares.5. As mentioned above, ownership in companies is rarely 
as concentrated as 51 percent and it is possible to control companies without that 
degree of ownership. Subsequent English cases have expanded the exception to Foss 
v. Harbottle to include “sufficient control to prevent what would otherwise be a 
majority from authorizing the action, or where they control the board and are thereby 
in control by mean of proxies.”6 While this is clearly an improvement on the 51 
percent rule, it still confers a burden o f proof on the plaintiffs to prove “sufficient 





Pavlides v. Jensen [1956] Ch 565
6
Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd. (No.2) [1982] Ch 204. See also the 
discussion in Boyle (2002)
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Boyle (2002) writes: “It is generally considered that the two most significant 
barriers to successful shareholders’ proceedings (especially in the case of derivative 
suits) are (a) the difficulty of obtaining, in advance of litigation, adequate evidence to 
support alleged wrongdoing (even where this is strongly suspected); and (b) the 
difficulty posed by the great expense of such civil litigation (without any hope of 
direct personal benefit).” Adding to the problem of expense, Boyle goes on to note, 
even with the introduction of the Conditional Fee Agreements Order 1998, “since the 
proceeds of a derivative action must accrue to the company as nominal claimant, it 
will inevitably be argued, should the point arise, that it is not open to the plaintiff 
shareholder in a derivative action to bargain away any part of the proceeds of a 
successful judgment.” Generally, however, the option of conditional fees should be 
open to those pursuing an ‘unfair prejudice’ action, which is emerging as an 
alternative to derivative suits under English law. (This will discussed in detail later.)
Conditional fees, on the other hand, should not be taken as an unequivocal 
blessing. Klein and Coffee (1996) point out that these can lead to collusive 
settlements, where the defendants strike a deal with the plaintiffs attorney where a 
low recovery is exchanged for high attorney’s fees. The results of this are two-fold:
(a) it can lead to a proliferation of attorney actuated nuisance suits and (b) the attorney 
has incentives to collude (or compromise, if  you will) because the attorney gets paid 
for a settlement but not if  there is an adverse verdict. This appears borne out by 
empirical studies (see, for example, Macey and Miller 1991, Romano 1991). 
Derivative suits do not have a significant impact on share prices (and thus no direct 
gain to shareholders). Gains from winning a derivative suit appear to accrue primarily 
to attorneys. The evidence from Japan appears even more damaging- while the
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incidence of derivative suits rose dramatically following a reduction in filing fees, 
there appears to be no improvement in share prices (West 2001).
However, this does not mean derivative suits are ineffectual. Even though 
gains from derivative suits may be not be observable in the actual instance of a suit, 
some effect can still be observed indirectly. Holdemess and Sheehan (2000) point to 
evidence that, in 86 percent of US corporate reorganizations, minority shareholders 
receive at least as much per share as block sellers, which amounts to a wealth transfer 
from majority owners to minority shareholders. Holdemess and Sheehan conjecture 
that this is because it is cheaper for majority owners to buyout minority shareholders 
directly than to risk SEC regulations. They contrast this with New Zealand, which is 
far less protective of minority shareholders, where minority shareholders receive 
substantially less in reorganizations than large-block shareholders.
Nevertheless, an alternative means of judicially constraining management has 
become available under English law. Section 459 (1) of the Companies Act 1985 
allows members to petition the court if: the company’s affairs are being conducted in a 
manner which is unfairly prejudicial to the interests of its members generally or of 
some part of the members or that any actual or proposed act or omission on its behalf 
would be so prejudicial. This remedy appears to avoid the traditional problems of the 
derivative suit: (a) Lord Hoffman made it clear in O ’Neill v. Phillips7 that the section 
would include any action which “equity would regard as contrary to good faith” and
(b) as mentioned above, conditional fees are admissible in an unfair prejudice petition.
7
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Intriguingly, especially in contrast to the LLSV thesis, Boyle (2001) 
recommends French and German solutions to derivative suits. Both France and 
Germany posit a sliding scale of shareholding required for a shareholder to bring a 
derivative action; the higher the amount of capital, the lower the percentage of 
shareholding required. Additionally, in direct contrast to US and UK law, French law 
disallows (a) any provision in the company’s constitution requiring plaintiffs to obtain 
authorization from shareholders’ meetings, (b) any general meeting to pronounce on 
the desirability of the suit or, most significantly, (c) any resolution passed by a general
Q
meeting to release or discharge directors from liability or breach of duty . It would 
appear, on paper at least, it is easier to bring a derivative suit in France and Germany 
than it is in the US and UK.
III.3) The Hayek Hypothesis
If substantive law is not the essential difference, then where could the 
difference be ? LLSV (1997,1998) hint that the answer might lie in legal origins.
They argue that legal systems of common law origin are more protective of 
shareholders than those of civil law origin. This is not original with LLSV. Hayek 
(1960) believed the common law tradition superior to the civil law tradition because 
the common law is more protective of individual rights. A straightforward correlation 
appears to confirm this: common law countries experienced more economic growth 
than civil law countries in the last four decades (Mahoney 2001). Glaeser and Shleifer 
(2001) advance a thesis that English law (and consequently all common law countries)
8
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is more protective of property rights than French law (and consequently all civil law 
countries). This stems, they argue, from the historical fact that, as French feudal lords 
were roughly equal in power to each other, it was prudent for them to “delegate 
dispute resolution to the sovereign”. In contrast, English feudal lords, wary of the 
power of the King, preferred to resolve disputes locally. This set the tone for civil law 
systems to be more forgiving of state intervention than common law systems and thus 
to the result that civil law systems are less protective of property rights than common 
law systems.
However, this suggestion is perhaps the most questionable of the LLSV 
proposals. LLSV provide no empirical or theoretical arguments about how the actual 
workings of the common and civil law contribute their effectiveness (a detailed 
comparison of attitudes towards statutory interpretation, for example). In the last few 
years, there have been several studies examining other factors that may explain the 
differential between civil and common law countries. Three members of LLSV 
themselves have conducted a study comparing labor laws against legal origin as 
explanatory variables (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer and Botero 
2004). While they still conclude that legal origin is the stronger explanation, there are 
other studies with the opposite conclusion (Roe 2003, 2005, see also Dyck and 
Zingales 2004).
The Historical Record. To argue, as LLSV do, that legal origin is the 
significant factor in shareholder protection, is to ignore great deals of surrounding 
historical circumstance. Most countries received their legal systems from colonization. 
Colonization, it is obvious, involved much more than simply an import of the legal
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system. Colonial powers had a great deal of influence on the economic and political 
structures and even on the culture of the colonized countries. It is difficult to say that 
it is the legal system that has resulted in the corporate structure.
In a European context, the thesis that common law systems have the strongest 
financial markets is simply historically incorrect. Rajan and Zingales (2000) point out
ththat Continental financial markets prospered in the early years of the 20 generally but 
tapered off after the First World War. They propose that it is the political climate of 
the country which is the key factor that then goes on to influence the financial climate. 
But empirically it does seem to have an impact.
Also, it is obvious that there are other ways of interpreting the historical 
record. De Soto (2000), for example, examines the development of American property 
law in detail and reports the chaotic state of property rights (despite the application of 
English property law) up to the early part of the 19th century. It was only after 
Congress began recognizing the ‘extralegal’ settlement of property (that is, the way 
the people themselves organized their property rights) that American property rights 
could begin to fuel rapid economic growth. It would appear that legal origin is less 
important than how that legal system is adapted to local circumstance.
Legal Transplants. Another interesting thesis is that laws only work when 
there is an underlying demand for them. By contrast, laws that are transplanted 
(copied from another country) without regard for local conditions tend not to be 
effective. Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard (1999) estimate that transplanted laws are 33 
percent less effective (the “transplant effect”). In some countries, transplanted laws
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can even have a negative effect in countries where those law clash with the underlying 
cultures and traditions. Attempts to transplant western forms of corporate law into 
China have resulted in perverse interpretations of those laws while neglecting the fact 
that traditionally, Chinese family law had much the same function as corporate law in 
the west (in the context of “clan corporations”) (Ruskola 2000). As Aoki (2001) puts 
it: “sustainable legal rules for corporate governance may be understood as the 
codification of an equilibrium arrangement in response to certain institutional 
environments (e.g., codetermination in Germany)”.
China is an interesting case of a country that has weak legal protection and yet 
has been able to attract substantial foreign direct investment. It appears that informal 
connections (guanxi) have been able to take the place of legal protection to a 
significant extent (Wang 2001). There is, however, the argument that it is precisely the 
lack of legal support that limits the potential of investment in China, as there are 
several well-documented cases of foreign investors failing in China because local 
commitments were not honoured (Studwell 2002).
Effectiveness of Enforcement. It is obvious that for a law to work, there must 
be effective enforcement. A study of legal change in transition economies appears to 
indicate that changes in corporate law (that is, law on the books) have significantly 
less impact than changes in the effectiveness of legal institutions (Pistor, Raiser, and 
Gelfer 2000). (They also find that the only legal index that has a significant positive 
impact on capital market development is securities regulation. )
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A Clear Exception to the Hayek Hypothesis. Perhaps the most intriguing 
piece of empirical evidence to emerge is the results of Nenova (2000)’s cross-country 
analysis of private benefits of control. Even though common law countries again 
outperformed German and French civil law countries, Scandinavian law countries 
outperformed all the others. As Scandinavian law resembles the civil law tradition 
more than the common law tradition and does not appear to strongly protect 
shareholder rights, Coffee (2001a) among others has suggested that other factors 
might be more significant in explaining the difference between countries, in particular, 
social norms.
The Bottom Line: Competition. Ultimately, corporate governance should be 
thought of as a system allowing the optimal allocation and use of resources. As such, 
it should be recognized that the primary incentive and indeed the strongest governing 
device for firms is product market competition. If a firm is not efficient, it will lose 
market share and be less profitable. Competition is the most effective mechanism for 
ensuring resources are used efficiently (Allen and Gale 2000b).
IV) Pro Ration: A Key Issue
If we take the viewpoint that there are justifiable reasons for ownership 
concentration, how then can we measure the impact of shareholder protection on 
companies ? We have to examine a much more direct result of poor minority rights: 
the control premium. The control premium is the difference in share price between a 
controlling block of shares and an non-controlling block. The value of a controlling 
share will be higher when the benefits of the control are higher (Barclay and
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Holdemess 1989, Zingales 1998, Modigliani and Perotti 2000). This is empirically 
tested by comparing the price of a normally traded with the price of share when it is 
bought for purposes of control. The value of control in Italy is 30 percent of the 
market value of equity (by contrast, it is four percent in the US) (Zingales 1994). 
(Note, however, Pratt (2001) estimates control premiums at far higher at four percent.)
If we take into account the existence of control premiums we can make two 
observations: (a) the share price of a company incorporates a pricing of confidence in 
its controlling shareholders (and/or management) and therefore, (b) minority 
shareholders should be most concerned when there is a change in control, that is, 
when there is a takeover. That is, the rule whereby any shareholder that accumulates a 
certain amount of shares (ranging from around 15 to 25 percent depending on country) 
must offer to purchase all remaining shares at a fixed price (the ‘tender offer’ rule) is 
justified, because minority shareholders should have a right to cash out when the 
controller of the company changes. Arguably, as derivative actions and unfair 
prejudice petitions are usually applied only to private companies, takeover laws are 
more important in protecting minority shareholders in general. In the UK, this is 
governed by the City Code, which is not law. (Singapore and Hong Kong have 
similar, non-legal takeover regulations.) As securities regulations was not law until 
not long ago in the USA, perhaps one can question whether regulations have to 
legislated to be effective (in other words, does it really matter if it’s law?).
IV.l) The Position Under English Law
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Whether or not one agrees with Richard Posner’s portrayal of common law 
judges as economic analysts of law, one must at least agree that his work illustrates 
the uncanny concordance between judges’ and economists’ perception of the key 
issues of a case. In fact, one could say judges, being less removed from the actual 
circumstances, are in a superior position to assess the essence of a case than 
academics. English case law in minority rights is a case in point. As the case law has 
progressed, the issue has gradually focused on what we have discussed above: pro
ration9.
The “overwhelmingly usual remedy” for an unfair prejudice petition is a 
buyout of the petitioner’s shares under Section 461 (Boyle 2002). The general stance 
on valuation appears to be that of Nourse J who mentioned in Re Bird Precision 
Bellows that there are no rules of “universal application to questions of this kind” 10. In 
practice, however, judicial opinion seems to closer to the position in O ’Neill v.
Phillips that a “reasonable offer” under Section 459 is one in which the valuation is on 
a pro rata basis without a minority discount unless there are “special circumstances”11. 
Examples of what these “special circumstances” might be appear to turn on a 
distinction made by Nourse J in Re Bird Precision Bellows between shares acquired in 
“quasi-partnership” and shares acquired from another. Shares acquired in quasi­
partnership must be valued pro rata unless the petitioners have “acted in such a way as
19to deserve their exclusion from the company” . This principle has been applied by
9
Another key issue in unfair prejudice valuations, which we regrettably will not consider here, is the 
date on which the shares are valued. The issue has been extensively considered in the Court of Appeal 
case Profinance Trust v. Gladstone [2002] 1 WLR 1024
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11




Jacob J in Re Planet Organic where he ruled that preference shareholders in that
particular case were not quasi-partners (no management duties and less risk than
primary shareholders) and had acted to deserve exclusion from the company
(attempting to vote out management) and therefore were subject to a minority
discount13. Interestingly, American courts, in applying the American version of the
‘unfair prejudice’ rule (shareholder oppression), have also been basically reluctant to
14allow minority discounts (see Pratt 2001) .
The reasoning in all of these cases have more moral than economic. The 
emphasis in assessing ‘fair value’ appears to be on ‘fair’. Nourse J argues that “it 
would not merely not be fair, but most unfair” that a minority shareholder whose 
interests have been unfairly prejudiced should be bought out on “any basis which 
involved a discounted price”15. The court is artificially limiting itself when it casts the 
argument in those terms. There is no need to divide the choice into simply pro rata on 
one hand and discounted on the other. If we consider that the result of the unfair 
prejudice is that the petitioner has lost value in some way, the legal remedy should be 
one of simple restitution: the prejudiced party should be paid the value of his shares 
had the prejudicial act not occurred, or more accurately, if  it had been impossible for 
the prejudicial act to occur. If the court then wants to add an punitive disincentive for 
controlling shareholders to prejudice the minority, then such punitive damages can be 
added...
13
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In fact, American courts almost never apply minority discounts. The usual reasoning given is that 
allowing the discount would “inevitably encourage the oppressive majority conduct, thereby further 
driving down he compensation necessary to pay for the value of the majority shares.” (Friedman v. 
Beway Realty Corp., 661 N.E. 2d 972: 977 (N.Y. 1995))
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A better reason for applying pro rata valuation has been given in the Court of 
Appeal’s decision in Virdi v. Abbey16, where the courts ruled that if a petitioner is 
entitled in principle to just and equitable winding up, an offer by the majority 
shareholders to buy his shares at fair value could be reasonably refused. The court 
stated explicitly that the fair value of the shares as valued by an accountant would 
include a minority discount, but the petitioner was entitled to a pro rata valuation as he 
would have received in a winding up. In order to prevent a petition for a winding up, it 
makes sense for the petitioner to receive an equivalent amount to what he would 
receive in a winding up. This is eminently reasonable considering that part of the 
reason for the Section 461 remedy is to avoid companies winding up in the first place. 
However, in the same judgment, Balcombe LJ observed that the courts have shown a 
general inclination toward pro rata valuation in both sections 459 and 122 (1) (g) (just 
and equitable winding up).
The “quasi-partnership” principle is also suspect from an economic point of 
view. Whether or not the shareholder was present at the time of the founding of the 
company and whether or not he had managerial functions has little bearing on how 
much his shares are worth. By a similar token, a shareholder who pays good money 
for the shares should not be punished any more for an unfair prejudice than a founding 
shareholder. The essential question should be: how much did they pay for their 
shares? Whether in a company-founding context or simply from trading, rational 




than a controlling shareholder. Any attempt at rendering a ‘fair’ value should reflect 
this.
A rather more consistent way of reasoning for not applying a discount in a 
“quasi-partnership” situation would be: if the nature of the unfairly prejudicial act is 
such that the minority shareholder, who used to have a managerial, i.e. “controlling”, 
role in the company, is now deprived of this managerial ability, then the proper 
restitution for such an act would involve the valuation of the minority without a 
discount, because originally the minority shareholder was, as a matter of fact, also a 
controlling shareholder.
IV.2) Does the Control Premium M atter ?
Fairness. The implicit viewpoint behind the ‘fairness’ argument pursued by 
the courts is that, as shareholders are owners of the company, shareholders should 
therefore own as much the company as their ‘share’ in the company. However, it is 
easy to see that ownership rights in the firm are very different from property rights as 
used elsewhere. Ireland (1999) calls shareholder ownership a “myth”. Penner (1997) 
notes this equation of ownership with income as a modem development in the idea of 
property, commenting further that the idea of property as a “thing” is rather distant 
when it comes to shares and a company. Any notion of fairness should take into 
account that shares of a company are not purchased at the same price.
I t’s Only Redistribution. One assessment of the control premium is that it is 
just a case of redistribution, that is, no value is lost, it is just that company profits go
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into the hands of the controlling majority disproportionately. If there is no firm 
monitoring system in place, outside equity providers will rationally discount the value 
of the shares for the probability that firm assets will be expropriated (Myers 1998). 
The empirical evidence of control price differentials confirms this. If no value is lost, 
merely redistributed, and all the affected parties have priced their stake accordingly, 
there should be no fundamental problem with control premiums.
Additionally, one must bear in mind that one result of a strong enforcement of 
pro ration is that companies will be forced to acquire other companies entire. As 
mentioned above, there are valid reasons of takeovers- a major one of which is the 
“make or buy” decision. In order to prevent disruption of business it sometimes makes 
sense for companies to control other companies along their value chain. (See 
Williamson (1985) and Hart (1995).) If these acquiring company is not allowed to 
control the acquired company for its own benefit, then the appropriate response would 
be for the acquiring company to acquire all the shares in the acquired company. This, 
however, would exclude shareholders who might be willing to invest in a subsidiary 
with a stable relationship with a parent company. The question is, then: is it proper for 
the courts to deny minority shareholders the right to participate in the subsidiary?
Or to take another viewpoint, granting minority shareholders the right to 
participate pro rata when a control block is transferred might produce suboptimal 
effects, as the participants in the sale would not be able to benefit fully from it. The 
effect of having to share the gain from such a transfer could have two results: (a) such 
transfers would not be undertaken even if it were socially optimal to do so or (b) in 
order to prevent minority shareholders from impacting such transactions, the
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entrepreneur would issue a suboptimal decreased amount of external equity 
(Bebchuck and Zingales 1996).
Legitimate Expectations. Shares are priced according to certain assumptions 
investors make about the actions of management. Shares have returns above the risk­
free rate partly because the actions of management are uncertain. Here we need to 
combine two economic paradigms of the firm: the firm as a ‘nexus of contracts’ and 
shareholders as residual risk takers. If we consider the obligations of the firms as 
contractual obligations (economists call this view the ‘nexus of contracts’ theory of 
the firm), then we have to ask what the implicit terms of these contracts are. The rights 
of shareholders are particularly incomplete: shareholders bear the residual risk in the 
firm and therefore should have residual control rights (Grossman and Hart 1986, Hart 
and Moore 1990, Hart 1995). However, once we recognize that minority shareholders 
do not have control rights, we should ask: what level of risk should they be susceptible 
to? In other words, what expectations can a minority shareholder reasonably have?
The English courts have conceptualized personal interests that shareholders 
have in firms additional to their general protection under company law as ‘legitimate 
expectations’17. However, recent judgments have shied away from this concept as it 
appears too susceptible to liberal misuse. Jonathan Parker J has observed that the 
application of ‘legitimate expectations’ in the context of a publicly listed company 
would ‘in all probability prove a recipe for chaos’ and specifically denies that 
minority shareholders could have expectations based on the Listing Rules, the City
17
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Code or the Cadbury Code18. In O ’Neill v. Phillips19, Lord Hoffman writes: “The 
concept of a legitimate expectation should not be allowed to lead a life of its own, 
capable of giving rise to equitable restraints in circumstances to which the traditional 
equitable principles have no application”. Joffe (2001) adds: “It follows that, in the 
future, the term ‘legitimate expectation’ should be avoided and that some care must be 
taken with regard to its use in the cases decide prior to O ’Neill v. Phillips”.
This rejection of the concept of ‘legitimate expectations’ is somewhat 
regrettable, but perhaps understandable as “the courts rarely use the language of 
implied terms in justifying a finding of legitimate expectations. They talk rather 
vaguely of expectations and understandings without articulating their theoretical 
basis” (Ryan 1992). As Ryan notes, the courts do not examine the particularly context 
of the case, but rather construct ‘legitimate expectations’ based on hypothetical 
reasonable minority shareholders. If shareholder expectations are to be protected, 
these should expectations formed on statements released by the company, for 
example, in its offering prospectus or annual report. It is shareholder expectations 
based on these public statements that should be considered legitimate and protected by 
the courts.
IV.3) The Problem with High Control Premiums
The problem of control premiums is not that they have disadvantaged minority 
shareholders (they should have discounted accordingly). However, this does not mean
18




that high control premiums do not negatively impact an economy. High control 
premiums can create at least four negative effects: (1) lower overall investment, (2) 
greater exodus of capital in a crisis situations, (3) it could divert effort away from 
increasing productivity, and (4) it could disturb the allocation of resources in an 
economy (by restricting the uses of funds).
Lower Overall Investment. When the benefits of a company are strongly 
concentrated with its block shareholders, the company is less able to seek external 
equity. That is, while the value of company is unaffected, the source of new capital 
funding the company must come either internally or from debt. This could reduce the 
amount of capital the company could otherwise have mobilized (Modigliani and 
Perotti 2000). Also, when there are fewer external shares trading in the stock market, 
this reduces liquidity in the stock market (Bolton and Von Thadden 1998). Perhaps 
more detrimentally, however, the predominance of companies where controlling 
shareholders derive most of the gains from a company could result in adverse 
selection against companies favorable to external shareholders, that is, investors might 
not be able to distinguish between companies with high benefits of control from 
companies where wealth is evenly distributed between shareholders, which would 
lead to the share price of the latter type of company being unfairly depressed by the 
market. This could, in turn, lead to lower investment in the whole country (Rueda- 
Sabater 2000).
Higher Risk in Crisis. If it is perceived that controlling shareholders can 
derive private benefits of control, then in crisis situations, there is the risk that the 
controlling shareholders might use that power to tunnel resources away from the
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company. External investors would then have strong reason to exit the company when 
it is in financial trouble (Johnson, Boone, Breach and Friedman 1999).
Productivity Diversion. There are two ways of characterizing this problem:
(a) allowing controlling shareholders to expropriate creates conflicting incentives. If 
we assume that controlling shareholders have the power to manage the company, then 
the discounting of share values by minority investors would, instead of spurring 
management to improve the company, provide even stronger incentives for controlling 
shareholders to expropriate (Bebchuck and Jolls 1999). (b) In a firm where 
expropriation is possible, the controlling shareholders will be dividing their efforts 
between maximizing firm value and devising methods of expropriation.
Restricted Resource Allocation. In two ways: (a) because established firms 
are likely to be more trustworthy (have better reputations) and are more able to 
provide collateral, established firms are able to obtain financing at significantly lower 
costs than entrepreneurs, which might lead to a restriction of competition (Stultz 
2001). (b) The general public are only given a limited ability to participate in equity- 
funded projects and thus are restricted to debt-funding. This limits the amount of risk- 
taking the general population might wish to undertake given the opportunity. This 
could have macro-implications, as there is evidence that liquid stock markets and 
banking development strongly contribute to economic growth (Levine and Zervos 
1998).
V) Solutions and Suggestions
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Self-Binding. Corporate governance is at its core a question of trust. It does 
not matter who has control as long as others have enough knowledge of what will be 
done with that control (and can price their participation accordingly). As we have 
discussed above, companies have an incentive to signal their trustworthiness to the 
market. What is required is a system that allows them to credibly do so.
Therefore, perhaps the most direct way to dealing with governance 
problems is to ask management or, as the case may be, majority shareholders, to bind 
themselves. This has wider implications. The approach that a company should always 
maximize (solely) its shareholder value misses one of the vital characteristics of a 
corporation: company management exists to act as an intermediary (financial, 
informational, etc.) (Blair and Stout 2001, Spulber 1999, Blair 1995)20. In fact, if we 
consider the value of the corporate form as precisely the separation it allows the 
corporate personality from its shareholders, then we must consider what implicit 
obligations the corporate form has to all its stakeholders (Zingales 2000). That is, 
from a transactions cost perspective, the primary reason why a firm exists as it does at 
all is because a bureaucratic structure is more efficient than a contractual one 
(Williamson 1985, Eisenberg 1999b). It is precisely the fuzziness of the firm’s 
obligations that is its structural strength. As such, management should have credible 
ways to control themselves to all parties involved. (Although why firms do not adopt 
stronger self-disclosure remains an unresolved question in financial economics.
A Return to Values ? Another factor in governance, which might be more 
important than previously imagined, is social norms (Coffee 2001a, Eisenberg 1999a).
20
For a systems theoric analysis these issues, see Teubner 1988.
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One reason (one could say the primary reason) why a company or its management 
would opt into a more stringent system is simply because it is the social norm to do so. 
As Cheffins (2001) puts it, one reason for the success for the London Stock Exchange 
in the early part of the 20th century is the “shared beliefs” of the market participants. 
Now with newspapers decrying the “crisis of trust” in the American capital markets 
(The Business, 9-11 June 2002), perhaps norms are returning to the forefront as the 
likeliest candidate for the past success of the US capital market.
Generally, we can now see that LLSV were perhaps a little precipitate in 
saying “The successful regulations of the US securities market, the Polish financial 
markets, and the Neuer Markt in Germany share a common element, namely the 
extensive and mandatory disclosure of financial information by issuers, the accuracy 
of which is enforced by tightly regulated financial intermediaries.” (LLSV 1999b) 
Only a few years later, the US stock market and the German Neuer Markt are no 
longer such good examples of corporate governance. Perhaps it is time we extend our 
analysis of the problem from its usual suspects (law, regulations, etc.) and focus 
instead on the fundamentals of what makes capitalism work: trust.
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Chapter 3: 
The Uses of Debt
Neither a borrower nor a lender be,
For loan oft loses both itself and friend,
And borrowing dulls the edge o f  husbandry.
Hamlet, Act 1, Scene 3, lines 75-77
Introduction
In the media, the mention of corporate governance is seldom more than a 
prelude into a blaming game. This even extends to whole countries: when an economy 
which is deemed to be dominated by its banks is not running well, it is due to the 
inefficiency of the banking system, conversely, when an economy fueled by equity 
stumbles, one blames the myopia of the stock market. The problem is many o f these 
statements do not come with adequate analyses into the tools these corporate 
governors have at their disposal and therefore cannot give a fair appraisal of whether 
these tools are being misused.
The use of debt has always been regarded with suspicion, reaching far back 
into history21. Two fears are associated with the use of debt: first is the traditional 
businessman’s advice to avoid debt, presumably because repayments will hinder 
growth and one runs the risk of losing the entire business and second, the association 
of debt with relationship lending. In an analysis of the Asian financial crisis, Rajan 
and Zingales (1999) write: “[Banking relationships] have a downside in that they do 
not rely on price signals. The consequence has been a widespread and misallocation of
. “[T]he condemnation o f usury stems from the earliest times. Aristotle remarks how strongly and 
justifiably it was disliked in his day, and comments that money was not intended for this, but for buying 
and selling; usury merely produced money out o f money and so of all ways to wealth was the most 
unnatural. Amongst the ancient Jews, usury was not only hateful and unnatural, it was a sin specifically 
condemned by God.” (Kerridge 2002: 15-16)
90
resources.” The perils of debt even apply at a macroeconomic level. Warburton 
forwards a thesis “that both citizens and governments have become heavily addicted 
to borrowing and no longer care about the consequences” (Warburton 2000: 19) and 
“over-emphasis, to the point of obsession, on the inflation objective has blinded 
governments and their central banks to the risk of widespread debt default by 
borrowers.” (Warburton 2000: 261)
This chapter will be divided into four sections. The first will be an overview of 
the literature on capital structure, as the theoretical framework presented will be the 
foundation of the arguments to follow. Secondly, I will explore how relational 
banking mitigates many of the factors that weigh against debt in the choice of capital 
structure. That is, relational banking reduces bankruptcy costs and informational 
asymmetry. The third section will be an argument defending the institution of secured 
credit which will lead into an analysis of the English floating charge and recent 
amendments to it.
I) Capital Structure.
Capital structure, or the balance between debt and equity financing in 
companies, has been one of the central issues in corporate finance from the very 
beginnings of the field. It is therefore no surprise that there should be interest in how 
capital structure varies from country to country.
Recent research into comparative financial systems has hypothesized that the 
common division of financial systems into bank-based and market-based systems
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could be caused by weaknesses in the legal framework of bank-based systems. As 
Modigliani and Perotti (2000) put it: “Securities are standardized arm’s length 
contractual relationships, and their associated investor rights depend largely on 
security laws; proper enforcement depends on the quality of the legal system. Thus an 
inadequate legal framework impairs the development of securities markets, allowing 
expropriation of small shareholders and bondholders. As a consequence, bank lending 
emerges as a more viable and reliable form of intermediation.” More specifically and 
perhaps more interestingly, La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 
(henceforth LLSV) find that countries with French and Scandinavian legal origins 
have low levels of both debt and external equity financing when compared to 
countries with English legal origins; countries of German legal origin have lower 
external equity levels but higher debt levels than English legal origin countries (LLSV 
1997).
Prasad, Green and Murinde (2001; henceforth PGM) make the important 
point, however, that it is not easy to generalize about comparative capital structure. 
PGM note that:
a) While, generally, countries can still be categorized as “high leverage” (Japan, 
Germany, France and Italy) or “low leverage” (Canada, the UK and US), there are 
many qualifications to such a categorization. Countries can change categories 
depending on how leverage is calculated and capital structures can change (sometimes 
radically) over time.
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b) Developing countries (which therefore, should have less developed financial 
systems and be bank reliant according to Modigliani and Perotti) show no absolute 
preference, as a group, for debt or equity.
It should also be noted that these differences in capital structures between 
countries do not seem to have a direct impact on economic growth. Despite the fact 
that countries of French legal origin are restricted to mainly private capital and 
countries of German legal origin to debt capital and countries of English legal origin 
having access to both debt and outside equity capital (LLSV 1997), their economic 
performance in the long run has not been that dissimilar.
In terms of prosperity creation (i.e. growth rate of GDP per capita) the US and 
Europe have been so similar over the last twenty years that if  you want make 
either a pro-European or pro-American case, you simply have to pick your 
start and end dates with care. And once you’ve picked your comparison years, 
what you end up with is one continent just a few tenths of a per cent ahead of 
the other. (Turner 2001) (Keeping in mind that, on the European continent, 
only the UK and the Republic of Ireland are of English legal origin.)
We could perhaps ask at this point: what are the essential differences between 
debt and equity? The fundamental differences are obvious; creditors are paid before 
shareholders in bankruptcy (priority), debt is paid in fixed amounts, ordinary shares 
are allowed voting rights, etc. But beyond all of this, it is possible to argue that both 
debt and equity are, at core, an infusion of credit for a return. Different variations in 
securities erode the differences between debt and equity; there are intervening levels 
of priority between secured debt and ordinary shareholders, convertible bonds capture 
both the security of debt and the upswings of equity and not all shares have voting 
rights. As Allen and Gale (1994: 351) put it: “The fact the debt and equity are not the 
only securities that firms use to finance their activities, and the constant introduction
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of new forms of securities, suggest that a more fundamental question than “What is 
the optimal debt equity ratio?” is “What are the optimal securities that should be 
issued?”.
(Intriguingly, however, corporations tend to use fairly straightforward debt and 
equity. Use of alternative financial devices is limited. (Copeland, Weston, Shastri 
2005: 617) Fama and Jensen (1983) propose that the separation of claims into only 
debt and equity makes sense because creditors (low risk bearers) can rely on 
shareholders (high risk bearers) to monitor the corporation, thus reducing monitoring 
costs and lowering the cost of risk bearing.)
Theories of Capital Structure
Arguments about D/E ratios tend to obscure one consideration: rationally, companies 
should choose to fund themselves using the lowest cost of capital. That is, they should 
use debt if  debt is cheaper and equity if  equity is cheaper. If we take an international 
comparative viewpoint, the question then becomes: is cost of capital cheaper in 
market-based systems than bank-based systems? This is a difficult question to answer. 
The general view appears to be that the cost of capital in Japan was lower than the US 
in the 1970s and 1980s but was been more or less equal in the 1990s. (Frankel 1993: 
60-1) Both the cost of debt and the cost of equity was cheaper in Japan (although the 
calculation of real interest rates was complicated by the requirement of borrowers to 
place “compensating balances” and the measurement of the cost of equity is always 
debatable.) (Argy and Stein 1997)
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However, measuring cost of capital directly is even more problematic than 
measuring capital structure. Ando, Hancock and Sawchuk (1997) present a 
painstaking and admittedly tentative study in which they conclude that “the cost of 
capital in Japan is somewhat lower than that is the United States, although not by a 
very large margin.” They also argue that “this lower cost of capital was probably 
generated by a very high and continually rising price of land”.22
We will now explore theories of the balance between debt and equity, starting 
with areas not normally covered by finance theory and then into standard models of 
capital structure.
LA) Macroeconomic Effects
There have been, oddly, very few studies of comparative macroeconomics and 
capital structure. Changes in inflation can affect debt and equity prices (in opposite 
directions) in two ways. (A change in interest rate has an inverse relationship to bond 
prices, that is, bonds go up as rates fall and go down and rates rise. Stock returns, 
however, show no clear correlation with interest rates. Lowering interest rates could 
be taken as a harbinger of future growth, causing stocks to rise, or an indication of
22
For those interested in the technical details o f Ando et al’s conclusions, this is their summary of  
their earlier work in field: “while, in the U .S ., the accounting measure and the market measure of 
capital appeared reasonably close to each other when they are averaged over a fairly long period of 
time, in Japan the market measure appeared to be noticeably higher than the accounting measure. The 
market measure o f the cost o f capital appeared similar for these two countries, and therefore the 
accounting measure o f the cost o f capital in the U.S. looked noticeable higher than that in Japan. [Ando 
et al] explored a number o f potential causes o f this pattern and suggested as a plausible hypothesis a 
role played by the extraordinarily high price o f land and continual real capital gains corporations in 
Japan enjoyed by their ownership of land. Since such capital gains are not included in the measurement 
o f earnings by firms, if  these gains are in fact recognized by market participants and taken into account 
in valuing corporate shares, it may explain the discrepancy between the accounting and market 
measures o f the cost o f capital, hence the difference between the cost o f capital in the U.S. and in Japan 
in terms o f its accounting measure.” (Ando, Hancock and Sawchuk 1997)
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economic sluggishness, causing stocks to fall. Interest rate changes should not affect 
stock prices in the long run. See, for example, Kettel (2001), chapters 5-7 or Van 
Home (2001) chapters 4, 6 and 7.)
a) Rational Inflation Discounting. “In contrast to bonds, equities are real assets. A real 
asset is one that is capable o f protecting the owner from inflation. Bonds cannot do 
this because the sums involved are fixed, whatever happens to the general level of 
prices. Companies, on the other hand, can raise prices to compensate for increases in 
their costs (subject to competitive and other influences, of course) and generally have 
a fighting chance of raising profits and dividends in line with the general level of 
prices. In fact, dividends have generally risen higher than inflation and it is this, as 
much as anything, that underpins the case for equity investment.” (Golding 2003: 50) 
It should follow, therefore, that investors in countries which are subject to high 
inflation should prefer equities. This point, however, has two caveats: i) equities can 
only be expected to beat inflation in the long term, short term effects can affect 
earnings and ii) there are inflation-adjusted bonds, they are just not as common as 
regular bonds.
b) Irrational Discounting or The Modigliani-Cohn Effect. If we assume that 
households and firms do their financial planning in nominal, rather than real, terms 
(that is, without taking inflation into consideration), then we can expect major 
miscalculations to occur. In particular, accounting profits would systematically 
understate economic profits. Therefore, shares would be undervalued. (Modigliani and 
Cohn 1979) The reverse could also be tme; if  inflation rates fall and this is not taken 
into due consideration by investors, share prices could be systematically overvalued.
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McCauley, Ruud and Iacono (1999) argue that this “reverse Modigliani-Cohn effect” 
could be one of the causes of the US stock market boom of the 90s.
I.B) Mispricing
Another factor in the pricing of securities is simply mispricing. Kaplan and 
Stein (1993) argue that the debt-heavy financial structures (particularly in leveraged 
buyouts) prevailing in 1980s US corporations were the result of a systematic 
overvaluation of high-yield bonds. Many recent financial collapses have also been 
blamed on mispricing of securities (one famous exposition is Robert Shiller’s 
Irrational Exuberance (2000). See, generally, Hunter, Kaufman and Pomerleano 
2003).
The majority of work in this field has been based on psychological deviations 
from rationality (summarized in De Bondt and Thaler 1995). While such work in 
behavioral finance is fascinating, more research must be done in regard to the specific 
institutional settings that affect decision-making (the social psychology counterpart to 
the psychology, as it were). A pressing question concerning financial markets is: why 
aren’t there rational market participants restoring rationality to the market simply by 
profiting off the irrational investors? De Bondt (2003) offers this argument:
A pure arbitrage opportunity does not exist unless it is certain that share prices 
will eventually revert to their fundamental underlying values. However, to 
affect prices, investors with superior forecasting ability or with inside 
information must assume increasing amounts of diversifiable risk. In practice, 
arbitrageurs face financial constraints (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Second, it 
many be rational for these traders to ride the trend rather than to go against it. 
Third, the resilience of a bubble may stem from the inability of rational 
arbitrageurs to coordinate their selling strategies. Fourth, a market may rational
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launch itself onto a speculative bubble with prices being driven by an arbitrary 
self-confirming element in expectations. (Tirole 1982)
An interesting addition to this field is what Cochrane (2003) calls “irrational 
trading, but not irrational valuation” (emphasis in original). This would include 
Cochrane’s own thesis of the tech-stock bubble as a result of a “convenience yield”. 
That is, when there is a large amount of trading due to wide differences of opinion in a 
given stock (or class of stock), then if the amount of shares is limited, the share price 
could be driven up. (Cochrane 2003) Cochrane also cites a model by Ofek and 
Richardson (2001) who explore a similar argument that short sale constraints prevent 
pessimists’ views from being expressed.
The problem with theories of mispricing, particularly theories that impute 
irrationality is that they explain too much. Any deviations from what would appear in 
hindsight to be rational or correct valuation can simply be explained as irrational. As 
Cochrane (2003) points out: “being wrong once is not the same as being irrational 
(emphasis in original). A theory of mispricing should be specific enough to detail the 
circumstances in which such a mispricing would occur and the manner and magnitude 
it should have. Current theories are simply not exact enough.
In summary, even though some argue (very likely, rightly) that securities in 
many periods are mispriced (e.g. McCauley, Ruud and Iacono (1999), who argue that 
capital structure in the USA can be explained in large part by an overvaluation of 
bonds in the 1980s and an overvaluation of stocks in the 1990s), it is very difficult to 
take mispricing into consideration for a theory of comparative capital structures. 
Mispricing is hard to rigorously identify and, vitally for a comparative theory, we do
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not have a theory of mispricing exact enough to allow us compare causal conditions 
for mispricing.
I.C) Standard Theories of Capital Structure23
The modem theory of capital structure begins with Modigliani and Miller 
(1958, 1963, henceforth MM). MM proposition I: “The market value of any firm is 
independent of its capital structure”. That is, under ideal market conditions (e.g. 
frictionless trading, borrowing at the risk-free rate, no taxes or bankruptcy costs, etc.), 
it should not matter what mix of debt and equity the firm is financed with. Miller 
analogized the matter to the slicing of a pie; no matter how a pie is sliced, it remains 
the same size. But first, we need a quick introduction to the concept of risk-retum.
The Risk-Retum Tradeoff. The risk-retum tradeoff is one of the fundamental building 
blocks of finance theory. The intuition is simple: investments which are riskier should 
provide a higher return. Projects which provide returns that are inadequate to the risk 
will be ignored, while projects with above-market returns should be bid up by the 
market (a concrete example would be: a) an entrepreneur who leams that she can 
lower returns to her investors and retain her projects attractiveness or b) a stock which 
is outperforming expectations will eventually rise to a level where it is no longer 
possible to profit from it). A reasonable efficient market will therefore converge on an
23
This is not meant to be a rigorous discussion o f the topic. Proofs and further elaborations on the 
assumptions o f these arguments can be found in most finance textbooks. See, e.g., Brealey and Myers 
(2000) or Copeland, Weston, and Shastri (2005)
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equilibrium level of risk-retum in projects. All projects should be on what can be 
thought of a Capital Market Line (CML). 24
MM prove their argument with an arbitrage argument. In a simplified form, the 
argument is simply this: imagine there are two firms with equivalent cashflows and 
risk, one of which is financed only by equity (firm A) and the other financed by a mix 
of debt and equity (firm B). If the value of firm A is deemed to be lower than the 
value of firm B (or vice versa for that matter), then it would be possible to get a higher 
return on firm A (because the price of firm A is lower than firm B, even though the 
value- that is, the cashflows, at equivalent risk- are the same). The market should 
eliminate this difference by arbitrage.
Risk-retum is also at the core of MM proposition II: even though the value of 
the firms stays the same, the addition of debt to the capital structure of a company will 
cause the rate of return on equity to rise. This is because of priority. As debt holders 
get paid before equity holders, if cashflow falls below the level of debt payments, 
equity holders will not get paid at all. Shareholders are more at risk from falling 
earnings than debt holders. Priority acts as a kind of risk-shifter. Therefore, to 
compensate shareholders for the extra risk, share returns in a debt-financed company 
should rise.
24
Current finance theory takes this idea one step further and speaks o f a Security Market Line (SML). 
This takes into consideration that fact that risk can be lowered by diversification, and, therefore, the risk 
of a security has to be measured against general market risk. This measure o f risk is called beta and can 
be defined as the covariance between the return on the security and the market portfolio divided by the 
variance o f the market portfolio.
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Once the idealized conditions of MM are relaxed, however, many factors come 
into play in determining capital structure. The following is a quick review:
Corporate Taxes. Interest payments are deducted from a company’s profits before 
taxes. Which means that payments to bondholders are not subject to tax (at a corporate 
level), whereas payments to shareholders (whether as dividends or capital gains) are 
pre-taxed. Debt, therefore, acts as a kind of “tax shield”. As a result of this, debt 
should be cheaper than equity as a result of debt having a dual function as a tax shield. 
(MM 1958,1963)
Personal Taxes. However, in many jurisdictions, personal income taxes are lower for 
capital gains than for interest income. Additionally, capital gains taxes can be deferred 
(that is, one can opt not to sell the shares). This means that for the final beneficiary, 
the effects of corporate and personal taxes can cancel each other out; debt is not taxed 
at corporate level, but is more harshly taxed at personal level. (Miller 1977) The 
advantage for debt is therefore uncertain, depending on the exact amount of taxes at 
each level. (Brealey and Myers 2000 note that the current US tax regime gives the 
edge slightly to debt.)
Other factors also mitigate the value of debt as a tax shield. First of all, the 
firm needs to be profitable in the first place in order to require a tax shield at all. Also, 
there are many other methods to reduce taxes, e.g. depreciation, pension fund 
contributions, etc. Interest tax shields are therefore more valuable to certain firms than 
others.
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Bankruptcy Costs. The higher the amount of tax a firm carries, the more susceptible it 
is to bankruptcy. If cash flows of the firm fluctuate to a level where it cannot make its 
interest payments, the firm becomes bankrupt. But we have to be careful about what 
we regard as the cost of bankruptcy. We must distinguish between financial distress 
and operational distress (in practice, the two are difficult to separate). Just because a 
firm is financially bankrupt does not necessarily mean that there is anything wrong 
with its fundamental business. If all that happens in a bankruptcy is that control of the 
company passes from the hands of the shareholders to the bondholders, the value of 
the company is unaffected. Even in the case of liquidation, “liquidation (dismantling 
the unprofitable firm) is a capital budgeting decision that should be considered 
independent from the event of bankruptcy (transfer of ownership to creditors).” 
(Haugen and Senbet 1978) If the process of bankruptcy itself causes a reduction in the 
value of the firm, participants in the bankruptcy process (i.e. creditors and 
shareholders) have an interest in preventing the bankruptcy from happening, that is, 
they should “avoid the costs associated with formal reorganization, should they be 
greater than the costs of informal reorganization.” (Haugen and Senbet 1978) In a 
rational market, therefore, bankruptcy costs are significant only when debt 
restructuring is costlier than formal bankruptcy.
Bankruptcy costs can be direct or indirect:
Direct Bankruptcy Costs. These are the obvious costs of bankruptcy: lawyer’s 
and accountant’s fees, other fees, administrative costs, etc . Warner (1977) measures 
these direct costs and comes to the conclusion they are trivial (5.3% at the time of 
bankruptcy). Later studies have shown some variation in the magnitude of these costs,
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e.g. Gibbs and Boardman (1995) found that bankruptcy costs amounted to 3.5% in the 
case of the Eastern Airlines bankruptcy case and Bradbury and Lloyd (1994) found 
that bankruptcy averaged 14.3% for New Zealand small businesses. The conclusion 
would seem to be that direct costs of bankruptcy are too low to substantially impact 
capital structure, except perhaps in small firms (assuming bankruptcy costs are similar 
in small or big firms, these costs would weigh more on small firms).
Indirect Bankruptcy Costs. However, if  we measure the decline of a firm’s 
profits and share prices during a bankruptcy, we see dramatic differences. Altman 
(1984) notes the presence of what might be termed business disruption costs: a) lost 
investment opportunities, these include investments that may not be possible in 
bankruptcy due to the higher cost o f credit as well as investments passed up by 
shareholders because gains from the investment will accrue directly to creditors 
(Myers 1977), b) losses from “bankruptcy stigma”, that is, loss of profits or sales due 
to the fact that a firm in, nearing, or even newly out of bankruptcy is perceived (quite 
rationally) to be less reliable. “Indirect bankruptcy costs are not limited to firms which 
actually do fail. Firms which have their high probabilities of bankruptcy, whether they 
eventually fail or not, still can incur these costs.” (Altman 1984)
Altman (1984) proxies indirect bankruptcy costs by estimating expected 
profits for the period up to three years prior to the bankruptcy (using two measures: a 
regression procedure and analyst forecasts) and comparing these expected profits with 
actual profits (or losses). He found bankruptcy costs exceeded 20% in some of the 
firms measured and ranged from 11-17% overall. Opler and Titman (1994) test for 
indirect bankruptcy costs by comparing the decline of high-leverage firms with low-
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leverage firms during a downturn. They found that sales and market value of high- 
leverage firms both decline an average of 26% more than low-leverage firms.
It is possible to see taxes and bankruptcy costs as the two balancing forces in a 
firm’s capital structure. (Leland 1994, Leland and Toft 1996) Sometimes 
taxes/bankruptcy costs and competing agency costs (explored in the next section) are 
held as competing equilibrium theories of capital structure. There is no reason why 
both (or rather all three) factors should not be at work at the same time. In fact, one 
reason why a definitive theory of capital structure is proving so elusive might be 
because there are too many factors to be captured in an empirical test.
Agency Costs. Whenever a firm acquires external financing, there is always the issue 
of how much the investors can trust the managers (or in the case of debt, also how 
much the creditors can trust the shareholders). These costs can take the form of 
investors monitoring the managers or actions that the managers need to take in order 
to assure investors that their investment will not be abused. The risk that investors 
face from improper actions from managers will be reflected in a higher return, that is, 
a higher cost of capital. Both debt and (external) equity incur agency costs. These 
have been explored in some detail in an earlier paper and so will be dealt with only 
cursorily here25.
Agency Costs of External Equity, or conflicts between shareholders and 
managers.
This discussion will follow the useful outline given by Culp (2001).
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a) Perquisite consumption by managers. When there is a separation of 
ownership from control (that is, when the entire firm is not held and run by the same 
party), managers have an incentive to divert some of the resources o f the firm for their 
own benefit. This is because profits of the firm do not accrue directly to the managers. 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976) This agency cost can be alleviated in some part by 
incentive devices such as share options (keeping in mind of course that the 
concordance of interests is never complete). (Bebchuck 2002)
b) Free cash flows and overinvestment. The problem of perquisite 
consumption becomes exacerbated in companies that have high levels of cashflows 
and few (positive NPV) investment opportunities. Managers could use these 
cashflows in unproductive ways, simply to increase the size of the firm and 
aggrandize themselves. (Jensen 1986, Stulz 1990)
Agency Costs of Debt. One way of controlling the above agency costs of 
external equity is by issuing debt. Debt reduces the amount of cash managers have at 
their disposal and adds an extra monitor of managerial behavior. However, debt also 
has agency costs.
a) Asset substitution. When the debt burden of a firm is high, shareholders 
have an incentive to take high-risk projects rather than low-risk projects, even if  the 
NPV of the high-risk project is lower26. Shareholders only stand to gain if  the payoff
Roughly, if  the payoff for a high-risk project is high but unlikely and the payoff for a low-risk 
project is low but relatively certain, to the extent that, once probability is taken into account, the low- 
risk project is more valuable than the high-risk project, then the low-risk project has higher NPV (net 
present value).
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of a project exceeds the debt burden of the firm because creditors have priority over 
the cashflows of the firm. (Fama and Miller 1972, Fama 1976, Easterbrook 1984)
The timing of investment decision is important. If creditors are aware of the 
shareholders intent to take the higher-risk, lower NPV project, they would buy out the 
shareholders in order to benefit from the higher NPV project. In practice, covenants 
and reputation discourage managers from blatant asset substitution. Corporate law in 
many countries also protect against this by stipulating that managers should act in the 
interest of creditors rather than shareholders when a firm is near insolvency. (Under 
English law, the position is uncertain as to when the responsibility of directors to 
creditors begins. See Finch (2002), pp. 504-520.)
b) Underinvestment or debt overhang. This is related to the problem of asset 
substitution and is the situation when the firm is debt-laden and has a positive NPV 
project with a payoff that only covers debt payment (no return to shareholders). The 
shareholders will then have no incentive to pursue the project. (Myer 1977)
Information Asymmetry or Pecking Order Theory. Pecking order theory posits that 
firms prefer their choice of financing in this order: retained earnings (internal equity), 
debt and then external equity. The less investors know about the prospects of the firm, 
assuming they are rationally risk-averse, the more skeptical they should be. The firm 
obviously has the best knowledge of its own prospects so retained earnings are the 
cheapest form of financing. Debt financing, because it a) is based on fixed payments 
(rather than residual claims), b) has priority and c) is sometimes secured, requires less 
detailed information (is less risky) than external equity. External equity is heavily
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reliant on information, but, even with disclosures under securities law, is at a 
disadvantage to the other forms of financing and is therefore riskiest and should be the
onmost expensive. (Myers 1984, Myers and Majluf 1984)
Conclusion. There have been a substantial number of studies attempting to verify 
different aspects of capital structure theory. These, taken as a whole, have been 
markedly inconclusive. The general gist of the theories appear to be correct (debt is 
cheaper than equity), but the specifics of each theory have not been clearly borne out. 
(PGM 2001 and Copeland, Weston and Shastri 2005: 604-611 provide able summaries 
of the empirical research.)
The theoretical side of the field is still developing, e.g. Leland (1998) has a 
combined model of taxes, bankruptcy and agency costs as well as a preliminary of the 
possible effects of risk management (hedging), Ju, Parrino, Poteshman, and Weisbach 
(2002) demonstrate that in a dynamic model, where firms can change their capital 
structures, transaction costs may play a significant factor in capital structure and the 
work of Welch (2002, 2003) indicates that stock returns may be the fundamental 
determinant of capital structure changes.
II) Relational Banking
Relational banking, that is, lending by banks with close ties (long term 
relationships or shareholding) to their borrowers, is looked upon with some suspicion.
27
A similar theory is signaling. One signaling story is: managers of firms can choose to send signals to 
the marketplace by issuing debt or paying dividends. These signals cannot be replicated by failing firms 
because they do not have the cashflow. (Ross 1977) Another story is that firms can be evaluated by 
how much owners invest in their own firms. If we assume that owners have the best view o f the 
prospects o f their firm, then the fact they choose (or not) to invest in their own firms is an indication of  
the quality o f the firm. (Leland and Pyle 1977)
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These practices are regarded as corrupt or “crony capitalism”. And no doubt, in many 
circumstances, related lending should be avoided. However, relational lending does
9khave its advantages .
In countries where equity control is weak and there is a risk of misuse of free 
cash flow (such as in transitional economies), then it may be the case that debt is the 
superior constraining device on management. (Baer and Gray 1995) Historically, even 
in the two countries where relational lending is least pronounced, the US and UK, 
relationship lending was widespread. (Lamoreaux 1996: 6-8) Lamoreaux points out 
that, in conditions of credit and informational scarcity, often the only method to 
mobilise credit is through reputation. Banks in the 1800s functioned rather like 
“investment clubs”. But just because most funds were made available by reputation 
did not mean that a) investors in the banks were at risk (Lamoureaux writes: “Because 
the practice of insider lending was common knowledge, purchasers of bank stock 
knew that they were for all practical purposes investing in the enterprises of the 
institution’s directors.” (Lamoreaux 1996: 52) or that b) outsiders were denied capital 
(outsiders simply faced more stringent requirements. Lamoreaux 1996: 52-70). In fact, 
the reason why the practice of insider lending eventually disappeared was because of 
an increase of credit in system, to the point where there were not enough insiders to 
use the capital. This then led to the emergence of banking professionals with objective 
criteria for credit extension, which then gradually became the standard upon which all 
loans had to meet. (Lamoreaux 1996: 89-118)
It is interesting to note that the prototypical relational lending system, the Japanese main bank 
system, occurred more or less as a result o f historical forces rather than as a “natural development”.
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There are studies that show that there are advantages to relational lending in 
the US even today (Petersen and Rajan 1994, Gande, Puri, Saunders and Walter 
1997), particularly in small and medium sized firms before they enter the capital 
markets. Relational lending can be used to overcome many aspects of informational 
and agency costs:
Asset Substitution. Because, as discussed above, the presence of debt in a firm’s 
capital structure gives the firm’s shareholders an incentive to select lower value 
(NPV) projects to the detriment of debt holders, some firms (without sufficient 
“reputational assets”) may not be able to issue debt in the capital markets. These 
firms, however, should still be able to obtain a loan from a bank provided the bank can 
monitor the firm enough to avoid asset substitution risk. (Diamond 1991, see generally 
Freixas and Rochet 1997: 32-40)
Certainty of Credit. A firm may have to make an unobservable investment in order to 
prepare itself for a project. If, however, the firm is uncertain about obtaining the funds 
to finance the project, it may choose not to pursue the investment. A stable 
relationship with a bank will guarantee a source of financing that allows the firm to 
make the efficient investment. (Boot, Thakor and Udell 1991)
Liquidity Constraints. An associated point with the previous one is: firms with 
relationships with banks appear to be less liquidity constrained than independent 
firms. (Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1993) provide evidence from Japan, Elston 
(1995) provides evidence from Germany)
(Hoshi 1995) This certainly lends credence to the theory of Bebchuk and Roe that corporate governance
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Tacit Knowledge. Even without transaction costs and all possible attempts to reduce 
information asymmetry, there are still advantages to relational lending. Aoki (2001) 
notes that tacit knowledge (“less standardized, unquantifiable knowledge”) is of 
foremost importance in developing economies in general and in new firms or firms in 
new industries even in developed economies. The relationship between bank and 
lending gives the bank borrower-specific information that allows the bank to properly 
assess the project. (Bhattacharya and Chiesa 1995)
Reduction in Bankruptcy Costs. Firms which a strong relationship with a bank may be 
able to avoid bankruptcy in the event of financial (rather than operational) distress. 
The bank will essentially privatise the bankruptcy process, thus eliminating indirect 
bankruptcy costs altogether. (Sheard (1994) studied Japan and Ferri, Kang and Kim 
(2001) studied Korean companies during the crisis)
This system is mutually beneficial, as the “a portion of the anticipated cost 
savings is passed on to the main bank itself, well before failure occurs. This is why, in 
spite of the anticipated special burdens that fall on the largest debtholder should a firm 
fail, each lender to a large, important Japanese firm covets the position of main bank.” 
(Flath 2000: 283-284)
Interestingly, this protection from bankruptcy does not occur in the German 
system. Whereas, in the Japanese system, the main bank will assign its own 
employees to the bankrupt firm and restructure the debt itself. (Sheard 1994), German
is path dependent. (Bebchuk and Roe 1999)
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banks have not shown a willingness to intervene in an industrial crisis (Canals 1997). 
Across the board, however, “bank-related firms are 75% less likely to file for 
bankruptcy than firms without ownership times to a bank.” (Claessens, Djankov and 
Klapper 1999)
Problems
Despite all the above advantages, however, relational banking has several 
inherent faults:
Soft Budget Constraints. Because a banking relationship is exclusive, banks may 
abuse this power by allowing firms too much credit. As these banks know they have 
priority rights over the firm in a quasi-bankruptcy (one that never goes to court, that 
is, a bailout), they do not have an incentive to monitor the firm beyond the point 
where the assets of the firms impact its bankruptcy value. (Dewatripont and Mashkin 
1995)
Misvaluation of Projects. Financial intermediation implies that the financial 
intermediary has some advantage over the market in the valuation of firms. However, 
the financial intermediary itself (in this case, the bank) has no market signals to rely 
on. The only market signals it has are at one remove: a reaction from its depositors or 
shareholders, neither of which is usually in an informational situation to assess its 
prospects adequately. This means that banks can be very wrong in valuing firms. 
(Rajan and Zingales 1999)
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Monopoly Rents. The bank can use its power over the firm to extract rents over it.
This could have a restrictive effect over the size o f firms. (Aoki 2001) There is also 
legitimate concern over banking concentration. If there are too few banks in an 
economy, then there could be a lower amount of credit available to firms. However, 
empirical research seems to indicate that, while banking concentration does lower the 
amount of credit, a concentrated banking sector does a better job of funding capital 
intensive industries. (Cetorelli and Gambera 1999)
Conclusions
The core problem behind relational lending is this: who controls the banks? It 
is precisely the role of bank as an intermediary that is its strength and its problem. The 
bank is assumed to have better knowledge of the company than the market, but it is 
precisely because the market cannot properly assess the performance of the bank that 
causes the mistrust of relational lending.
Relational banking is then an issue of a shift in control. Control (and risk) is 
partially taken away from the shareholders of the firm and put in the hands of banks. 
But can they be trusted? Who is monitoring the monitors? To put the problem another 
way: a) do depositors have the ability to evaluate the bank? and b) are regulators 
motivated or informed enough to control wayward banks?
Ill) How Strongly Should Secured Credit be Protected?
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There is an ongoing argument in the Law and Economics literature about the 
efficiency and desirability of secured credit, which has been responsible, at least in 
part, for the Cork Committee report’s29 recommendation than 10% of the net 
realisations of assets subject to charges be made available for distribution among 
unsecured creditors and has led, in turn, to the institution of such a re-distribution in 
regard to floating charges in the Enterprise Act 2000 (EA). This section will argue that 
many arguments against secured credit are based on misunderstandings (some of 
which are misunderstandings of other arguments against secured credit) and will 
attempt to establish parts of the arguments, both for and against secured credit, on a 
firmer base. For the most part, these arguments can be considered a generalization and 
extension of the arguments put forth by Mokal (2002).30
This section will develop four arguments: 1) that many attacks on secure credit 
stem from a mischaracterization of the nature of secured credit, in particular, a) most 
attacks underplay or ignore entirely the property aspect of secured credit, focusing on 
the priority aspect and b) part of the justification of secured credit arises from 
inefficiencies in the usual de facto alternative to secured credit,pari passu; 2) an 
analysis of the “uneasy case” for secured credit, that is, that accusation that secured 
credit diverts value from unsecured creditors must answer the question: which party 
is the most efficient bearer of the relevant risk?; 3) on the other hand, the argument 
that secured credit is not only not detrimental to unsecured creditors, but is usually
29
Insolvency Law and Practice, Report o f  the Review Committee (Cmnd 8558, 1982)
30
In part because Mokal (2002) focuses more on relating empirical evidence to these arguments while
the arguments in this paper focus on presenting the theoretical argument in a rigorous form.
31
The term “uneasy case” comes from the strongest and most general statement o f this line of 
argument, the seminal article Bebchuk and Fried (1996).
113
beneficial to them (Schwarcz’s “easy case”32) is overstated: there is always a tradeoff 
between secured and unsecured credit; 4) the two proposed new alternatives to 
secured credit, adjusting priority and partial priority, produce different results and 
should not be considered too similar.
This section will extend current arguments in several ways. Starting from the 
observation that practice in capital structure has tended towards more diverse kinds of 
security and priority structures, such as sophisticated securitizations (e.g. CDOs) and 
debt-equity hybrids, the first series of arguments will be a defense of secured credit.
An argument will be presented that demonstrates that Schwartz’s (1989) argument 
that priority provides protection for prior creditors can be extended the other way, that 
is, priority may sometimes be required for previous investors to make an efficient 
investment. One corollary of this is that Schwartz’s proposal that prior creditors be 
given automatic priority is flawed. More generally, it will be argued that the market 
for securities in general follows the rules of all markets: supply and demand. The 
customization of securities can create value because of the different preferences and 
capabilities of investors. The second half of this section will be a refutation of attacks 
against secured credit. In general, most arguments against secured credit focus on the 
possibility that the debtor firm will abuse other creditors. However, any misconduct of 
the debtor firm will adversely affect its shareholders. This section will accordingly 
argue that only in rare cases, specifically in some tort cases, should secured creditors 




One way of generalizing the question of secured credit is to look at it as the 
problem of how incentives are skewed under limited liability. The nature of limited 
liability is such that risks that should fall to the company owners are externalized. 
Limited liability essentially creates a structure in which risks are limited, but returns 
are unlimited. This creates an incentive for owners of the firm to take on more risk 
than they would otherwise. However, this system of shifting risk from the 
entrepreneur onto the society at large has proven to be an essential tool for capitalist 
investment. In a similar way, security in credit is a method of parceling risk down the 
credit chain. The question then is: what is the value of this risk parceling? A tentative 
answer, to be examined further in this chapter, is that this parceling of risk allows each 
participant to better isolate, understand and hedge against that risk. The cost of 
allowing this risk parceling is that some element of risk falls upon the true non­
adjusting creditor, the tort victim. To compensate for this, perhaps some kind of 
institution is needed, such as tort insurance.
III.A) The Efficiency of Secured Credit
Some commentators start with the argument that there is no efficiency case for 
secured credit in the first place. They base their arguments on the MM hypothesis 
discussed earlier. In a perfect market, choices in capital structure are neutral; there is 
no net gain from different choices of capital structure. However, perfect capital 
markets do not exist. This section will demonstrate that there are at least some cases 
where the use of secured credit is efficient.
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The case for the efficiency of secured credit usually starts at the issue of 
reduced interest. Secured loans are generally cheaper (that is, given at a lower interest 
rate) than unsecured loans. However, the reason why these secured loans are cheaper 
is usually explained simply by saying that they are “lower risk” (Bebchuk and Fried 
1996: 857, Schwartz 1984: 1054). This can lead to a fundamental misunderstanding of 
the nature of secured credit:
Secured creditors will charge lower interest rates because security reduces 
their risks, but unsecured creditors will raise their interest rates in response 
because security reduces the assets on which they levy, and so increases their 
risks. The interest rate reductions are precisely matched by interest rate 
increase; hence, the firm makes no net gain from granting security. (Schwartz 
1984: 1054. Emphasis added.)
A deeper analysis of these issues is required. Secured credit has two prominent 
features: property and priority (Adler 1997). Both of these features contribute to why 
secured credit is used, but in subtly different ways.
The Property Aspect of Security. Taking security over a property constitutes 
taking a proprietary interest in that property. The property is then encumbered and 
cannot be disposed without the consent of the secured creditor (except in the case of 
the floating charge, which is unique in many respects). Upon bankruptcy, any 
proceeds from the property must first be used to satisfy the debt to the secured creditor 
(either through direct possession or a court-led bankruptcy process). (See, for 
example, US UCC articles 9-201 or, under English law, Swiss Bank Corporations Ltd. 
v. Lloyds Bank Ltd.33)
33
[1982] A.C. 584. Also see, generally, Goode (2003: 12-30)
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While it is clear that priority is necessary for the property aspect of security, 
the property aspect is a major factor in its effectiveness. This is because the 
proprietary right secured creditors possess translates into a lower likelihood of loss in 
the case of bankruptcy. There are at least two reasons for this: a) Creditors may have a 
informational or transactional advantages on the property over the company as whole. 
If creditors are able to assess the value of the property more readily than they assess 
the value of the company, they will be able to lend at a lower interest rate on the basis 
on the property rather than the company. Creditors may derive this ability for several 
reasons: i) they could have special knowledge about that type of property (perhaps 
from long experience in the field), ii) they could have a mechanism that allows them 
to monitor the firm more effectively than other creditors (perhaps from being a major 
player in the that field)34, or iii) they could be hedged against the risk that property 
presents, b) Creditors with a proprietary interest are in some jurisdictions allowed to 
foreclose on the asset without court intervention (a “repossessory right”). This allows 
them to opt out of the bankruptcy process, which is usually costly (see above on 
bankruptcy costs). It also allows creditors the threat of repossession, which should 
allow them the ability to influence debtor behavior even before insolvency (Scott 
1986: 950). In other words, security can lower information asymmetry, lower agency 
costs and act as a basis for risk-diversification.
To clarify the point and distinguish it from the argument of Levmore (1982), 
one can express it thus: security creates value because is separates different areas of 
risk, thereby allowing specialization. To see this, one can examine the popular market 
structures:
34
For the two above points, see Jackson and Kronman (1979), Scott (1986), Schwartcz (1989) and
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1) Mezzanine debt. Mezzanine debt is subordinated debt that ranks lower than 
senior debt but is higher than equity. It is generally unsecured. Mezzanine 
debt has been growing popularity. It is a) non-dilutive to equity and b) 
offers high returns, thus appealing to non-bank institutions, such as 
insurance companies and hedge funds. The market for mezzanine debt 
demonstrates that demand-side diversity can create value- once we step 
outside an MM world, the separation of capital into low-risk debt (asset- 
backed, which can be bank-financed), high-risk debt (unsecured, which 
appeals to investment funds) and equity (which owners may not want 
diluted) can itself create value.
2) Loan securitization. Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs),
Collateralized Mortgage Obligations (CMOs) and Collateralized Loan 
Obligations (CLOs) are three of the fatest growing markets in securities 
(Fabozzi 2004). These structures work on the principle that the assets 
securing the loans are similar to be priced statistically (but are diverse 
enough to represent the risk of that asset market). This is particularly clear 
in the case of CMOs: instead of creating a basket o f personal loans, which 
would be very risky to price (as in case of credit card loans), the separation 
of person’s mortgage makes it possible to create a security class which can 




Once it is recognized that risk-separation can confer value due to the normal 
forces of supply and demand, one can see that it is not generally true that the amount 
of interest saved from lower interest rates from secured credit will simply be offset by 
higher interest rates from unsecured credit. The net amount of interest a debtor will 
pay if  financed with a mix of secured and unsecured debt will depend on the 
proportion of debt taken under each rate of interest. Once the MM assumptions are 
relaxed and secured debt can be considered to add value to capital structure (that is, it 
is cheaper than unsecured debt), it is easy to construct a case where the combined 
interest in a mixed secured/unsecured debt financing is cheaper than a pure unsecured 
financing. That is, while unsecured creditors will indeed raise their rates in the 
presence of a secured creditor, the net amount of interest burden the firm will bear 
may decrease. A numerical example will illustrate this (see Appendix A).
Bebchuk and Fried (1996: 916-917, echoed by Finch 1999: 653) deny the 
efficiency benefits of the proprietary right advantage by characterizing the benefit as 
“monitoring-coordination”. They focus on the fact that, in actuality, the gains from 
allocating specific asset risk to the creditor most able to handle those risks do not 
occur because most borrowers only have one “sophisticated” creditor capable of 
monitoring the firm. However, the efficiency argument for proprietary rights does not 
even require more than one creditor. As in the example in Appendix A, borrowing 
costs even from a single creditor can be decreased by allowing a security interest, as 
long as the borrowing cost (risk) for the asset is lower than that of the company as a 
whole.
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The Bebchuk and Fried (1996) argument also ignores an alternative response 
to information asymmetry: credit rationing. Credit rationing occurs because creditors 
cannot simply raise rates to compensate for higher risks. If creditors, responding to the 
uncertainty deciding between good and bad borrowers, raise interest rates in response, 
this can have the effect of chasing good borrowers from the market (the interest 
demanded becomes too high for the project). (This is called “adverse selection”.) It 
then becomes more efficient to invest in acquiring information rather than
- i f
compensating for risk through raised interest rates.
It is important to note here that any informational, hedging or agency benefits 
should accrue to either the secured creditor or the debtor. From an economic 
perspective, this is obvious; any agreement between two parties that benefits a third 
party is a classic “free-rider problem” and the parties will endeavor to the best of their 
abilities to internalize those benefits36. The social efficiency benefit of proprietary 
rights do not arise primarily from the fact that the monitoring of the property 
decreases agency costs (any gain from agency cost reduction should be internalized 
into the transaction) but rather from the allocation of the monitoring cost to the most 
efficient monitor .
This is the classic argument o f Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). It is mentioned by Mokal (2002).
36
See, on this point, Levmore (1982).
37
This is different from the point raised in Finch (1999: 653) of situations where unsecured creditors 
may be better monitors (cf. Triantis and Daniels 1995). In the case o f the debtor company as a whole, it 
is certainly possible (in fact, it is probably true) that the secured creditor is not the ideal monitor, 
however, the whole point o f the above argument is that secured credit allows the efficient allocation of 
monitoring duties. The secured creditor is given the part it is best suited to monitor.
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The Priority Aspect of Security. Even without asset-specific benefits, security 
can still be efficiency enhancing. This is due less to any inherent benefit to priority 
and more to the inefficient effects of the default alternative to security, the pari passu 
regime . In pari passu, creditors are considered equal in insolvency and will be paid 
pro rata, according to the amount of their claim. This can lead to inefficiency because 
creditors are not rewarded for the specific increase in the value of the firm that came 
from their contribution, but must share in the effect of the total financing of the firm. 
That is, creditor returns are diluted by other creditor claims. The interesting thing 
about this argument is that it can apply to both the case of a preceding creditor and a 
subsequent creditor. (This is an extension of Schwartz (1989), where the argument is 
only applied to preceding creditors. However, based on only one side of this 
argument, Schwartz argues for a rule giving initial creditors who hold substantial debt 
priority. However, as the second example demonstrates, this can lead to 
underinvestment, as there can be cases where subsequent creditors will suffer from a 
dilution of returns. Any scheme that would require later creditors to have to request 
permission from initial lenders would have to face the problem that the initial lender 
would have to be compensated for that permission. This, however, does not interfere 
with Schwartz’s proposal that negative pledges be fully-effective. This author agrees 
with that view.)
*>Q
Consider the following examples :
It has been argued that pari passu  cannot be taken as the fundamental rule o f insolvency because 
there are so many exceptions to it (Mokal 2001). See Finch (1999: 421-449) for a discussion of 
exceptions to pari passu. These arguments, however, do not affect the examples or the argument behind 
them: the value o f an unsecured creditor will be diluted by another unsecured creditor.
39
These examples are an adaptation o f those used in Roe (2000: 229-233).
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Case 1- The firm is financed by a loan of $200, which will be invested in a project 
with 50% chance of returning $340 and a 50% chance of returning $100. This project 
has a return of $220, so it is an efficient project. With the first financing in place, the 
firm now has a project that requires an additional $100 of financing for a project that 
give the firm a 50% chance of returning $100 and a 50% chance of returning $560. 
This project will increase the value of the firm to $330 (from $220, for a $100 
investment), so it is also an efficient project. However, the return to each individual 
financier is as follows.
First project:
Creditor 1 Shareholders Company Value
Failure 50 (50%* 100) 0
Success 150 (50%*300) 20 (50%*40)
Total Value 200 20 220
Second Project:
Creditor 1 Creditor 2 Shareholders Company Value
Failure 25 (50%* 100/2) 25 (50%* 100/2) 0
Success 150 (50%*300) 100 (50%*200) 30 (50%*60)
Total Value 175 125 30 330
We can see in the second project how the pari passu system amounts to a reduction of 
creditor 1 claims, such that its investment no longer becomes viable. One way to 
prevent this problem is for creditor 1 to take security so that subsequent creditors 
cannot dilute its return. Would it be efficient then for the firm to give priority 
according to the order of investment40? The answer is no, because this could lead to 
underinvestment, as in the next example.
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Case 2- The exact reverse position is also possible. In this situation, the firm has a first 
financing of $100, which has a 50% payoff of 0 and a 50% payoff of $220. Later on, 
the firm then has a project which require a financing of $200 and will raise firm value 
to a 50% chance of $100 and a 50% chance of $560. This is efficient, because it will 
raise firm value by $210 (for a $200 investment).
First project:
Creditor 1 Shareholders Company Value
Failure 0 0
Success 100 (50%*200) (50%*40)
Total Value 100 20 120
Second Project:
Creditor 1 Creditor 2 Shareholders Company Value
Failure 25 (50%* 100/2) 25 (50%* 100/2) 0
Success 100 (50%*200) 150 (50%*300) 30 (50%* 60)
Total Value 125 175 30 330
In this case, creditor 2’s return will be too low for it to invest. The firm will then lack 
the means to finance an efficient value-increasing project. Once again, one way for the 
firm to provide the proper incentives to the second creditor would be for it to give 
security.
If creditor 2 were granted security, the payoffs for the second project would 
look as follows.
Second Project (with secured second creditor):
Creditor 1 Creditor 2 Shareholders Company
Value
40
See also Finch (2002: 487-8), who points out that having debt ranked chronologically could be 
inefficient because creditors will seek more “estate-avoiding measures” which will both be expensive in 
their own right and raise the cost o f debtor assessment for subsequent creditors.
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Failure 0 50 (50%* 100) 0
Success 100 (50%*200) 150 (50%*300) 30 (50%*60)
Total Value 100 200 30 330
We can see that in both examples, the dilution from pari passu can lead to an 
unfairness to the first creditor or underinvestment for the company. Security (or at 
least subordination) is one way to deal with these problems. It is also clear that the 
unsecured creditor, whether in case one or two, must be compensated for the risk 
posed by the value diversion in insolvency when secured credit is given. Between 
them, however, the first case can be resolved through contractual means such as a 
negative pledge or a subordination agreement. The second case is harder to resolve 
contractually because there is no incentive for creditor 1 to subordinate itself.
Conclusions. We can see that there are at least two efficiency benefits to 
secured credit.41 In general, shareholders will use the security device for the two 
purposes above, a) allocation of asset to the most efficient assessor or monitor or b) 
prevention of claim dilution in insolvency, simply because it is their best interest to do 
so. (Bebchuk and Fried (1997) raise examples of how secured credit can be used 
inefficiently, which will be discussed in the next section.) However, the main source 
of contention is- since secured credit can clearly be used by subsequent creditors to 
prejudice the preceding creditors- how can preceding creditors be compensated for the 
risk? An efficient scenario would have the preceding creditors including the risk of 
subsequent creditors (whether secured or unsecured) into their claim, leaving the firm 
the option of an efficient later granting of security. There are two cases where 
expropriation may occur: a) when there are involuntary creditors (then it does not
41
These two are the most demonstrable of the efficiency claims o f secured credit. Most claims are 
variants o f these two arguments.
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matter if they are preceding or subsequent, the presence of any other creditors will 
decrease their return involuntarily) or b) when the preceding creditor has not priced 
the risk of additional creditors into the original agreement (that is, the preceding 
creditor is incapable of such an inclusion).
III.B) The Case for the Inefficiency of Secured Credit
There are three separate types of arguments for the inefficiency of secured 
credit: a) the presence of secured credit provides an incentive for shareholders to use 
security interests inefficiently, b) the use of secured credit itself creates costs and c) 
secured credit can be used to divert value away from unsecured creditors to secured 
creditors (while rewarding shareholders in the process). While the last case can be 
dealt with by the general argument that unsecured creditors can protect themselves 
from this value erosion, the first two case are more serious as they are arguments that 
the loss from the secured credit contract is less than the gain to all parties (and 
therefore, no amount of adjusting from anyone will make it worthwhile).
The Costs of Security Interests. Bebchuk and Fried (1996: 895-904) examine 
five efficiency costs that arise from secured credit. Secured credit 1) increases the use 
of inefficient security interests, 2) increases the use of security interests, when 
covenants might be more efficient, 3) distorts investment decisions by the borrower, 
4) leads to suboptimal use of covenants by the secured creditor and 5) leads to 
suboptimal enforcement efforts by the secured creditor. I will group the first two 
inefficiencies as one set, because they rely on a similar premise: they involve the 
borrower and the secured creditor expending resources “inefficiently encumbering an
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asset merely to transfer bankruptcy value from nonadjusting creditors” (Bebchuk and 
Fried 1996: 896-7)42.1 will also group the latter three inefficiencies as one set, again 
because they rely on a similar premise: the secured creditor, insulated from loss by the 
security, will have no further incentive to affect the firm’s decisions beyond the scope 
of its security (Bebchuk and Fried 1996: 897-903).
i) The inefficient use of security interests. Bebchuk and Fried (1996:896-
7) use a clever example to demonstrate their point. To facilitate the discussion, their 
example will quoted at length.
[Sjuppose that firms borrows Si million each from three sources: Bank, a 
nonadjusting creditor, and an adjusting creditor. Suppose further there is a 5% 
chance that Firm will fail by the end of the year and leave $600,000 of assets 
to its creditors. Assume that to obtain a security interest in the $600,000 worth 
of assets, Bank would be required to spend $2000, and that use of the security 
interest would affect neither the probability of Firm’s failure nor the amount of 
assets that would be available to Firm’s creditors in the event of default. Thus, 
creating the security interest would be inherently inefficient because it would 
reduce the total value captured by all of the parties by $2000.
[...] Now consider the case in which the security interest would confer full 
priority on Bank’s claim against the Firm. Under a rule of full priority, the 
security interest would reduce Bank’s risk of loss by $20,000 and would 
increase the other creditors’ risk of loss by $10,000 each. Since Bank would 
incur $2000 in contracting costs in connection with the security interest, and 
its risk of loss would be reduced by $20,000, it would charge Firm $18,000 
less in interest while the adjusting creditor would charge Firm $10,000 more in 
interest. Thus, full priority will give Firm an incentive to create an inefficient 
security interest merely to transfer value from its nonadjusting creditors. 
(Bebchuk and Fried 1996: 896-7. Footnote omitted.)
The cleverness of this example lies in the fact that, because the loan to Bank is 
made at arm’s length value and a full year before the bankruptcy, it does not fall under
42
The covenants case is simply an extension o f the general case. The secured creditor and borrower 
have an incentive to use security even though covenants will yield a higher return to creditors with no 
reduction of value to shareholders.
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the two main legal provisions designed to protected creditors in bankruptcy: 
preference law or fraudulent conveyance provisions43. However, it is possible to note 
there are two logically separable actions in the example given: a) the taking of the new 
loan and b) the cost of creating the security. There is nothing inherently inefficient in 
the new loan or the security interest because, in this example, the Firm is receiving the 
attendant reduction in interest rate (at an efficient discount) it should be getting from 
granting the security. It is the cost of creating the security interest which is inefficient, 
since it does not improve the prospects of the Firm.
The key point here is one which is not even mentioned by Bebchuk and Fried. 
In normal circumstances, the shareholders are the residual claimants of the firm; they 
receive their share after unsecured creditors have been paid. Therefore, any value they 
divert away from unsecured creditors will simply be paid out of the shareholders’ 
portion. Shareholders have an incentive (in fact, they have the best incentive) to 
pursue efficient, firm value-maximizing behavior; they receive only the residual value 
of the firm. In Bebchuk and Fried’s example, this would mean that, if the firm does 
not go bankrupt, the $2000 cost will accrue to the shareholders.
The only case where shareholders would engage in this kind of value- 
destroying activity would be where the firm is near or in insolvency. It is precisely 
these cases where shareholders no longer have an incentive to maximize the value of 
the firm that laws are required that make clear that the duties of the directors are
43
Under US law, s. 547 (b)(4)(A) o f the Bankruptcy Code allows the trustee to avoid any transfer o f  
an interest o f the debtor in property on or within 90 days before the filing o f the bankruptcy provision.
S. 548 o f the Bankruptcy Code allows for the avoidance of any transfer that is given for “less than a 
reasonably equivalent value”. Under UK law, the time span for avoiding preferences is six months
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toward the company (which when the firm is insolvent more or less means the 
creditors) rather than toward shareholders44.45
Security is not a necessary component of debtor misconduct near insolvency.
In fact, it is possible to come up with an example where the debtor can act to the 
detriment of secured creditors as well. Take this (admittedly somewhat contrived) 
example under English law: A car manufacturing firm has a creditor secured with a 
floating charge and a trade creditor (a steel recycling plant). The firm is in dire need of 
cashflow and sells unassembled auto parts to the steel plant at arm’s length value. The 
firm then receives cash, the trade creditor gains a normal profit from the deal, and the 
floating charge holders loses, that is, the firm would be worth more in insolvency if it 
had kept the auto parts and assembled them into cars (though that would have taken 
too much time for the firm). The cashflow keeps the firm afloat for another ten 
months, thus avoiding preference laws. As the deal was made at an arm’s length 
value, it avoids fraudulent conveyance provisions as well. This transaction then 
manages to accomplish the exact opposite of the Bebchuck and Fried example: it is a 
deal that profits the unsecured creditor and harms the secured creditor. However, the 
point is that the deal was not made to defraud the secured creditor, it was simply a 
poor business decision. There should indeed be laws to prevent debtors from engaging 
in value-destroying exercises, but this has nothing inherently to do with secured credit.
(section 240 (1) (b) o f the Insolvency Act) and because the transaction is for fair value, it would avoid 
section 238, 339 and 423 (1) of the Insolvency Act.
44
In the US, this would be the rule in Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe 
Communications Corporation, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215 at n.55 (see Roe 2000, 491-295), though the 
position is not uncontroversial. In the UK, this would covered by s. 212 o f the Insolvency Act.
However, s. 212 is procedural and does not provide a cause o f action.The exact extent o f the duty is still 
a matter of much dispute, however. (See Finch 2002: 499-520.)
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ii) Incentives to monitor the borrower. The second contention by Bebchuk 
and Fried is that the possession of a security interest will lead to lowered monitoring 
of the firm (Bebchuk and Fried 1996: 897, 900-903). The secured creditor has no 
incentive to monitor the value of the firm beyond its security interest. It is possible to 
imagine a scenario where the use of covenants or a keener screening of the firm would 
result in a lower risk of loss. In other words, if the creditor had not received the 
security interest, it would have been forced to carefully assess the prospects of the 
firm (or follow its actions closely) and therefore prevent the firm from wasting the lent 
money (either by not lending the money or taking prompt preventive action when an 
inappropriate use is found). The use of the security interest in these cases is then 
socially inefficient46.
The problem with the contention is this: creditors have incentives to monitor 
only to the extent of their risks. What this argument says is essentially that risk to 
creditors should be increased so that they would have more incentive to monitor. 
Shareholders are the ultimate risk bearers of the firm as they are the residual 
claimants. Any risk that is not home by the creditors is passed on to the shareholders. 
Also keep in mind the intrinsic link between risk and return; we can see that 
increasing the risk of the loans will have to result in increasing returns to the loans as 
well. One way of looking at capital structure is by noting that capital structure is a 
means of dividing risk between different capital providers. Even unsecured creditors, 
because they have priority over shareholders, do not have to monitor firm value below 
a certain level.
45
This point is also made by Schwarcz (1997: 437).
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One may, however, distinguish between two different kinds of monitoring: the 
monitoring of business decisions, where it can be agreed that shareholders are best 
suited, and the monitoring of shareholders’ misuse of assets to the detriment of 
creditors, where the shareholders cannot be trusted. The absence of security would 
create a situation where all creditors, instead of only the unsecured, would have to 
monitor the shareholders of the firm. However, this would only improve efficiency if  
it was contended that the secured creditors, i.e. banks, are more efficient monitors of 
the firm than unsecured creditors. From an efficient market point of view, this seems 
strange. The most efficient monitors of the firm should already offer to monitor the 
firm. To put it another way, if  there were an institution that could monitor the firm 
more efficiently than any unsecured creditor, then that institution should offer to 
guarantee the debts of the firm to the unsecured creditors for the price of the interest 
rate spread. If what is implied in this argument is that if  only secured lenders were 
reduced to the level of unsecured lenders, unsecured lenders would be able to benefit 
from the increased monitoring then this would clearly create a “free-rider” problem. 
What would be the incentive for banks to choose to monitor for the benefit of all 
creditors?
In summary, the only way for all capital providers to be full monitors of the 
firm is for all capital providers to be shareholders. The very existence of capital 
structure means that some capital providers will have stronger incentives to monitor 
the firm than others. Unless there is some element that results in the erosion of the 
incentive to maximize firm value (like proximity to bankruptcy as discussed above),
46
Manove, Padilla and Pagano (2001) is a formal version o f this argument, which clarifies the issues
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shareholders are the proper monitors of the firm. Creditors should be compelled to 
monitor the firm to the exact amount they are at risk.
In an attempt to test the “lazy bank” hypothesis, Padilla and Requejo (2001) 
tested for average default rates where creditor rights are more strongly enforced, 
reasoning that stronger enforcement of security would lead to lower screening and 
therefore higher debt default rates. Their results were ambiguous (although it must be 
admitted that there are many practical difficulties in this kind of testing).
The Plight of the Nonadiusting Creditor. There are four groups of creditors 
that cannot simply adjust interest rates to compensate for the addition of a secured 
creditor: a) involuntary creditors (more or less tort claimants), b) the Government, c) 
imprudent creditors (whether because unable or incompetent), and d) prior voluntary 
creditors. (Bebchuk and Fried 1996: 882-891) These are creditors that are exposed to 
the risk that their returns in bankruptcy will be affected by secured creditors without 
their consent.
i) Involuntary Creditors. Tort creditors can have their claims substantially
reduced by the presence of a secured creditor in the tortfeasor’s capital structure47. 
There are two scenarios: a) the tortfeasor can use the instrument of secured credit to 
transfer value away from the tort creditor to the secured creditor and b) the fact that 
the secured creditor does not share in the loss of the tort means that the firm can deny 
the risk of committing a tort by issuing secured credit. Both arguments turn, however,
nicely.
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on the question: how much should secured creditors (or any creditor for that matter) 
share in the risk of a tort?
The two scenarios are a little different. In the first case, it can be assumed that 
the incoming creditor is aware of the outstanding tort debt the borrower owes. While 
there may still be efficiency gains from allowing the firm to borrow secured, it is clear 
that both parties to the transaction will be aware that it amounts to a reduction of the 
value of the tort creditor’s claim. There is definitely a strong argument that the tort 
creditor should be given super-priority over all adjusting creditor claims. A super­
priority claim at least over all subsequent creditors would make more sense than 
giving the tort creditor a pro rata claim because even the addition of unsecured claims 
would dilute the tort creditor’s claim.
The argument that the tort creditor should be given some kind of super-priority 
over even preceding creditors’ claims is a little different. The argument behind this 
would be that secured creditors should take some risk of the firm subsequently 
committing a tort. Allowing the firm to insulate part of its capital structure from tort 
risk would result in the firm being able to procure capital at a risk level lower than the 
firm’s actual risk (Bebchuk and Fried 1996: 898-9). The fear, in this situation, is of a 
purposely undercapitalized firm, financed principally with debt, for the purpose of 
engaging in risky enterprise.
47
See LoPucki and Whitford (1993) where, in two o f 43 bankruptcies, tort claims amounted to more 
than two-thirds o f the unsecured claims against the company. See also LoPucki (1994) for more cases 
of tort claims in bankruptcy.
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It is clear that if  a firm is explicitly and, more importantly, provably, financed 
with that purpose in mind, then the creditors should be as liable for the tort as the 
shareholders. The question, however, is how much should secured creditors (or if  
super-priority to tort creditors is given, all creditors) be responsible for the actions of 
the firm? Or, are creditors really able to prevent a firm from committing torts? The 
argument for tort creditor super-priority would be that firms that are more susceptible 
to tort risk (or firms that exhibit risky behavior) would face more expensive financing 
and therefore firms would have an incentive to restrain their risky behavior. However, 
if  creditors have little influence on the actions of the firm (which is generally the case 
in reality48) then the result o f tort creditor super-priority would be an increase in 
information asymmetry and agency cost, which could to lead to credit rationing, as 
mentioned above49. One way of asking the question: what if the firm was equipped 
primarily through leasing? That is, imagine a manufacturing company with no assets, 
with all its equipment leased from an affiliate company. If this firm engages in risky 
enterprise, should the tort debt rank above the leasing debt? It seems rather arbitrary to 
have a creditor of the firm have to take a tort risk, unless they can be deemed to have 
been partially responsible. Why should a secured creditor be considered more 
responsible for tort than any other kind of creditor?
48
Under US law, lender involvement to firm activities can lead to their loans being equitably 
subordinated (the “Deep Rock” case: Taylor v. Standard Gas and Electricity Corporation., 306 U.S. 307 
(1939)) or they might face lender liability (e.g. State National Bank v. Farah Manufacturing Company., 
678 S.W. 2d 661 (Tex. App. 1984). Under French law, article 180 o f the Bankruptcy Law (the 
‘comblement de p a ssif)  holds that the “managers” o f the company may be liable for any shortfall in 
paying off creditors; these “managers” may include banks acting to enforce covenants in loan 
documents. (See Norton Rose 2000: 129-130.)
49
Alternate arrangements to internalize tort risk might be more appropriate, such as mandatory tort 
insurance for companies, as mentioned by Finch (1999: 656-7).
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ii) The Government. The government’s claims over a firm are “set by 
statute without regard to a firm’s capital structure” (Bebchuk and Fried 1996: 884) 
and therefore, the government’s tax and regulatory claims might be subordinated to 
secured creditors in the event of bankruptcy without the government having adjusted 
for it. This is a bit of an artificial problem, as there is nothing to prevent the 
government taking security or even just legislating for super-priority. There would 
seem to be nothing conceptually wrong with having creditors take into consideration 
the borrower’s governmental liabilities before lending. However, giving the 
government priority over secured creditor has caused some problems in transitional 
economies (e.g. Hungary and Poland), as it reduces the ability of borrowers to borrow 
on the basis of collateral, particularly in cases where the government is the primary 
creditor of the company (Baer and Gray 1995: 23).
iii) The Imprudent. These fall in two camps: a) those that cannot afford to 
take subsequent creditors into consideration (the creditor could be too small or the 
deal might be too small to make such a calculation worthwhile) and b) those that 
simply lack the capability to make such a calculation (such as newcomers to the 
market). In a situation where creditors are aware that a secured creditor could be 
added to the capital structure of the debtor, unsecured creditors can protect themselves 
by including the cost of the risk of that future secured creditor into the current price 
they charge the debtor. However, Finch (1999: 651-2) gives three reasons why this 
might not be possible: 1) That sector of trade might be too unstable and therefore, 
instead of developing seasoned creditors who are able to properly price the risk of a 
new secured creditor, that sector will have a constant influx of new traders who are
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systematically punished50. 2) Small, unsecured creditors might not be the most 
efficient bearers of the risk, as they are the “least able to manage, absorb and survive 
financial risks and shocks”. The risk should be bome by the party most able to manage 
it. 3) Having the small, unsecured creditor bear the risk might be socially inefficient. 
Finch (1996: 652) gives the example of a carpentry company which is more efficient 
(for carpentry) than a multi-national company, but, if  forced to account for the default 
risk of the customer, will have to charge higher rates than the multi-national (who is 
able to take security), thus losing efficient business.
Addressing these arguments one by one: 1) There are some sectors where 
information and agency problems are so acute that government intervention is 
necessary. Consumer investment is one of them. There does seem to a “constant flow 
of new suckers” who are willing to invest in ponzi schemes and indeed these cases of 
market failure need to be handled through strict regulation. It would appear, however, 
that these cases of market failure are the exception rather than the norm and, while it 
can be argued that secured credit exacerbates these market failures when they exist, 
the existence of these cases do not make for a general case for weakening the 
institution of secured credit.
2) One would expect that in a free, open market economy, risk will be bome 
by those who can most efficiently bear that risk, simply because it would cheaper for 
them to do so than other parties. In fact, as I argued earlier, secured credit (in its 
property aspect) is one method to accomplish that allocation of risk. There seems to be
As LoPucki (1994: 1956) has it: “With a constant flow o f new suckers and poor information flows 
there is no a priori reason why the markets for unsecured credit cannot persistently underestimate the 
risk, resulting in a permanent subsidy to borrowers.”
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an implication in Finch’s argument that banks are better able to bear default risk than 
small traders. This would be too broad an assertion. Banks are, by their very nature, 
very risky enterprises. One primary aspect of banking is the conversion of illiquid 
assets into liquid assets, which combined with another aspect of banking, the fact that 
banks are heavily financed with callable debt (deposits), make banks prone to crises 
(i.e. bank runs). (Goodhart et al., 1998) A market-based solution to risk-allocation 
would involve more methods of isolating risks (maybe trade creditors can securitize 
their debt) rather than reducing these methods.
3) If the small trader is less able to handle risk than the multi-national 
(resulting in the multi-national able to offer more competitive prices), then it would 
seem that, generally, the multi-national is the more efficient company for this market. 
There are many instances where size offers efficiency advantages. This is true in many 
industries. It is difficult for new entrants to enter, let’s say, the publishing business, 
because they do not have the distribution networks of the established players (or the 
mobile phone business, because they do not have access to stores). These examples 
abound in the real world. While the notion of a level playing field is very attractive, 
abolishing (or weakening) secured credit in order to reduce the advantage the big 
player has over the small player is tantamount to reducing both of them to same level 
of inefficiency. As mentioned above, it would perhaps be wiser to work for a market 
solution, if necessary aided by government funding.
iv) Prior Voluntary Creditors. As has been stated several times in the 
course of this section, prior voluntary creditors should raise their current price to 
compensate for the possibility of the addition of secured creditors to the debtor’s
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capital structure. The more interesting question is: is this an efficient state of affairs? 
After all, it could be the case that the debtor has no intention of pursuing secured 
credit. They would then be unnecessarily penalized. But- the debtor can commit to 
limiting its future borrowing, whether through a negative pledge or granting the prior 
creditor itself security. In a way, one could view the premium charged by prior 
voluntary creditors as an option for the debtor to subsequently pursue secured credit.
Conclusion. A perusal of the empirical evidence would seem to indicate that 
concerns about debtors using secured credit to expropriate returns from unsecured 
creditors is exaggerated, if  not entirely misplaced. As Mokal (2002) notes, large firms 
(which are most likely to have involuntary creditors) are the firms most reluctant to 
borrow on a secured basis. More directly, Schwarcz’s (1997: 470) research indicates 
that trade creditors tend to give better trade terms to firms in danger of insolvency 
when they receive additional, secured financing. One can also note that between debts 
of similar standing (as measured by credit ratings), creditors charge lower interest 
rates for uncollateralized loans rather than collateralized loans. John, Lynch and Puri 
(2002) argue that this is because creditors are aware that collateral carries in itself 
agency costs (debtors have an incentive to misuse the collateral). The implication 
would be that, given an equivalent choice, creditors would choose to lend unsecured 
rather than secured.
III.C) Does Secured Credit Benefit Unsecured Creditors?
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So far, we have argued that secured credit has at least some efficiency benefits 
and that, in most cases, concerns about harm that can be done to unsecured creditors 
through secured credit is misplaced. Schwarcz (1997) takes this one step further. 
Schwarcz argues that, as debtors tend to issue secured credit as a last resort (that is, 
when it is in danger of insolvency) and insolvency is costly, the very fact that the 
secured credit loan gives the debtor the liquidity to avoid insolvency provides a 
benefit to unsecured creditors. In other words, Schwarcz claims that secured credit is 
Pareto efficient, that is, it benefits all parties. Schwarcz cites two pieces of empirical 
evidence to support his claim: a) an informal eight year study of troubled companies 
that had acquired secured financing had 14 of the 20 companies showing an increase 
in share price, 3 showing little or no price change, 1 showing a decreased rate of price 
fall and 2 showing a small price decrease, b) as mentioned above, trade creditors 
appear to give better terms to debtors after they have received additional secured 
financing (Schwarcz 1997: 467-471).
Schwarcz appears to argue that additional secured financing will benefit 
unsecured creditors at least in most cases. Schwarcz presents his arguments in rather 
general terms: “secured debt... tends to create value for unsecured creditors as well as 
for the debtor” (page 430: emphasis added), “A sensitivity analysis demonstrates that 
a change in the chance of a debtor’s bankruptcy will have a much greater effect on 
whether or not value is taken from unsecured creditors than will a change in other 
variables.” (page 442), “whether or not any given secured transaction is Pareto 
efficient, the probability is that the average secured transaction will be Pareto efficient 
in that the debtor and secured creditor will benefit and unsecured creditor will not lose 
(and indeed may gain) value.” (page 483: emphasis in original)
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With respect, Schwarcz appears to state his argument too strongly. We will use 
the same equation given by Schwarcz (page 473-474, changing only the variable 
letters), where the payoff to the unsecured creditor (V) is given by two parts: the 
return to unsecured creditor should the company survive (R) times the probability that 
the company will survive (P) and the return to the unsecured creditor should the 
company go bankrupt, which is calculated as R minus a fraction of R (BR, where B is 
the bankruptcy discount), times the probability that the company will go bankrupt (1- 
P). That is, PR+(R-L)( 1 -P)=V.
As the equation above is a three variable (P, B, R), non-linear equation, it is 
difficult to describe its behavior in plain English. In fact, the easiest way to understand 
the nature of the equation is to observe it numerically (as in Appendix B and C). What 
is observable is that: 1) B and P are both highly significant to the value of the 
unsecured creditor’s debt. It is incorrect to describe one variable as more important 
than the other, (see Appendix B for details) and 2) Whether the increase in the 
probability of survival profits the unsecured creditor depends on both B and R, 
particularly, when the arrangement of B and P is lower than that presented in 
Appendix C, then the unsecured creditor loses value from the arrangement.
The conclusion here is commonsensical: an influx of new, secured capital 
might or might not profit the unsecured shareholder, depending on how the three 
variables change. Any statement on what might “tend to” happen or what the 
“average” case might be would have to be empirical, not determined a priori. These 
outcomes are certainly not predicted by Schwarcz’s argument. In this case, it might be
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said that the equation is a much more exact statement of the conclusions that might be 
reached than any linguistic generalization.
Nevertheless, Schwarcz (1997) has at least demonstrated that in some cases, 
the inclusion of a new, secured creditor could profit unsecured creditors. It is then odd 
that Mokal (2003) does not include even a reference to Schwarcz’s argument in his 
discussion of floating charges. Mokal argues that the real value of the floating charge 
lies in the capability of the floating charge holder to keep the insolvent company as 
one complete unit and dissuading other creditors from enforcing their claims against 
the circulating assets of the company, in other words, the worth of the floating charge 
is as a “residual management displacement device”. As Mokal denies the floating 
charge has a property-based efficiency benefit (he argues that circulating assets cannot 
be properly valued or monitored) and since the administration procedure instituted in 
Enterprise Act 2002 fulfills the role of management displacement, there is no reason 
to grant priority to floating charge holders. From which Mokal then concludes that 
“there is a strong case for setting at the highest level politically feasible the proportion 
of property which should go to unsecured creditors, right up to one hundred percent. 
The floating charge is not relied on for priority, except opportunistically (i.e. ex post), 
so this would result in some benefit to unsecured creditors and would case no harm to 
creditors who take security.”
Even disregarding the commonsense case of a company’s whose assets are 
primarily circulating (let’s say a car dealership), which would benefit from being able 
to use these circulating assets as security, Mokal ignores the implications of 
Schwarcz’s argument. There is a reason for granting blanket security over the
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company’s assets, even without the property-based benefits, and that is that the extra 
financing this blanket priority provides might assist the company in avoiding or at 
least strongly surviving insolvency.
Empirical evidence for Schwarcz’s conjecture can be found in instances of 
Debtor In Possession (DIP) financing in the US. Section 364 of the US Bankruptcy 
Code allows for court approval of a special class of creditor given priority over 
unsecured creditors (and sometimes even equal priority to a secured creditor51) in 
Chapter 11. This is precisely the kind of blanket security, evidently without property- 
based efficiency benefits, that Mokal argues should not be allowed. However, as 
Dahiya, John, Puri and Ramirez (2000) report, firms that receive DIP financing are 
more likely to reorganize successfully than firms that did not receive DIP financing. 
DIP financed firms also tend to have shorter reorganization periods than non-DIP 
financed firms. They did not find evidence of overinvestment52. This would lend some 
credence to Schwarcz’s argument, although it must be noted that court involvement 
would mean there is some prior screening for abuse which would be absent in the 
granting of floating charges.
III.D) Alternatives to Full Priority
Bebchuk and Fried (1996: 904-911) propose two alternatives to full priority: a) 
the “adjustable” priority rule and b) the “fixed-fraction” priority rule.
51
Provided that the debtor cannot obtain credit otherwise and the original secured creditor is given
adequate protection (s. 364 (d) o f the Bankruptcy Code).
52
Intriguingly, they also find that smaller firms tend to received DIP financing more often from prior 
lenders and that financing from prior lenders or new lenders makes no difference in reorganization 
outcomes.
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Adjustable priority: “Under the adjustable priority rule, claims of nonadjusting 
creditors would not be subordinated to secured claims with respect to which they were 
nonadjusting.” (page 905) The claims of nonadjusting creditors would be treated as if 
they had full priority (over the secured claim) and the secured creditor would receive 
priority over whatever remains. In effect, the dichotomy is not actually between 
nonadjusting creditors and secured creditors, but between adjusting and nonadjusting 
creditors (secured creditors are, by definition, adjusting creditors).
Many jurisdictions already allow for the super-priority of tax, social security 
and employee claims (e.g. France). There would seem to be no conceptual problem 
(beyond those raised above) to adding tort creditors and other governmental claims to 
that list. The question, however, is how inclusive the list of “nonadjusting” creditors 
should be. As argued above, the case for small claims and trade creditors is 
significantly weaker than that for tort creditors or the government (or even employees, 
who can arguably be seen as incompetent to protect their own interests).
It is difficult to judge how the granting of super-priority to the government and 
employees has affected French financing. French business has traditionally relied 
heavily on government financing (Bertoro 1994, 1997), although the evidence seems 
to indicate this is changing (Rajan and Zingales 2003). France also exhibits very low 
levels of court-based bankruptcy, which would indicate a preference for preventive 
measures or out-of-court restructuring (Banque de France 1999: 41).
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Fixed-fraction priority: “Under this rule, a fixed fraction of a secured 
creditor’s secured claim would continue to be treated as a secure claim, and the 
remainder would be treated as an unsecured claim.” (page 909) This is the regime 
proposed by the Cork Committee and imposed on floating charge holders as a part of 
the Enterprise Act 2000. The effect of this proposal is relatively clear: secured 
creditors would simply discount the property charged by the fraction that cannot be 
secured. The justification for this kind of regime seems rather weaker than allowing 
nonadjusting creditors super-priority. For one thing, a fixed-fraction regime would not 
be distinguishing between adjusting and nonadjusting creditors, but between secured 
and unsecured creditors. If the fixed-fraction regime is justified by the protection it 
gives nonadjusting creditors, it would be odd to institute a regime that would benefit 
adjusting, unsecured creditors as well. Finch (1999: 655) rightly points out that a 
virtue of the fixed-fraction rule is its certainty. However, giving certain, well-specified 
classes of nonadjusting creditors super-priority is, if  anything, an even more certain 
rule. It would seem that only advantage a fixed-fraction rule would have over a 
nonadjusting creditor super-priority rule is that the fixed-fraction rule would benefit 
nonadjusting creditors who cannot be rigorously defined. Who these elusive 
nonadjusting creditors might be and whether the benefit accruing to them under the 
fixed-fraction rule is worth the reduction in efficiency (because the fixed-fraction 
discount on secured credit would proportionally limit both the property-based 




From a pure economic perspective, it would be optimal if  a capital provider 
were awarded risks and returns of the project the capital is meant to finance. That way 
incentives would be most closely aligned. These structures can be setup 
transactionally, such as an asset securitization or a project financing. There are also 
some legal rules that tend in that direction (purchase money security interests under 
US UCC article 9 or the Personal Property Security Act in Canada)53.
The problems begin when investment interests are pooled into a single 
corporate form. As mentioned in section III. A, security can be viewed as a tool for the 
allocation of risk. If these allocations can bring incentives closer to their optimal case, 
it adds to efficiency. As mentioned in section III.B, the shareholders of a corporation 
have incentives to pursue efficiency, as this will tend to contribute to their own 
returns. However, there are cases where these incentives can break down and they 
should be guarded against. Turning the situation the other way, there is the question of 
how much creditors should be responsible for the risk the corporation takes. This is a 
difficult question to answer. I have raised doubts as to how efficiently secured 
creditors can deal with these agency costs. This paper has argued, nonetheless, that 
there might be a case for giving super-priority to some nonadjusting creditor claims 
particularly in cases where they would be readily calculable and certain.
53
Although these are not without their own problems, particularly concerning proceeds from the sales 
o f these assets. See Walsh (2003).
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Appendix A: A Simple Model for Lowered Interest Rates
We are going to use a highly simplified model of returns to a loan. A loan is 
worth to its creditor its probability adjusted returns. A creditor will only lend if the 
payoff from the loan is worth the risk of what the value of the loan could decline to. 
Consider a scenario with only two states of the world, where the firm could enter 
bankruptcy with a probability Pb and return only the amount B, or it could succeed 
with a probability (1 - Pb) and repay (including interest) the amount R. The minimum 
amount a creditor would lend in this situation would be: PbB+(1-Pb)R=L. To express 
the same notion another way, the least amount a loan would have to return to induce a 
creditor to lend a certain amount of money L would be: R=L- PbB/1-Pb. The net 
amount of interest the loan would have to pay would be R-L.
Now suppose we are in a state where a creditor can choose either to lend on a 
secured or unsecured basis. This creditor is more certain about the prospects of the 
security than it is about the prospects of the company as a whole. In particular, the 
creditor believes that even in a state of bankruptcy, the value of the security will not 
fall below the amount C. It is clear that if  C is lower than B, then Rc, the amount of 
return required for the creditor to lend the same amount of money will be lower for the 
secured case.
The question now becomes: are the interest savings from the secured loan 
simply offset by increased interest rates in subsequent loans (as suggested by 
Schwartz 1984: 1054)? The answer is: not necessarily. Even assuming that an 
unsecured creditor will get nothing in bankruptcy if  there is a secured creditor, there 
are still values where the unsecured creditor will rationally lend at a rate where the
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combined interest of the secured and unsecured creditor would be lower than the rate 
of a single unsecured creditor54.
A numerical example can illustrate this. Give the firm a 50% chance of 
bankruptcy and a 50% chance of success and let’s say it wants to borrow $100. If the 
firm borrows unsecured, the bank believes that in a bankrupt state, it will recover only 
$20. The bank will then demand a return of R=100-10/1-0.5=180, that is, $80 worth of 
interest (80%). However, in a secured state, the bank believes the property will only 
decline to $40 in a bankrupt state. (This is possible in cases where the firm can incur 
further debts, such as penalties for breaches of contract. In such cases, the firm can be 
worth less than its assets.) Let’s say that half the amount required is then borrowed 
secured and the other half unsecured. The secured half will be lent at a rate R=50- 
20/l-0.5=$60. That is, the firm will pay only $10 in interest (20%). The other half of 
the loan will be lent at a rate R=50-0/l-0.5=100, that is, the firm will have to pay $50 
worth of interest (100%). The combined interest of the two halves of the 
secured/unsecured loan comes up to $60, which is cheaper than the $80 required in the 
purely unsecured case.
54
The mathematical expression for the amount would be: assuming that an unsecured creditor would 
get nothing in bankruptcy and would have be compensated Ru taking up a proportion (1-S) of the loan, then 
the equation that would have to be satisfied for the secured plus unsecured loan to be cheaper than wholly
Pb[ L { S - \ )  + C + B ] - L  n
unsecured loan i s : -----------------------------------------h oL  >  U
1 - Pb
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Appendix B: Comparing the Effects of B and P
Taking Schwarcz’s equation and eliminating some variables, we get: 
PR+( 1 -P)(R-L)=V=PR+R-PR-L+PL=R+PL-L=R+L(P-1 )=V, where L=BR.
Keeping in mind that:
P= the probability of firm survival;
R=the promised return to the unsecured creditor;
B=the percentage the return the unsecured creditor will be reduced in bankruptcy; 
V=the value of the loan to the unsecured creditor.
We now run this equation through several scenarios, keeping V constant and varying 
B and P. What we will note from this demonstration is that it is difficult to say what 
Schwarcz means by saying that P is "more sensitive" than B. If he means, all other 
things being equal, increasing P by 10 percent yields a greater gain than increasing B 
by 10 percent he is correct. But this is meaningless- the relationship between the 
variables is inverse. If he means, all other things being equal, adjusting P by 10 
percent makes more difference than adjusting B by 10 percent, then the above chart 
shows he is clearly wrong. The variables have the same effect, merely in different 
directions
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Appendix C: Maintaining Unsecured Creditor’s Value
In this appendix, we begin with the observation that, one of the ways we can 
determine the impact of B and P is to keep V constant. This way, we can demonstrate 
the balance that B and P need to keep in order not to lower the overall value of the 
debt to the unsecured creditor.
Adapting the equation in Appendix B for B, we get B=(V-R)/(P-1)R, and 
adapting for P, we get P=(V+R/L)+1.
Keeping in mind that:
P= the probability of firm survival;
R=the promised return to the unsecured creditor;
B=the percentage the return the unsecured creditor will be reduced in bankruptcy; 
V=the value of the loan to the unsecured creditor.
Part 1: Keeping V constant, we vary B and observe the value of P.
From the demonstration below, we can observe that 1) any value of P that is above 
what is shown in the chart (given the other respective values) improves the value of 
the loan for the unsecured creditor and 2) conversely, any value for P lower than 
shown on the chart lowers the value of the loan of the unsecured creditor.
Note: In this chart, any value of P above 1 can be disregarded, as the highest 
probability a firm can go bankrupt is 1, similarly, any value of P below 0 can be 
disregarded as the lowest probability a firm can go bankrupt is 0.
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Part 2: Keeping V constant, we vary P and observe the value of B.
From the demonstration below, we can observe that 1) any value of B that is above 
what is shown in the chart (given the other respective values) improves the value of
151
the loan for the unsecured creditor and 2) conversely, any value for B lower than 
shown on the chart lowers the value of the loan of the unsecured creditor.
Note: In this chart, any value of B above 1 can be disregarded, as this would imply the 
case of the unsecured creditor getting a better return from insolvency than solvency, 
similarly, any value of B below 0 can be disregarded, as 0 implies that the unsecured 
creditor gets nothing.
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Theoretical Foundations for the Enterprise Act 2002
Q: Have you any word o f  advice for those o f  us who are not bankrupt?
A: [with that twinkle] Eat your hearts out
John Updike, The Bankrupt Man
Insolvency studies are a literature of discontent. Nearly every article in the 
field is centered upon proposals for reform. Bankruptcy laws around the world are 
particularly susceptible to overhauls (in recent years, Germany, Japan, nearly all the 
countries affected by the Asian crisis, and now the UK, have substantially reformed 
their insolvency laws). There is a lack of a clear model for insolvency law. American 
scholars rail against a “continuation bias” in their system while UK scholars complain 
of a “liquidation bias”, yet so fraught are the issues that neither can simply accept the 
other system as a model for reform. Into this tangled skein, the UK has now 
introduced the regime of the Enterprise Act 2002 (the “EA”).
The arguments presented in this section will extend previous scholarship by 
arguing that, not only does the new regime aid rescue in a very limited way (which 
has been argued by numerous authors, e.g. Frisby 2004), it strengthens the position of 
unsecured creditors, to the detriment of shareholders and unsecured lenders. This 
section will also compare the current UK regime to the US regime, demonstrating that 
the UK regime is less conducive to company rescue, and discussing how the 
differences in the US and UK regimes contribute to how companies may choose their 
financing. As many US commentators have argued for a market-based approach to 
bankruptcy, this section will also discuss these proposals and their viability. The 
approach taken in this chapter is the viewpoint expressed in the first chapter (as well 
as demonstrated in the previous two chapters): parties involved in bankruptcy
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proceedings will pursue avenues available to them under the bankruptcy system, 
sometimes in ways unintended by the policy-makers. As will be argued in more detail 
later, the current UK regime gives great negotiating power to unsecured creditors.
This could have the effect of making unsecured debt the security of choice for vulture 
investors who aim to profit from a debt restructuring. Out-of-court restructurings will 
also be discussed, along with their inherent limitations given the bankruptcy regime.
The amendments introduced into insolvency law by the EA are meant to 
“facilitate company rescue and to produce better returns for creditors as a whole”55, to 
“address the fear of failure that is a significant barrier to enterprise and help to prevent 
companies in difficulty from going under unnecessarily”56; in other words, to promote 
“a culture in which companies that can be rescued, are rescued.”57 The essentials 
features of these amendments are, to begin with, a) strongly restricting the availability 
of administrative receivership, and, b) in order to establish administration as the 
primary insolvency regime, easing entry into administration and c) aligning the 
incentives of the administrator to unsecured creditors, if they are eligible, through a 
scheme of priorities, a voting process and a procedure for redress i f ‘Unfair harm” can 
be established. Only one of these amendments directly provides for the “rescue” of a 
company and even that, s. 3 (1) (a) in Schedule B1 of the IA 1986, is strongly 
qualified (some would say, nearly disqualified) by the requirements it must fulfill.
One could then ask: in what way could the EA 2002 be considered to facilitate a 
“rescue culture” at all? It could be argued that while the EA amendments do not
Hansard, HC Deb 10 April 2002, col. 53 (Patricia Hewitt MP, Secretary of State for Trade and
Industry)
56
Ibid., col. 111. (Melanie Johnson, Under-Secretary of State for Trade and Industry)
57
Insolvency Services, An Update on the Corporate Insolvency Proposals, January 14, 2002 (website)
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legislate directly for corporate rescue, they are designed to weaken the perceived 
“liquidation bias” in the previous system.
The main charge against administrative receivership is that it is not an 
inclusive process. As Mokal (2004b: 1) puts it: “the receiver- while regarded as the 
debtor’s agent- owes his primary (in some important respects, exclusive) obligations 
to the chargee. He may choose to deal with the company or its assets in a way that 
directly inflicts harm on junior claimants, as long as he acts in good faith in the 
chargee’s interest.” Armour and Frisby (2001) have argued, however, that the scope 
for banks to abuse their power over the administrative receiver is limited because they 
would an incentive to do so only when they are over-secured and the statistical 
evidence would seem to indicate that banks tend to be under-secured rather then over­
secured. These statistics, even if valid58, would still not detract from the argument that 
situations in which receivers are given prejudicial incentives could readily occur under 
the old regime. Frisby (2004: 253) also points out that, in practice, judicial initiatives 
have approximated many of the elements of administrative collectivity in 
receiverships: moratoriums and relief from forfeitures. Indeed, perhaps all that is 
required is a stipulation that makes receivers accountable to all creditors (West 2001: 
176, 177). This is, however, begging the question: if  administrative receivership at its 
best resembles administration, why not simply use administration? The question 
ultimately rests on efficiency: which procedure produces a better return? And that will 
have to wait for data. On the basis of principles, though, receivership is a procedure 
based on the enforcement of a charge holder’s property rights in its security and, as 
such, shows signs that it was not meant to be part of a collective process. If we can
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agree that a collective process is what is desired in insolvency, then it would be best to 
rely on procedures designed directly for collectivity.
On, then, to the new administration itself. The administrator is constrained by 
a list of statutory objectives he must pursue. As soon as is “reasonably practicable”, 
the administrator must then send out “proposals for achieving the purpose of 
administration.”59 These proposals must then be voted on by a creditors’ meeting 
(meaning, in practice, unsecured creditors)60. (Armour and Mokal (2005) argue 
convincingly that the administrator’s objectives apply only before a proposal has been 
approved. An approved proposal would act as a “ratification.”)
Let us examine both stages of this process. Schedule B1 states the objectives 
pursuable by the administrator and the circumstances in which they are to be pursued:
3- (1) The administrator of a company must perform his functions with
the objective of-
(a) rescuing the company as a going concern, or
(b) achieving a better result for the company’s directors as a whole 
than would be likely if  the company were wound up (without 
first being in administration), or
(c) realizing property in order to make a distribution to one or more 
secured or preferred creditors.
(3) The administrator must perform his functions with the objective
specified in sub-paragraph (1) (a) unless he think either-
(a) that it is not reasonably practicable to achieve that objective, or
(b) that the objective specified in sub-paragraph (1) (b) would 
achieve a better result for the company’s creditors as a whole. 
(Italics added)
As Mokal (2004a: 9, 2004b: 5) points out, the mean recovery rate of banks do not tell us much about
the proportion o f debts which are under or over-secured.
59
S. 49 (1) and (5) (a), Schedule B l, IA 1986.
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S. 3(1 )(a) is the only time company rescue is mentioned in the whole Act. Note 
too, that the section speaks of rescuing the “company”, not the business. Read in 
conjunction with s. 3(3)(b), the effect is that, companies should be rescued as going 
concerns only in the event that returns are equal to creditors whether the company is 
rescued as a going concern or not. That is, if rescuing the company will achieve the 
best result for creditors, then s. 3(1 )(a) is redundant, therefore, the only situation in 
which s. 3(l)(a) serves a purpose is when two options exist, one involving the rescue 
the company, the other not, both providing an equal return to creditors, and no other 
option would “achieve a better result for the company’s creditors as a whole.” In that 
case, the administrator should choose to rescue the company. It is hard to see how this 
portion of the Act can seriously be described as promoting corporate rescue. A wary 
would-be entrepreneur is unlikely to be much assuaged. It is tempting to say that the 
law in this case is so subtle it could be described as misleading.
As mentioned above, the administrator should set out a proposal that will then 
be voted on in a creditors’ meeting. S. 52(1) states that a proposal need not be voted 
on if  the administrator “thinks”-
(a) that the company has sufficient property to allow each creditor of the 
company to be paid in full,
(b) that the company has insufficient property to enable a distribution to be 
made to unsecured creditors other than by virtue of section 176A(2)(a), 
or
(c) that neither of the objectives specified in paragraph 3(1 )(a) and (b) can 
be achieved.
Insolvency (Amendment) Rules, 2.40 (1)
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However, “creditors of the company whose debts amount to at least 10 per 
cent of the total debts of the company” (s. 52(2)(a)) can still request a meeting.
What this amounts to is a system in which the residual creditor is given control 
over the company. If the value of the company is more than the owed to secured 
creditors, unsecured creditors then have control over the company; if  less, the secured 
creditors have control. (Presuming the valuation is acceptable. Armour and Mokal 
(2005: 35-37) argue that, even though the IA specifies a subjective measure, i.e. what 
the administrator “thinks”, the valuation must be publicly justified and such a 
valuation can still be contested in court.)
Note, though, that it is still the residual creditor who is given control, never the 
shareholders, even if the shareholders are the residual claimants. Even though 
schedule B1 gives the company and its directors the right to appoint an administrator, 
it gives no positive incentives why they should do so (there are punitive incentives in 
the form of the wrongful trading provisions- s.212 and 214 of the IA 1986). In the, 
even if  unlikely, case that the company is put into administration when its assets 
exceed its debt (which is possible, given that a default that crystallizes a floating 
charge need not be concerned the company’s market value), then shareholders lose 
control over whatever value in the company they should still rightfully own. In 
general, the amendments do nothing to strengthen the status of shareholders or 
directors in insolvent companies, the people who have the best incentives to rescue the 
company.
61
That is, the 10% ring-fenced fund carveout.
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The EA 2002 amendments, then, promote corporate rescue only in an oblique 
way: by reducing the “liquidation bias” in the old regime. It does this by restricting 
access to administrative receivership, statutorily making administrators beholden to 
creditors “as a whole”, and allowing the residual creditor control over the company.
But why should we rescue companies at all? What does it mean “to prevent 
companies in difficulty from going under unnecessarily”? This is a question that goes 
to the core of modem corporate insolvency law. The standard justification for 
corporate insolvency law is predicated on the notion that a collective procedure for 
debt enforcement is more efficient than each individual creditor pursuing its own 
remedies. When the asset pool is insufficient to pay off all debts, each creditor has an 
incentive to try to enforce their own debt as soon as possible (which in practice, 
usually means a sale of the debtor’s assets), even though the return to all creditors 
might be higher under an alternate arrangement. In other words, in Jackson’s (1986: 
14) classic statement, a collective insolvency proceeding preserves “the surplus of a 
going-concem value over a liquidation value”. A more modem statement of the 
principle is that an insolvency proceeding should maximize the value of the firm.
(Hart 2000) There is also a cmcial distinction to be made between “business” and 
“company” rescue. There might be cases where the business might be best maximized 
by changing its form and ownership; that is, the company might be worth more broken 
up or restructured in some other way. The EA, however, is focused on company 
rescue, not business rescue.
The stated objectives of the EA, however, appear to go beyond maximizing the 
value of the insolvent company. While it is understandable that “maximizing value”
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isn’t as politically marketable as “corporate rescue”, it still sometimes sound as if  the 
rhetoric surrounding the EA is similar to that coming from those Baird (1998) terms 
the “traditionalists”, which he contrasts to the “proceduralists”:
In short, the traditional bankruptcy experts believe that: (1) the preservation of 
firms (and therefore jobs) is an important and independent goal of bankruptcy; (2) 
contemplation of the rights and needs of the parties before the court matters more than 
the effect of incentives before the fact; and (3) bankruptcy judges should enjoy broad 
discretion to implement bankruptcy’s substantive policies. The proceduralists, on the 
other hand, believe that (1) the preservation of firms is not an independent good in 
itself; (2) ex ante effects are important; and (3) the judge, after controlling for the 
biases and weaknesses of the parties and resolving the legal disputes, must allow the 
parties to make their own decisions and thereby choose their own desitines. (Baird 
1998: 579-280)
Baird claims to write this as a “neutral observer” (Baird 1998: 574), but his 
statement of the dichotomy makes the “traditionalists” sound rather irrational . There 
are other arguments in favor of a “continuation bias”. Gross (1997) argues that 
insolvency laws should take into account community interests. She justifies her 
argument by a recourse to general principles of altruism. However, as Armour (2001) 
points out, it is hard to see why altruism should be legislated into insolvency law. It is 
possible, nonetheless, to extend Gross’s argument. It is possible to argue that the 
impact of a liquidation goes beyond the shareholders and creditors of the firm itself. 
We could consider the negative effect of a firm’s liquidation on the “community” as 
an externality that should taken into account. The most coherent theory o f this kind is 
an extension of Blair and Stout’s (1999) team production theory of the corporate form. 
LoPucki (2003c) argues that companies cannot be viewed as simply their shareholders
Baird writes: “I attempt to look at this problem as a neutral observer who comes to these questions 
without preconceptions. Nevertheless, these questions hold an interest for me precisely because I have 
been involved in these debates for a long time and have been strongly identified with the ranks o f those 
I call proceduralists. Hence I must remind both myself and the reader o f the difficulties I face in trying 
to assume the vantage point of a disinterested observer.” (Baird 1998: 574-5)
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and creditors. The corporate form derives its value from the fact that it stands as a 
conduit, an intermediary, between different parties. Part of the benefit of the 
separation of ownership and control is that the directors are not (or at least should not 
be) directly pursuing the interests of the shareholders, but rather of the company as a 
whole. From this perspective, therefore, “all who have made firm-specific investments 
have rights that need to be accounted for in a collective proceeding”.
There are, then, at least two reasons why companies should be rescued. Firstly, 
companies should be rescued if  it can be explicitly proven that preserving the 
copmany is the optimal method of maximizing its value. Secondly, there might be 
reasons for an a priori assumption that companies should be rescued- there could be 
value in maintaining the corporate form that is difficult to demonstrate. But- there is a 
third reason why companies should be rescued in their original corporate form; the 
possibility of the survival of the company could be an incentive for the shareholders 
and directors of the company to enter insolvency voluntarily to preserve the company 
and for them to cooperate in the restructuring of the company.
The Role of Violations of Absolute Priority
The paradigm case o f a country with a “rescue culture” would be the United 
States of America. Chapter 11 is known for protecting debtors to the extent of 
violating absolute priority, that is, shareholders are paid even when creditors have not 
been fully repaid. Absolute priority is the rule that, in bankruptcy, the debtor receives 
no value until his creditors have been repaid in full, and that junior creditors receive
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no value until senior creditors have been repaid in full. It is easy to see why deviations 
from absolute priority may be harmful; it amounts to the debtor not having to repay 
part o f the loan. This can lead to instances where the debtor has an incentive to abuse 
the loan proceeds, as, even if the debtor company goes bankrupt, the shareholders will 
still receive some return (Schwartz 1994) and, possibly, even to a reduction in lending 
across that jurisdiction as the risk to lenders is increased (Longhofer 1997).
Studies estimate violations of absolute priority (VAP) in American 
bankruptcies to be around 4-8% (Eberhart, Moore and Roenfeldt 1990, Franks and 
Torous 1989, Lopucki and Whitford 1991)63. But we should first understand that the 
letter of American law does not directly legislate for VAP. Rather, violations come 
about as a result of the interpretation and application of the law.
To loosely summarize, the U.S. Bankruptcy Code provides that the court may 
only approve a reorganization plan that has not been approved by a class of creditors 
when i) that class of creditors is “not impaired under the plan”64, ii) the impaired class 
of creditors will receive property “that is not less than the amount such holder would 
so receive or retain if the debtor were liquidated”65 or iii) the court finds that the plan 
is “fair and equitable” to the dissenting class66. The conditions for a plan to be “fair 
and equitable” are, with respect to unsecured claims, that i) the plan allows the class 
property of a value equal to the claims and ii) no claims junior to that class will
A good summary o f empirical studies concerning VAP can be found in Garbade (2001: 99-104).
64





receive any property67. The action of a court approving a plan without the approval of 
a class of creditors is commonly called a “cramdown”. Aside from situations where 
the court undervalues creditors’ claims in a cramdown, VAP tend to come in practice 
from a) creditors essentially paying off shareholders to avoid costly delays in 
negotiations (Roe 2000: 125-131)- this is a result of Chapter 11 giving voting rights to 
lower priority claimants, and b) creditors’ post-petition interest is not included in the 
value that is to be matched under the definition of “fair and equitable” (Roe 2000: 
373).
Recent academic work has argued that VAP might be beneficial. More than 
simply being concessions, necessary evils endured for the sake of implementing 
Chapter 11 voting procedures, VAP might provide positive incentives for debtors. The 
following benefits have been proposed:
Promote firm-specific investments. When a company is broken up in 
insolvency, firm-specific value is lost. Knowledge and assets geared specifically to the 
operation of that company cannot be transferred. Therefore, if the shareholders of a 
company perceive that the company may be in risk of insolvency, they will avoid 
making firm-specific investments, such as employee training (human capital 
investments). Firms may be more willing to make such investments if there is less risk 
of the firm being broken up in insolvency. (Bebchuk and Picker 1993, Berkovitch, 




Provide an incentive for debtor to enter insolvency at appropriate times.
Managers of a company will always have better information about the company than 
creditors. However, if  it is certain that managers will be ousted in insolvency, 
managers will have an incentive to postpone the insolvency. They certainly do not 
have an incentive to enter insolvency at the optimal time (for the creditors). An 
insolvency system which does not automatically displace managers may provide an 
incentive for managers to use insolvency procedures to attempt to save the company 
and encourage information disclosure by managers in general. (Baird 1991, Povel 
1999)
Lower incentives for managerial entrenchment. Managers might also attempt 
to entrench themselves in the firm to improve their bargaining position in 
reorganization proceedings. (Baird and Picker 1993, Adler and Triantis 2002)
Avoid underinvestment due to debt overhang. This is a standard agency 
problem of debt, discussed above. If the firm owes so much that any money it makes 
belongs, in effect, to creditors, shareholders will have no incentive to pursue value- 
creating projects. This can be mitigated if  shareholders are promised a share in the 
reorganized company. (Berkovitch and Israel 1998, Gertner and Scharfstein 1991)
Deter asset substitution. This is also a standard debt agency problem, also 
discussed above. Shareholders in debt-laden companies have an incentive to invest in 
high-risk projects because they do not share the losses. This can again be mitigated if 
shareholder receive a part of the reorganized company. (Eberhart and Senbet 1993, 
Gertner and Scharfstein 1991)
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VAPs are, in effect, ransoms paid by creditors in order to prevent debtors from 
injuring the firm. The costs of VAP are obvious: debtors will be able to benefit from 
reorganization to the detriment of creditors. In fact, VAP should encourage asset 
substitution because creditors would bear more of the effects of an insolvency than 
would be otherwise (Jensen and Meckling 1976). This runs directly counter to the 
proposed benefits of VAP above. The last two alleged benefits are not really benefits 
at all; they are simply cases where it is as if  the company had less debt (because the 
debt is worth less if absolute priority is not respected).
Such a reallocation of priorities would, in effect, subsidize and encourage risky 
investments from the shareholders because the debtholders would bear more risk 
(Adler 1992: 448). Additionally, Bebchuk (2002) argues that “the introduction of AP 
violations increases the nominal interest rate (to compensate the debtholders for 
getting less in bad times), and this increase in the nominal rate worsens the further the 
distortion in favor of risky projects, because such an increase lowers the attractiveness 
of safe projects more than it lowers the attractiveness of risky projects”.
What effect does VAP have empirically? The first question would be whether 
debt is priced efficiently by the market. In other words, are debtholders being 
systematically expropriated by Chapter 11? Altman and Eberhart (1994) report two 
studies that bonds appear to be priced efficiently. One study attempted to test if  bonds 
were efficiently priced at time of default, the results were mixed but the “statistically 
most reliable sample” supported efficiency. The second study compared senior bonds
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with subordinated bonds and found that seniority provided significantly higher 
payoffs, which would indicate that bonds are efficiently priced at issuance.
The second, more important, question is about the effect insolvency provisions 
have on capital structure in general. Armstrong and Riddick (2000), in examining the 
equity returns of firms in six countries (Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain,
Japan and the U.S.) find that British firms lose the most value (89%) prior to 
bankruptcy and American firms the least (61%). Germany and Japan had highly 
correlated losses in value (77%), which suggests that similar insolvency laws has 
similar effects. Armstrong and Riddick (2003) argue that liquidation bias in Britain 
and the continuation bias in the U.S. should cause British equity to be worth less than 
U.S. equity and provide evidence that British firms do lose more value than U.S. firms 
prior to an insolvency filing. However, Acharya, Sundaram and John (2004), in a 
rather more nuanced and sophisticated study, present comparative data between the 
US and UK demonstrating that, while direct comparisons between the capital structure 
of these two countries are inconclusive, there is strong support that, in an equity- 
friendly system, firms with high asset-specificity will employ greater leverage and, 
therefore, optimal debt levels in any given country would depend on both the 
bankruptcy code and the asset-specificity of the company. The intuition behind this is 
the same as the “firm-specific investment” argument in favor of VAP above: a debtor- 
friendly bankruptcy code would lead to the loss of firm-specific value in the case of an 
insolvency. Companies with extensive firm-specific assets (‘high asset-specificity’) 
would therefore choose low leverage in debtor-friendly environments in order to avoid 
insolvency.
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The studies above argue that bankruptcy codes can affect financial structure. 
However, causation can be difficult to prove in these cases and there are arguments 
that have causation running the other way: financial structure could dictate 
bankruptcy. Armour, Cheffins and Skeel (2002; “ACS”) argue that dispersed debt- 
holding calls for reorganization-oriented bankruptcy rules. The ACS argument begins 
by noting that, while the UK, like the US, has dispersed shareownership, UK firms 
tend to have concentrated debt-holders. That is, UK companies tend to be financed by 
banks rather than by publicly held bonds. The (relatively) small number of banks, in 
contrast to the large number of bond-holders, and the relative ease with which they 
can cooperate, is what allows UK companies to be re-organized out-of-court through 
an informal process known as the “London Approach” (Armour and Deakin 2001). In 
other words, so far, the UK has not “evolved” a need for a formal reorganization- 
oriented bankruptcy rules. However, ACS argue further that, as debt in UK firms 
continue to disperse, the UK might soon require US style Chapter 11 rules.
An argument closely related to the ACS thesis, though it is normative rather 
than positive, is that presented by Hahn (2004). Hahn argues that the Chapter 11 
model, where the managers of the firm are left running the firm during insolvency, is 
not appropriate for concentrated ownership firms. Firms with dispersed ownership are 
likely to be run by professional managers, while firms with concentrated ownership 
are likely to be run by family members. Professional managers “may realistically be 
expected to successfully manage the reorganizing corporation while complying with 
its fiduciary duties to the creditors”, however, if management and shareholders are 
effectively the same party (or even the same person), it is unrealistic to expect 
management to protect the interest of creditors. Another normative model is that
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presented by Berkovitch and Israel (1999; “BI”), which is based on information flows, 
rather than ownership structures. BI note that we can roughly divide financial systems 
into three types: bank-based (e.g. Germany), market-based (e.g. US) and under­
developed. The first two, developed, financial systems are assumed to have good 
information flow. To simplify the BI argument: 1) in a bank-based system, the banks 
have such good information that there is no need to pay the shareholders or managers 
a “bribe” to enter insolvency efficiently, therefore the bankruptcy system should be 
manager-displacing. 2) in a market-based system, either the creditor or the debtor 
could be the party that possesses the best information on when to file for insolvency, 
depending on the informational efficiency of the country. BI argue that managers 
should be compensated for entering insolvency efficiently according to the probability 
that debtors could have found out the relevant information. In other words, the less 
likely it is that debtors could have found out information that would have allowed 
them to put the company into insolvency efficiently, the more managers should be 
rewarded for coming forward. Such systems should therefore have both a manager- 
displacing and manager-preserving code. 3) in an under-developed system, 
information flows are very poor and BI assume that creditors know next to nothing 
about the company. Therefore, in this system, managers should gain the full benefit of 
any loss that might have been incurred if  insolvency had been postponed. Such 
systems should also have both manager-displacing and manager-preserving codes, but 
should be even more protective of managers in the manager-preserving code.
We can now ask: when is VAP appropriate? Of the benefits of VAP described 
above, it would appear that the argument that VAP encourage firm-specific 
investment is vindicated by empirical data (in the Acharya, Sundaram and John (2004)
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study). Also, debtors do not appear to be expropriated by Chapter 11, bond prices 
reflect VAP at issuance. If we accept that debtholders simply adjust their interest rates 
to reflect the value they assume would be lost in a Chapter 11 process, then we could 
describe the situation under Chapter 11 as a case where shareholders are paying 
debtholders in order to be able to maintain control of the firm in bankruptcy, which 
seems reasonable enough. The situation is similar to the arguments for weakening 
secured credit above- if the debtholders can adjust, then there is no harm to any party. 
However, this ignores the role of debt as a provider of financial discipline. Leaving 
the power to instill financial discipline to the courts weakens the power of the market. 
In a debtor-controlled insolvency process, firms would control their risk of insolvency 
through carefully managing their capital structure. In a court-controlled, manager- 
friendly insolvency process, however, the risk the managers face of being displaced is 
up to the courts. This then becomes a Coaseian question: should we leave financial 
discipline to the courts or to the markets? (A Coaseian answer would be that we 
should leave decisions to the courts when markets fail, which they may be considered 
to, if  a firm’s debt-holders are so dispersed they cannot be relied on to make a 
coordinated, efficient debt restructuring.)
Another question that should be asked is: should other countries adopt a 
Chapter 11 style system? Should the UK? Three factors are relevant: company 
ownership (Hahn 2004), debt concentration (ACS 2002), and debtor-creditor 
information flows (BI 1999). As ACS point out, as debt in the UK becomes more 
dispersed, the “London Approach” will become more difficult to implement, and a 
formal court-based procedure may become necessary. ACS also mention that the UK 
is moving towards a “debtor-in-possession” system for small companies in the
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Insolvency Act 2002.1 presume this is a reference to the moratorium for small 
companies in Schedule A l, where directors are allowed to continue to manage the 
company while proposing a Company Voluntary Arrangement (CVA). However, as 
Hahn points out, small companies, which are likely to be family-run or at least 
closely-owned, are the worst candidates for manager-preserving approaches. Small 
company owner-managers have the strongest incentives to keep the firm running for 
as long as possible at any cost and to take the highest risks in an attempt to save the 
firm, because they have a fair amount of their own personal wealth invested in the 
firm. As for under-developed countries, while BI argue, quite rightly, that creditor- 
debtor information flows are poor, it is not clear if  court systems in these countries are 
sophisticated enough to deal with issues pertaining to the financial well-being of 
companies. Also, most of these countries (LLSV 1997, 1998) have concentrated 
corporate ownership, which, as Hahn suggests, is inappropriate for manager- 
preserving insolvency.
Valuations and Voting: the Balance of Power
At the centre of insolvency law lies the assumption of debtholder conflict. If 
debtholders are not in conflict, then there is no reason for a firm to enter a formal 
insolvency process; the firm can simply restructure. All that would be required, in a 
worst case scenario, would be a mechanism for passing control of firm over from 
shareholders to debtholders. Bankruptcy would be nearly costless as debtholders 
would coordinate in order to eliminate bankruptcy costs (Haugen and Senbet 1978). 
Unfortunately, debtholder conflict is inevitable in insolvency: senior (perhaps secured) 
debtholders only require the firm to be sold for a sufficient amount to repay them and
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therefore would usually be more concerned with prompt repayment rather than 
maximizing value and junior debtholders would want the firm to continue operations 
and perhaps assume increasing risk in order for there to be a possibility the firm will 
be worth enough to cover their repayment.
Recall our earlier discussion of risk/return; an investment can have the same 
value while varying on the risk/return scale. In the case of an insolvent company, even 
if  different classes of debtholders can agree on the value of the company, they can still 
diverge greatly on the manner in which it is to be managed. Take, for example, an 
insolvent company which is worth $110, with secured debt of $100 and unsecured 
debt of $50. The company can be liquidated immediately, paying $110, or it can be 
allowed to continue, where its value can appreciate to $160 or decline to $60, with 
equal probability. Both contingencies provide the same payoff: $110. However, the 
payoff to debtholders is different. The liquidation scenario will pay $100 to the 
secured creditors and $10 to the unsecureds; the reorganization scenario, on the other 
hand, has a payoff of $80 (50% of 100+60) to the secured creditors and $30 to the
Z Q
unsecureds (60/2). Therefore, even when the creditors are agreed on firm value, their 
choices in regard to the firm’s future will be different.
However, debtholders have a strong incentive to disagree about how much the 
firm is worth. Senior debtholders will attempt to value the firm as low as possible, in 
order to deny junior debtholders any share, and junior debtholders will attempt to
Note that a reason for using $110 as firm value in the example is because if  firm value is set at $100, 
that is, the amount owed to secured creditors, then the unsecured creditors would have no say in the 
future of the firm, as the firm would effectively belong to the secured creditors. If the secured creditors 
should then pursue a risky reorganization, whatever benefit they accrue would then belong to them 
alone. The unsecured creditors would have lost their claim completely.
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value the firm as highly as possible, in order to receive any returns the firm might 
have.
There are three elements to every insolvency: 1) the valuation of the insolvent 
firm, 2) the control of the future of the insolvent firm and 3) the determination of the 
ownership of the insolvent firm. These three elements are connected (one could say 
they are circular). The valuation of the insolvent firm could determine the ownership 
of the firm and the owners of the firm could then decide its future. Or, if  the 
insolvency process is controlled by an administrator, the administrator could value the 
firm, which would determine the ownership of the firm. Or, if the insolvency process 
of that country is auction-based, the firm would be auctioned, and the shareholders 
and creditors would be paid from the proceeds of that auction. The valuation-control- 
ownership loop, then, can be cut at any link. However, determining which link to 
instigate the insolvency process is not trivial.
A) Market Valuations of the Bankrupt Firm
Arguments for market valuations start from the observation that the Chapter 11 
bargaining process is flawed. 1) The integrity of the bankruptcy process is ultimately 
maintained by the judge’s valuation of the dissenting creditors’ claims (because, as 
mentioned above, a plan may not a) distribute to a class less than the class would get 
in a liquidation without unanimous consent, or b) be “crammed down” unless it is 
“fair and equitable”). This can lead to deviations from the absolute priority, often 
inadvertent. 2) The process of bargaining can lead to inefficient capital structure 
(often involving deviation from absolute priority) as bargaining power given by
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Chapter 11 can lead to strategic negotiations. 3) The process itself is costly, both in 
direct litigation cost and delays, which can arise from a genuine inability to reach 
agreement or from strategic concerns. (Bebchuk 1988) On an empirical basis, it has 
been alleged that Chapter 11 (compared to the previous 1978 act) lends itself to 
inefficient behavior from managers, which has lead to: 1) an increase in the frequency 
of bankruptcy filing, 2) shareholders losing greater wealth and 3) bondholders losing 
greater wealth (Bradley and Rosenzweig 1992, but see counter-arguments in LoPucki 
1992).
To avoid reliance on judges and strategic bargaining, it is argued that a market- 
based valuation system can be used. Once a market valuation has been established, a 
debt-to-equity can be done to distribute the reorganized firm’s assets. There are many 
versions of market based valuation.
Auctions. The most obvious approach would be to auction off the firm’s 
assets. If the purpose of the auction is merely to value the firm, Roe (1983) has 
suggested that it might be enough to auction off a portion of the company’s assets 
(Roe suggests 10%). Baird (1986) and Jackson (1986) argue that there is no reason to 
limit the sale of the firm to 10% and advocate the sale of the entire firm by auction.
The advantage of the auction approach is that the problem of control is, if  not 
solved, then sidestepped. The auction process itself can be controlled by a third party, 
since the auction should maximize the value of the firm without the auctioneer 
requiring specialized information or incentives. However, it may be questioned 
whether auctions in general are efficient mechanisms for determining value. At least
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three problems remain: A) In an English auction (that is, bidders raise prices until 
there is a winner), it is a well-established result that the winning bid will be closer to 
the second-highest valuation rather the highest. This is because the winning bid 
merely has to beat the second-highest bid, which might not be as high as the price the 
winner is willing to pay. In a closed-bid auction, on the other hand, a bidder that 
knows his valuation is high may be wary of overbidding and therefore wait to see a 
winner first, and then if  his valuation is higher, buy the firm from the winning bidder. 
That is, there is an incentive not to reveal information. B) there is persistent risk for 
bidding firms to suffer from the winner’s curse, where it is the bidder with the most 
optimistic valuation of the firm, rather than necessarily the bidder who can most 
efficiently use the assets of the firm, who wins the auction. C) potential bidders, who 
are most likely to be firms in the same industry, may tend to be liquidity constrained 
at the same time the auctioned firm goes bankrupt. Therefore, insolvency auctions 
may well be underpriced as bidders simply do not have the capacity to pay full price. 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1992).
Ontions-based Valuation. The Bebchuck (1988) options proposal works by a) 
giving the most senior class all of the shares in the bankrupt firm then b) junior 
claimants are then given options (based on their pro-rated share of their classes’ 
claim) to buy the shares of the senior class by paying the total amount the senior class 
is owed. If the junior claimants believe the firm is worth more than the debt owed to 
the senior class, the junior claimants can buy the shares from them at the face value of 
the debt.
175
This scheme has the significant advantage that it does not require a “correct” 
valuation. Each class will simply be accorded rights; it is up to the classes to apply 
these rights for efficient gains. Once the company has been valued, Bebchuk (1988) 
notes that “the choice of capital structure cannot be used to divert value from one class 
o f participants to another”. Thus, the task of actually reorganizing the firm can 
entrusted to a variety of parties. Because company value has already been divided, it is 
even possible to simply have the reorganized company vote for a scheme under 
normal corporate law (Aghion, Hart and Moore 1992). Another advantage of the 
options scheme is that it can alleviate the liquidity problem of the auctions approach. 
As the options accorded the junior claimants are tradable, the junior claimants can 
simply sell them or use them as security to obtain external funding.
Dilution Mechanism. Adler and Ayres (2000) have proposed a mechanism 
whereby the court issues shares to the senior claimants and then solicits schedules 
from all classes of claimants to buy or sell shares at a fixed price ($1), conditioned on 
a particular number of new shares issued to junior claimants. This process aims to 
force both senior and junior claimants to reveal their true valuation of the company. 
Senior claimants would sell the shares they hold once the level of dilution diminishes 
the value of the firm to the value the senior claimants think the firm is worth and 
junior claimants would buy shares up to the level they think the firm is worth.
The dilution proposal aims to reduce the liquidity problem of the options 
proposal. In the Bebchuk (1988) proposal, even if the value of firm is above the 
claims of the senior claimant, if the junior claimants lack liquidity and are unable to 
pay off the senior claimants entirely, any senior claimants not bought out will be
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making a gain, violating absolute priority. From this perspective, the Bebchuk (1988) 
options proposal is a special case of the dilution proposal, where the senior claimants 
tender their entire share without dilution.
Consider a paradigm case: both parties agree that the firm is worth $160. The 
senior class gets 100 shares, priced at $1. Dilution shares are then continuously 
supplied to the junior class until a) the senior class desires to sell its shares and b) the 
junior class stops wanting to buy shares. This should occur at the same time, that is, 
when 60 dilution shares have been issued, because that is the point at which each 
share is now worth $1. This is essentially a fixed-price sealed-bid auction for the value 
of firm in excess of what the senior class had been given. The amount given to the 
senior class, however, has to be the amount the senior class is owed. Consider again 
the case above: the senior class is owed $80 and both parties agree that the firm is 
worth $160. At the equilibrium dilution point, the senior class has 100 shares and the 
junior class has 60 shares, each share is worth $1; the senior class makes a profit; 
conversely, if the senior class is given less than it owed, the senior class will make a 
loss (if the senior class is owed $110 and the firm is worth $160, the same scheme 
would result in a $10 loss to the senior class). To maintain absolute priority, the 
amount given to senior class has to be exactly equal to what it is owed.
Therefore, we can view the dilution mechanism as a reverse auction, where the 
winner of the auction has to pay the senior class whatever it is owed. From this 
perspective, it is possible to execute the mechanism with an external auctioneer. The 
advantage of handing the process over to one of the parties is that it can make the 
process cashless. It works as a reverse auction because the price is initially set high
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and is then bid down until there is a buyer. (In the basic Adler/Ayres framework, this 
would be junior class.) The usual drawback of a reverse auction is that the price 
cannot go higher than the initial offering price, however, in this case, that is not 
significant, because if the price is so high that the auctioneer does not allow it to be 
bid down (in the dilution framework, the senior class does not sell even at no 
dilution), then the whole firm simply falls to the senior class (implying that the firm is 
worth less than what the senior class is owed).
The advantage the Adler and Ayres offers over the Bebchuk options proposal 
is that, if  the Adler/ Ayres proposal works perfectly, it should not require either class 
to have liquidity at all, since the dilution mechanism should distribute shares to the 
equilibrium price without either class having to buy anything. (Once a valuation has 
been established, the shares can then be distributed in order to pay off the senior 
class.) In the worst case scenario, where the senior class (or the auctioneer) attempts to 
test the junior class’s liquidity by “daring” them to buy the shares at low or, for that 
matter, no dilution, the amount the junior class requires is at worst equal to what is 
required under the Bebchuk scheme. The Adler/Ayres proposal, in other words, works 
as a cashless auction (for the junior and senior classes; third-party bidders will still 
have to pay cash). To put it another way, the winner of the auction has to pay the 
senior class what they are owed and the junior class any value in excess of that (in 
accordance with absolute priority), however, whichever class wins the auction gets the 
entire company and can then pay off the losing class in shares, which means that no 
cash changes hands.
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In summary, the dilution mechanism works as an auction where the senior 
class are protected against junior class over-valuation by a put option, where they can 
force the junior class to buy them out at the face value of their debt, while the junior 
class is protected against senior class undervaluation by a call option, where the junior 
class can buy senior class shares at undervalue. To reformulate the dilution 
mechanism in starker terms, the junior class is given three options: a) it can propose a 
distribution of shares acceptable to the senior class or b) it can pay off the senior class 
at face value and get the entire firm. If the junior class is unable or unwilling to do a) 
or b), then c) the senior class gets the entire firm. Stated in this way, we can see that 
where the dilution mechanism adds to the options proposal is in the added alternative 
of proposing a distribution of shares acceptable to both junior and senior classes.
To restate the logic of the procedure: the senior class will only agree to take 
shares in the reorganized firm if it is equal to or above the value of their debt and the 
junior class will only give shares to the senior class if  the shares are equal to or lower 
than the value of the debt. If the senior and junior classes agree on valuation, this 
procedure will reveal that value (for example, if the company is worth $160 and the 
senior class are owed $100, the equilibrium distribution would be to give the senior 
class 85% of shares, which would reveal the $160 valuation). If an equilibrium 
valuation is reached, no cash needs to change hands. We can note further that even in 
cases of divergent valuations, absolute priority will be maintained to the perceived 
valuation of each party. If the senior class values the firm higher than the junior class, 
it will accept a lower number of shares rather than be paid the face value of debt, and 
if the senior class value the firm lower than the junior class, it will simply be paid the 
face value of debt.
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Problems with Market Valuations. It is generally recognized that markets 
cannot be relied on to solve every problem automatically. There are widely discussed 
problems that lead to market failure. The market valuation methods cited above do not 
escape these problems. There are three problems in particular that have not been 
satisfactorily resolved:
1) Liquidity. The authors of all the methods above acknowledge that liquidity 
can be an impediment to the implementation of their procedures. In the auction 
method, whether in 10% version or full auction version, if the likely buyers of the 
business are affected by the same market forces that lead to the bankruptcy of the 
auctioned company, then the price the bankrupt company fetches in the auction is 
likely to be lower than its true value. In the options proposal, if  the junior creditors 
cannot obtain funding to buy out the senior creditors, then the return will accrue to the 
senior creditors, violating absolute priority. Similarly, in the dilution mechanism, if 
the senior creditors choose to sell their stake, the juniors must be able to obtain 
funding to make the mechanism respect absolute priority.
Generally, in a reasonably efficient market, firms should be able to obtain 
funding for a profitable project, even if  they do not possess the fund themselves, by 
borrowing or issuing shares. In the options proposal, the options themselves can be 
sold, which would mean the creditworthiness of the junior class would not be an issue. 
Adler and Ayres (2000) cite four reasons why liquidity issues would be mitigated in 
their proposal: 1) Third party bids could be allowed, which would, in effect, work like 
an auction. However this would still be affected by the above observation that likely
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third party bidders themselves may be liquidity constrained. 2) Dilution leverage. That 
is, the junior class could use the dilution shares they are issued as collateral for a loan. 
However, if  the senior class is acting strategically, it would, rationally, choose to 
“put” their shares at the lowest possible dilution, precisely to deny the use of dilution 
shares as leverage. 3) Free-riding. Adler and Ayres (2000) argue that individual senior 
class members would be reluctant to “put” their shares because they would choose to 
hold out for the possibility of gaining from the reorganized company’s shares. 
However, if  the senior class believe the junior class to have a similar valuation of the 
company, the senior class knows it will offered shares in the reorganized company 
equal to the value of the debt they are owed. Therefore, it would make sense 
strategically for the senior class to either a) challenge the junior class’s liquidity orb) 
only accept a share offer if it is sufficiently generous (thus violating absolute priority). 
4) Acquiescence. If the shares of the company may be worth more if sufficient share 
ownership is given to junior claimants, the senior class may allow the junior class to 
hold shares even if  the senior class can win a liquidity challenge. Note, however, that 
this applies to all of the above forms of market valuation. While such situations could 
occur in practice, it would be remiss to allow a contingency to be one of the primary 
solutions to such a central problem.
2) Transaction and Informational Costs. The above discussion raises the 
general question: what impedes the functioning of markets? Situations in which 
institutions could function better than markets are when there are high transactions 
costs (including information asymmetries). In addition to the discussion above, 
acquiring external funding can involve significant transaction costs, both directly, 
such as the costs in obtaining and documenting the funding and compensating the
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lender for various risks (i.e. paying interest) and indirect costs, such as, having to post 
collateral and tying up capital for other projects.
We can also discuss informational problems. Creditors are unlikely to be 
sufficiently informed to manage (or, for that matter, sell) the business they finance. 
External financiers are likely to have even less information about the business, and as 
such, would not be in position to finance (without significant costs), much less 
manage, the reorganization of the bankrupt firm. (See the discussion in Bufford 1994.)
3) The Problem of Control. The valuation approach aims to set the value of the 
firm, which would then decide the ownership and control of the firm. However, 
control is an intrinsic element of the value of the firm in two ways: a) the value of the 
firm may depend on who controls the firm (that is, what direction the firm is heading, 
or even a reflection of the competence of the managers of the firm) and b) controlling 
blocks of the firm command a premium (as discussed in the second chapter). The 
valuation approach effectively ignores these elements.
A. In all but one of the approaches mentioned above, the valuation of the 
reorganized firm will be uncertain because the prospective buyers of the firm do not 
know who will control the firm (or even which management team will lead the firm). 
(The exception is the whole company auction, which will be discussed later.) In 
analogous cases, such as an IPO or an M&A, the management team or prospective 
buyer will have to set out a prospectus for the status and future of the firm. In the 10% 
auction, options or dilution proposal, the identity of the management of the 
reorganized firm is potentially until the valuation process is complete. This leads to
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uncertainty in the value of the firm. The exception to this is a whole company auction, 
where the buyer will, of course, control the firm.
The problem also occurs in the options and dilution proposals, but in different 
forms. In the dilution mechanism, in some cases this will not be a problem. For 
example, if  we assume that 50% gives control of a firm, the senior class is owed $100, 
the firm will be worth $120 if the senior class controls it and worth $160 if the junior 
class controls it, then in this case, it is clear that whichever valuation we use the senior 
class will end up controlling the firm. (Note that the senior class may well 
subsequently hire the junior class to manage the firm. However, this will only affect 
the valuation of the firm subsequent to the valuation.) Situations where there will be 
problem are when, for example, if we again assume 50% as the control threshold and 
the senior class is owed $100, the firm will be worth $190 if  the firm controlled by the 
senior class and worth $210 if  it is controlled by the junior class. In this case, the 
valuation and control of the firm are inextricably linked. The junior class will not be 
able to offer the higher valuation unless they are absolutely certain they will gain 
control. In the options proposal, the problem occurs at the other end of the spectrum. 
Recall that under the options proposal, the junior class has to buy out the senior class 
at the face value of their debt. If the senior class is owed $100, and the firm is worth 
$90 if  controlled by the senior class and $110 if  controlled by the junior class, the 
junior class will only be willing to exercise any of their options if they are confident 
they can exercise enough of their options to gain control.
B. Controlling shareholders of firm command a premium. They control the 
future of the firm, they have more information and they may even derive private
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benefits from the control. The fact that such controlling blocks may exist is a serious 
flaw of the Roe 10% auction proposal, as a 10% block will not reflect the value of the 
controlling block. (Roe 1983) Similar complications arise in the options and dilution 
proposals. If the exercising of the options or the dilution mechanism leaves any single 
shareholder in possession of a controlling block, that resulting shareholder in effect 
has profited from the distribution. Roe (1983) has suggested (and Bebchuck (1988) 
has endorsed) a provision whereby any party that is provided with a controlling block 
is required to dispose of his controlling position, by selling his shares until they fall 
below a certain threshold, within a specified period of time. However, this would 
ensure that the resulting reorganized company has a dispersed shareholding structure, 
which, particularly since the reorganized company does not yet have a management 
team in place, could lead to serious problems in corporate governance (as discussed in 
Chapter 2).
B) Structured Bargaining
It is the contention of many opponents of market valuation methods that the 
best (though, admittedly flawed) way to avoid the distortions of market valuations is 
have the court guide the restructuring process (Bufford 1994, LoPucki 2003a). The 
court will both limit the range of options available (preserving absolute priority) and 
facilitate the passing of desirable restructuring plans (e.g. cramdown in Chapter 11). 
These are sometimes irreconcilable goals. It has to be recognized as well that any type 
of structured bargaining apportions negotiating leverage to the parties and that it is 
difficult (perhaps even impossible) to impose negotiating rules without distorting the 
balance of power.
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We will now examine the bargaining process under the UK administration 
procedure. The administration restructuring process can be divided into two general 
steps: 1) The administrator has to propose a plan that, unless the company’s value is 
low enough such that unsecured creditors will receive no distribution, will be voted on 
by unsecured creditors.69 2) In this proposal, the administrator may propose to 
restructure the debt using one of the two tools for court-assisted restructuring: a) a 
company voluntary arrangement (CVA) under Part I of the Insolvency Act or b) a
7ftscheme of arrangement under section 425 of the Companies Act.
1. The Administrator’s Proposal. At the outset of the administration, the
71administrator will set out a proposal for the purpose of the administration. If the 
administrator thinks that the company has sufficient property for a distribution to 
made to unsecured creditors, then the administrator must hold an initial creditors’ 
meeting where the unsecured creditors will vote on the proposal. Resolutions are 
passed by a simple majority of members present.72 Secured creditors are not allowed 
to vote the secured part of their debt (unless the administrator thinks unsecured
7Tcreditors will get nothing). However, secured creditors’ rights are protected by 
section 73 (l)(a) and 73 (2)(a) of Schedule B l, Insolvency Act 1986, which prevents 
the administrator setting out a proposal that affects the rights of a secured creditor of 
the company to enforce his security, unless the relevant creditor consents. The secured
69
Rule 2.40 (1) and (2), the Insolvency (Amendment) Rules 2003.
70
Section 49 (3) (a) and (b) Schedule B l, Insolvency Act 1986
71
Section 49 (1) Schedule B l, Insolvency Act 1986
72
Rule 2.60 (1) Insolvency (Amendment) Rules 2003.
185
creditor states his estimation of the value of his security in the proof of debt,74 but, if 
the administrator is dissatisfied with the valuation, the administrator may require any 
property comprised in the security to be offered for sale.75 (The terms of the sale may 
be agreed or as the court may direct. )
Presumably, only unsecured creditors are given the right to vote because they 
are the residual risk bearers and secured creditors’ rights are adequately protected. 
However, this is problematic both in regard to shareholders and secured creditors:
1) Shareholders. With regard to shareholders, recall that a company may enter 
administration when “the company is or is likely to become unable to pay its debts”.77 
That is, the company may enter administration from pure cashflow reason, even 
though the assets of the company are valuable enough for distribution to shareholders. 
Even in cases where shareholders may be entitled to distribution from the company, 
they are not entitled to vote, nor are their rights protected by the statutory purposes of 
administration, which means they cannot even defend their rights by an application to 
the courts. (The purposes only protect “the interests of the creditors of the company as 
a whole”. ) If the company is indeed worth more than is owed to creditors, the 
administrator, working for the interests of the creditors, may pursue a course of action
73
Section 52 (1) (b) Schedule B l Insolvency Act 1986 read in conjunction with Rule 2.40 (1) and (2)
o f the Insolvency (Amendment) Rules 2003.
74
Rule 2.72 (vii) Insolvency (Amendment) Rules 2003.
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Rule 2.93 (1) Insolvency (Amendment) Rules 2003.
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that does not maximize the value of the company, but rather a lower risk policy that 
guarantees the unsecured creditors the highest return.
2) Secured Creditors. A rationale for denying secured creditors the right to 
vote (at least for the secured portion of their claim) is that secured creditors are not the 
residual riskbearer of the company. The reason why residual owners are considered to 
be the optimal decision-makers for the company is because they capture the marginal 
risk and return of the company. However, in cases where firm value is highly variable, 
this is no longer true. Decisions regarding firm policy can affect more than just the 
value of the lowest priority class. Recall our discussion earlier that senior and junior 
classes have differing strategies in regard to risk-bearing for the firm. Senior classes 
have incentives to keep the risk of the firm low because they do not capture any 
benefit if  firm values goes beyond what they are owed, but are affected if  firm value 
falls below that threshold. Conversely, junior classes have incentives to pursue a high- 
risk strategy because their downside risk is limited. Allowing only unsecured creditors 
to vote would mean that unsecured creditors would be likely to pursue a high-risk 
strategy. Secured creditor rights are protected, however, to the extent that they can 
enforce their security. This can still, nevertheless, lead to violations of absolute 
priority if  the firm is worth more restructured than liquidated. The situation is similar 
to the forces behind “strategic NPLs” (Non-Performing Loans).
The Asian Crisis was marked by the phenomenon of strategic NPLs. This was 
a situation where distressed debtors would elect not to repay their loans and, in effect, 
challenge creditors to take them into bankruptcy proceedings. At the time, most 
countries affected by the Asian Crisis had auction-based (i.e. liquidation) bankruptcy
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systems. One counter-intuitive result was that very few firms were actually liquidated 
and most firms were restructured in ways that violated absolute priority. This is 
because these firms had much higher going-concem values than liquidation values. 
What happens then is, because all debt restructuring had to done with the consent of 
both parties (debtor and creditor), the system gave debtors the negotiating leverage to 
offer the following deal to creditors: either a) the firm is liquidated and the creditor 
gets minimal returns or b) the firm can be restructured, however, the excess value 
from the restructuring had to shared with the debtor. (See a discussion along similar 
lines in Kordana and Posner 1999.) To use a numerical example: the firm is worth $50 
if  liquidated and $120 if restructured. The creditor is owed $100. The creditor can 
choose to liquidate the firm and get $50 or he can negotiate with the debtor to 
restructure the firm, however, in a restructuring, the creditor must offer part of the 
excess returns to the debtor. That is, out of the $70 ($120-$50), since the leverage for 
the negotiation is split evenly (both the creditor and the debtor have the power to 
collapse the deal), each party would probably get half. Therefore, the creditor would 
receive $85 and the debtor would receive $35, which violates absolute priority.
In the case of UK administration, it may be argued that the administrator is 
statutorily bound not to offer a deal that violates absolute priority,79 and therefore such 
a situation cannot arise without the secured creditors alleging “unfair harm” against 
the administrator.80 However, in the realities of deal-making, it is possible that the 
unsecured creditors could make it known that they will not accept any deal that does 
not split the excess value equally. Arguably, the risk is mitigated under the UK regime
79
As previously mentioned, the administrator must act “in the interests o f the creditors o f the company 
as a whole”.
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as the administrator has the option of proposing a going-concem sale before the issue 
comes to a vote by the creditors’ meetings (see the discussion in Armour and Mokal 
2005: 21-22). The situation under the present UK regime would then be as follows:
1) The administrator could effect a going-concem sale, on the grounds 
that delaying the decision to sell the company would be detrimental to its value (note: 
not for the reason that such a decision would be blocked if  put to a creditors’ vote). 
The Court has indicated that it is willing to countenance such a sale, but the sale may 
be contest later as an abuse of the administrator’s powers (Armour and Mokal 2005: 
22)
2) The issue of a going-concem sale may be put to a creditors’ meeting 
vote, where the same concerns as above would apply. Presuming the going-concem 
sale does not completely pay back the unsecured creditors (thus giving them the right 
to vote), they could still vote to block the sale, with the aim of procuring a better 
(priority-violating) deal.
3) If the administrator’s proposals and its subsequent revisions are 
rejected, then the issue falls to the courts. In that case. s. 55 (2) of Schedule Bl states 
that the court may:
(a) provide that the appointment of an administrator shall cease to have 
effect from time to time;
(b) adjourn the hearing conditionally or unconditionally;
(c) make an interim order;
80
Section 74(1 )(a) and (b).
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(d) make an order on a petition for winding up suspended by virtue of 
paragraph 40(1 )(b);
(e) make any other order (including an order making consequential 
provision) that the court thinks appropriate.
It would seem that in any case where the unsecured creditors fail to coerce the
secured creditors and the administrator into getting a preferential deal, the issue will
ultimately reach the courts, either as a challenge to the administrator’s use of powers,
as in 1), or as a court decision if the administrator’s proposals are rejected by the
creditors’ meeting. It is therefore crucial that the court present a line of decisions that
will dissuade unsecured creditors from taking unfair advantage of the voting power
81given them by the insolvency regime. In Re T & D Industries, Neuberger J advised 
that administrators seeking to avoid challenge should seek the consent of as many 
creditors as possible. This would indicate that the court believes that the going- 
concem sale should be a reflection, as far as possible, of what creditors would desire 
(if given the time to decide). However, in this case, the court would have to clearly 
indicate that the unsecured creditors are not to use their rights in the creditors’ meeting 
to the detriment of the secured creditors (perhaps by arguing that by effecting a going- 
concem sale, the administrator is fulfilling its duty of serving the interests of all 
creditors, whereas allowing it to come to vote would benefit only the unsecured 
creditors.)
2. Debt Restructuring. An administrator is allowed to propose a plan that 
affects the right of a secured creditor to enforce his security or disturb the priority of a 
preferential creditor only in three ways: a) he obtains the consent of the creditor, b) a
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CVA or c) a scheme of arrangement. Effectively, in an insolvency where there are 
many creditors with conflicting interests, there are only two ways to apply to the court 
for assistance in reaching a reorganization agreement: a CVA or a scheme.
€>•5
CVAs. In a CVA, both a shareholders’ and creditors’ meeting have to held. 
Approval at the meetings requires a 75% majority of the value of the members present 
or voting by proxy.84 Once passed, the arrangement binds all parties, both those 
entitled to vote and those that would have been so entitled had he had had notice of
Of
it. However, the meetings may not approve of any proposal that affects the right of a 
secured creditor to enforce his security, except with the concurrence of the creditor 
concerned.86
As Finch (2002: 352-253) points out, there are two main issues regarding the 
CVA: 1) whether the approval majority of the CVA is too high and 2) whether 
shareholders should given the right to participate in the CVA at all.
1) There are valid reasons for maintaining a high threshold for any resolution 
that will affect the return of those dissenting. As Finch (2002: 352) relates, the DTI 
argued that the 75% rule “was designed to encourage companies only to enter a 
moratorium if a successful rescue is likely and to provide an effective bar to unsound 
proposals being accepted”. The Insolvency Service, after consultation, “was moved by
81
[2000] 1 BCLC 471
82
Section 73(1) and (2) Schedule B l Insolvency Act 1986.
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Section 3(2) of Part 1 o f the Insolvency Act 1986.
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Rule 1.19 Insolvency Rules 1986.
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the argument that lowering the threshold would not necessarily have any significant 
effect on acceptance levels; and that concerns would be aroused by binding creditors 
against their will by a simple majority”. However, given the fact that the voting 
provisions do not bind secured creditors (who must concur individually) and the high 
majority bar, it is doubtful whether the CVA voting provisions will be of much 
assistance in cases where agreement between creditors is caused by the presence of 
many creditors and conflicting interests (the paradigm case for bankruptcy law).
2) As argued above, there is no reason to exclude shareholders from a 
reorganization if the value of the firm leaves them a stake. What is worrying about the 
CVA provisions is that it has no minimum value requirement. Even more worrying is 
Section 4A (3) of Part 1 of the Insolvency Act 1986 which states:
If the decision taken by the creditors’ meeting differs from that taken by the
company meeting, a member of the company may apply to the court.
This has to read in conjunction with Section 4A (6), which states:
On an application under subsection (3), the court may-
(a) order the decision of the company meeting to have effect instead of the 
decision of the creditor meeting, or
(b) make such other order as it thinks fit.
What is most distressing is that there are no statutory guidelines (and at the 
moment, minimal judicial precedents) regarding the application of these sections. 
Section 4A(6)(a) would appear to imply that there is a presumption that in the case of 
shareholder and creditor conflict, the shareholders’ resolution is to prevail. Section 
4A(6)(b), if  read literally, would appear to give the court the authority to allow the
Section 4(3) Part 1 Insolvency Act 1986.
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creditors’ resolution to prevail. (How far does that authority extend? May the court 
amend the resolutions? Can the court affect the rights of secured creditors? Surely 
not.) What is required here is some variant of the “fair and equitable” rules of Chapter 
11 that guides the court’s decisions on whether and how to prefer one meeting’s 
resolutions over another. For example, if  the value of company extends to the 
shareholders and the creditors are adequately protected, the court may prefer the
resolution of the company meeting. As such, section 4A leaves too much room for
87confusion .
Schemes o f  Arrangements. Section 425 of the Companies Act 1985 allows for 
a company to come to an arrangement with its creditors. Resolutions may be passed 
by a majority in number representing three-fourths in value of the creditors or class of
OQ
creditors. The major difference between a CVA and a scheme is that “the 
supervision of a voluntary arrangement is left mainly to the nominee of the scheme
D A
rather than the court, as under a section 425 scheme.” Schemes of arrangement have 
many requirements, many of which are only vaguely defined, which may be 
challenged in court. As such, schemes under section 425 have not proven popular. As 
Finch (2002: 326) states: “A major constraint on use has been that such schemes have 
been so rigorously protective of minority interests that, in practice, schemes have not
There are some precedents from winding-up cases. In In Re Tea Corporation [1904] 1 Ch. 12, the 
court disregarded dissent from shareholders when it regarded the shareholders as having “no interest 
whatever in the assets” and in In Re St. Thomas ’ Dock Company (1875-76) LR 2 Ch. D. 116, the court 
chose to dismiss a petition for winding up from unsecured creditors when it believed the assets from a 
winding up to be insufficient to cover the secured debt. Aside from the burden upon the court to value 
the company (which the court might not be best placed to do), these judgments appear to be 
conceptually sound.
88
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been approved unless they have happened to satisfy the interests of all parties affected 
by them.”
One major difference between s. 425 schemes is that creditors are to be 
divided into classes. The commonly used definition of a class was given by Bowen 
L.J. in Sovereign Life Assurance Co. v. Dodc?0: “those persons whose rights are not so 
dissimilar as to make it impossible for them to consult together with a view to their 
common interest”. Although it could argued that any party voting against the scheme 
could be considered evidence of a dissimilarity of common interest, this view has been 
corrected in several decisions. In Re BTR Pic., Jonathan Parker J. argued that the 
rights which arise from class should be considered distinct from the personal interests 
of the members of the class.91 Chadwick L.J. warned in Re Hawk Insurance Ltd?2, 
that “the courts should be wary of giving the minority a veto by the overzealous 
application of court distinctions. The minority are still protected by the need to obtain 
the court’s sanction even if  the meetings have approved the scheme.” One advantage 
that a scheme may have over a CVA for debtors is that, in a scheme, it may be 
possible for secured creditors to come to an arrangement without individual consents. 
That is, if  a majority comprising 75% of value of a class of secured creditors consent 
to a scheme, that may be sufficient to confirm the scheme even if it impedes on the 
right of the secured creditors to enforce their security. However, while “those who 
have a common security, e.g. holders of debentures ranking pari passu, will comprise
90
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a class”, creditors who have “similar though not common security” will probably not 
comprise a class.94
There are many obstacles to approving a scheme in practice:
1) Constitution of Classes. If classes have been not classified correctly, the 
court may not subsequently sanction the scheme. However, the court will not rule on 
the classification of classes until the final hearing for the court’s sanction of the 
scheme. This leaves considerable uncertainty. This practice has been strongly 
criticized in Re Hawk Insurance Ltd.95, where Chadwick L.J. pointed out that such late 
decisions over this matter means that where the applicant made a wrong decision at 
the outset there will have been a considerable waste of time and expense.
2) Fair Representation. Each class must also be fairly represented. In addition 
to the rule that approval requires a majority of three-fourths in value of the class, if 
that majority are in a position to gain from the scheme by reason of some other 
capacity, then the court may reject the scheme, particularly if the minority object.96 
Note that requirement that approval requires both a majority in numbers as well as 
75% of value already makes schemes more difficult to approve than CVAs. (For the 
simple reason that it amounts to two requirements, which may not overlap, instead of 
one. See Braham and Steffen 2001.)
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3) Reasonable Approval of a Man of Business. The court may not sanction a 
scheme if  it concludes that there is “such an objection to it as that any reasonable man 
might say he could not approve it”. However, as Lloyd J. in Re Equitable Life 
Assurance Society said:
Unless it be said that these favourable votes were obtained under some 
misapprehension or as a result of inadequate information, it would be a 
remarkable proposition that a Scheme favoured by more than 220,000 of the 
Society’s policy-holders was one which no intelligent and honest man in their
Q Q
position could reasonably approve.
A scheme, then, can only be passed if  the court sanctions it at two levels, both 
at classification of classes and the fair and equitable nature of the scheme itself. A 
scheme requires: 1) an extensive statement sent to all creditors and members, 2) an 
approval vote from a majority in number representing 75% in value and 3) sanction 
from the court regarding classification and the fair and equitable nature of the scheme. 
It can be seen why schemes are regarded as an expensive, difficult and complicated 
processes.
Conclusion. Both CVAs and Schemes under s. 425 have problems that render 
them unlikely to be helpful in resolving conflicts between creditors. CVAs do not 
affect the rights of secured creditors, require a 75% majority and furthermore, appear 
to allow shareholders a say in the proceedings whether the value of the company 
extends to them or not. Schemes, on the other hand, would appear to allow voting 
within the secured creditor class, but, on the other hand, require an even more 
stringent majority (75% in value which must also be 50% in number), are procedurally
97
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cumbersome, and are open to extensive intervention by the courts (towards the 
rejection of the scheme, not for the facilitation of the scheme). As Finch (2002: 355) 
notes, from the perspective that creditors are likely to be in conflict, “it may be argued 
that the CVA is unlikely ever to offer the most popular or effective route to rescue 
because in most areas of corporate trouble the creditors tend to have divergent 
interests and powers that rescue operations are most likely to be arrived at by degrees 
of imposition rather than negotiation”. Therefore, whether for a CVA or a Scheme, 
improvements would have to “institute changes that will reduce divergences of 
interest (or perceived divergences of interest) between different creditor groupings”. 
(Finch 2002: 355)
The Privatization of Bankruptcy
There is a long line of argumentation, particularly in the American bankruptcy 
literature, encouraging the use of private solutions to bankruptcy. The failings of 
Chapter 11 are well documented and therefore it is to be expected that participants 
should have strong incentives to avoid these problems through private negotiations. 
For example, Jensen (1988) argued that one benefit of concentrated debt (e.g. an 
LBO) would be to effectively privatize the bankruptcy process as having large, few 
creditors allows the process of debt restructuring without having to go through the 
Chapter 11 structured bargaining process. A pair of papers by Baird and Rasmussen 
take these arguments even further: they allege that 1) the traditional goal of 
bankruptcy- to preserve the going concern value of the firm- is no longer important, as 




minimal" and, therefore, 2) large corporations and their creditors deal with financial 
distress either by privately negotiating a solution (such as a prepackaged bankruptcy) 
or arranging a sale; companies that enter bankruptcy without a solution already in 
place are usually also without going-concem value. (Baird and Rasmussen 2003a and 
2003b.) LoPucki (2003a) has argued against the conclusions of Baird and Rasmussen, 
pointing out that 1) the value of the corporate form also rests on the relationships 
between the people in the organization, which is not easy to reestablish when the firm 
is split up and 2) the Baird and Rasmussen hypothesis would imply that there is some 
contractual means to efficiently allocate rights in a bankruptcy outside the formal 
process, however, this mechanism has not been specified.
Ignoring for the moment the empirical debate between LoPucki and Baird and 
Rasmussen (whether the number of large bankruptcy reorganizations have increased 
or not), we will examine here the contention that the trend for large bankruptcies (in 
the US) to end up either a prepackaged bankruptcy or an asset sale (also noted in 
Skeel 2001) is desirable and an indication that the market is correcting towards 
efficiency through contracting. This is similar to the argument that UK insolvency 
need not be improved, as most large insolvencies in the UK are dealt with adequately 
by the “London Approach”.100 It is possible to note at least two alternate hypotheses:
1) Prediction. Prepackaged bankruptcies could be increasing because parties 
are becoming more sophisticated and now able to predict, for better or worse, how 
they would fare in the courts. Rationally, if  any party in a prepackaged bankruptcy
99
This follows from Coase’s classic argument that the reason for the existence o f the corporation (as 
opposed to separate contracts between individuals) is that transactions costs (e.g. negotiating costs) 
between individuals is high and can be lowered by uniting these individual in a corporate enterprise.
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thinks it can do better in a Chapter 11 process than from the prepackaging, then they 
would have an incentive to push the bankrupt firm into Chapter 11. If the results are 
largely determinate, then there is no reason why the parties will not simply apportion 
the reorganization in the same proportion they predict they will receive under Chapter
11. This, however, does not indicate any approval or disapproval of the Chapter 11 
process. It simply preempts it.
2) Cost Avoidance. In fact, Chapter 11 need not be entirely predictable. If all 
parties believe they will end up worse in Chapter 11 (through costs, both direct, e.g. 
legal fees and indirect, e.g. reputation loss, inadequate financing, delays), they might 
come to an agreement simply to avoid Chapter 11. Once again, the fact that the case 
did not reach Chapter 11 does not mean that the agreement reached is efficient, one 
would expect the party that bears the most loss from the Chapter 11 process to 
concede the most in order to achieve a deal that avoids Chapter 11 as much as 
possible.
It is possible even to say that all bankruptcy contracting takes place in the 
shadow of Chapter 11. In the same way, the “London Approach” takes place in the 
shadow of UK insolvency law. These private negotiations are presumably more 
efficient than the formal process itself, but this need not be because they are 
intrinsically efficient; these “privatized” bankruptcies could simply be avoiding the 
costs of formal bankruptcy. If the underlying law, ultimately the last resort in an 
insolvency, is improved, then the private negotiations themselves would improve.
For details on the “London Approach”, see Armour and Deakin (2001).
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Conclusion
While the desirability of “rescue” is debatable, the amendments introduced by 
the Enterprise Act 2002 to the UK insolvency regime in unlikely to lead to any real 
rescue. If we consider that a court-assisted rescue is most required in cases where 
there are conflicts of interests between creditors (and even maybe shareholders), we 
can see that the present regime poses many impediments in efficiently resolving those 
cases:
1) The administrator has no statutory duty to look after shareholder interests 
(even if shareholders still carry residual value in the company) and the statutory duty 
to “rescue” the company only applies to very restricted situations.
2) The two debt restructuring regimes offered (CVAs and s. 425 schemes) 
require high creditor approval. The CVA does not affect secured creditor rights and 
the s.425 scheme is very strongly protective of minority interests. These are unlikely 
to be successful in cases with high inter-creditor conflict.
3) We cannot simply rely on out-of-court mechanisms, such as the “London 
Approach” because ultimately such mechanisms will reflect the law. If any party can 
get a better return by using the judicial mechanism, they will. The fact it is not 
possible to contract out of insolvency regimes means that all negotiations take place in 
the shadow of insolvency law.
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In sum, the new administration regime cannot really be called a “rescue” 
regime at all, but rather an unsecured creditor biased regime. Given that the Enterprise 
Act 2002 also introduced the ring-fenced fund for the benefit of the unsecured creditor 
(as discussed in chapter 2), it can perhaps cynically be argued that the statements on 
“rescue” are, in fact, nothing more than cant obscuring the real purpose of the Act, 





My central theme in this thesis through this thesis is that markets are 
constantly adjusting. The absence or weakness of an institution does not mean that the 
market breaks down; it compensates. If equity protection is weak, investors will rely 
on debt; if the bankruptcy courts are inefficient, debt restructurings will take place 
privately. This means that the identification of any alleged weakness in a country’s 
economic system has to be undertaken with a high degree of subtlety: you cannot stop 
at pointing out the deficient institution, you have to follow through to the limits of 
what the market can do to compensate for that deficiency. For example, critics of the 
American capitalism in the 1980s (when Japan was ascendant) would claim that the 
American background of arm’s length shareholding and lending impaired its ability to 
fund innovation. This problem was admirably solved in the 90s by the proliferation of 
venture capitalism (which requires an active stock market). A notable fact is that, if 
we compare developed countries over a 20 year period, it is difficult to identify a 
system with a distinct advantage (as measured by growth rate of GDP per capita). 
(Turner 2001)
I have examined three cases in particular: ownership concentration, secured credit and 
insolvency.
Concentrated Ownership
In a recent paper, Mark Roe (2005: 246) presents two conclusions, the first 
strong, the second weak: a) “studies that examine corporate law worldwide tend to
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overpredict the importance of corporate law in the world’s richest nations” and b) 
“development agencies may do everything right in getting the corporate law 
institutions of these nations ready for ownership separation, and it is at least possible 
that no one comes to the party”. I agree with both of these conclusions. Roe’s (2005: 
247) argument is that “The quality of conventional corporate law does not fully 
explain why and when ownership concentration persists in the wealthy West, because 
core corporate law does not even try to directly prevent managerial agency costs from  
dissipating a firm ’s value” (italics in original).
This might be overstating the matter. Part of the problem, in my opinion, is 
that Roe is simply using the wrong measure: he should be looking at private benefits 
of control, rather than separation of ownership and control. There are many forces at 
play in the separation of ownership and control that have nothing to do with private 
benefits: for example, the growth and size of corporation, the market for managers, 
and patterns of shareholding in a society. Private benefits are a much more direct 
measure of the impact of corporate law and in this, as Gilson and Gordon (2003) put 
it, corporate law imposes an “upper bound” of how much majority shareholders can 
take. Even in “wealthy” countries, Holdemess and Sheehan (2000: 162) find a wide 
differential in how much American and New Zealander minority shareholders get paid 
in reorganizations which can be explained primarily by corporate law. Dyck and 
Zingales (2002) find that LLSV’s “anti-director” rights explain 17 percent of the 
variation in private benefits of control across countries.
Nevertheless, it is clear that extra-legal institutions are at least as important as 
corporate law in both separating ownership and control and lowering private benefits
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of control. Roe (2005: 243) presents evidence that greater labor protection (which 
could indicate that a) “the polity would tend to promote non-profit-maximizing 
expansion” or b) “nations in which labor or the left held significant power could be 
unwilling to build the institutions that facilitate distant shareholding”) is a better 
predictor of low ownership separation than either the LLSV index or even private 
benefits o f  control. As for the control premium, Dyck and Zingales (2003), find that, 
controlling for two extra measures, diffusion of press readership (a proxy for the 
“shaming” effect on executives) and tax enforcement (tough tax authorities keep 
corporate reporting honest): “Any distinction between English-based legal systems 
and others disappear. If anything, common law countries have higher (not lower) 
private benefits of control once these extra legal institutions are taken into 
consideration, but this effect is not statistically significant.” (italics in original)
Secured Credit
As chapter 2 argued, some kind of priority arrangement is necessary for firms 
that borrow sequentially from more than one creditor. Without priority, the forced 
mixing of the risks of the two loans could lead to an inefficient outcome for one o f the 
creditors, which would, in turn, lead to reduced access to funding for the debtor. One 
could say that if priority in lending did not exist, it would have to be invented (or just 
privately contracted).
Even arguably the most egregious of secured credit arrangements, the floating 
charge, has a role to play. As argued above, the floating charge has a role in English 
distressed debt reorganizations akin to the American DIP (Debtor-In-Possession)
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lending arrangements. As Skeel (2004) among others has argued, DIP has emerged in 
the last decade as a vital tool in post-petition Chapter 11 financing. DIP financing has 
at least two virtues: 1) it keeps the debtor in business, thereby avoiding business 
disruption costs, 2) close monitoring from the DIP creditor prevents the bankrupt firm 
from undertaking suboptimal risky projects. (Skeel 2004: 1923-124) One major 
difference between floating charges and DIP financing, however, is that DIP financing 
requires court-approval. This is vitally important as floating charges can also simply 
be used to transfer value away from unsecured creditors. On balance, given the 
possibility for misuse, the English floating charge system should be modified to be 
closer to DIP financing, perhaps with court approval or subsequent censure or even 
requiring some level of unsecured creditor consent.
As for the 10% ring-fencing, or carve-out, from the floating charge now 
available for unsecured creditors under the Enterprise Act 2002, it fulfills few of the 
arguments in its favor. 1) Carve-outs do not encourage further bank monitoring. Even 
if security makes banks “lazy” (the empirical evidence is unclear), all a carve-out 
accomplishes is it reduces the amount a debtor can borrow on a secured basis. The 
bank continues to be “lazy”, it simply lends less money. 2) Carve-outs do not 
discourage torts. Tort claimants are the most deserving nonadjusting creditors. 
However, a carve-out is unlikely to inspire secured creditors to increase monitoring 
against the debtor committing torts: a) for a tort claim to substantially change the 
payoff to secured creditors, the debtor must have minimal unsecured debt, that is, it is 
the risk of tort that threatens to create the possibility of a carve-out at all and b) as in 
1), secured creditors simply are generally not very close monitors. 3) Carve-outs are 
irrelevant to value-diversion in insolvency. The argument has been made that debtors
205
and secured creditors can collude to divert value away from unsecured creditors. 
However, preference and fraudulent conveyance provisions are the proper safeguards 
against this kind of behavior. Secured creditors do not have any more incentive, or 
facility, for that matter, for defrauding unsecured creditors.
Insolvency Law
Even though the stated purpose of the administration regime under the 
Enterprise Act 2002 is to promote “rescue”, the law does little to empower 
shareholders or managers. Instead, more power is placed in the hands of unsecured 
creditors, which, insofar as unsecured creditors are closer to being residual claimants, 
is commendable. However, this state of affairs neglects the advantage of regimes that 
promote company continuation (i.e. Chapter 11), which is to allow managers and 
shareholders some return in the event of insolvency that they may not deserve by letter 
of their contracts, in return for their cooperation in steering the company through 
insolvency and the period preceding insolvency.
Instead, the new administration regime strengthens unsecured creditor claims, 
much like another section of the Act, which provides for a 10% ring-fenced fund for 
unsecured creditors. Unlike the ring-fenced fund, however, this might not be a bad 
thing, if  we believe that aligning the interests of the administrator closer to the 
residual claimant is desirable. As argued in chapter 4, though, the issue of the 
“residual claimant” in insolvency is not quite so simple. Unsecured creditors and 
secured creditors could still have widely varying objectives in insolvency (unsecured 
creditors have an incentive to pursue high-risk projects and secured creditors have an
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incentive to pursue low-risk projects). Ultimately, the administrator, assisted (or, 
rather, constrained) by the court, will still have to delicately balance the interests of 
each party.
Implications and Areas of Further Research
One of the fundamental questions of regulation is: which should we mistrust 
more, markets or governments? In which situations are markets or governments more 
likely to fail? Mainstream economists have more faith in the market. The underlying 
reason for this is simple: market participants have better information and more direct 
incentives to succeed; governmental officials, on the other hand, have indirect 
information and are faced with many potentially distortional evaluations before they 
are rewarded through the political process. Greed and ingenuity are often strong 
enough forces to solve most problems; the times when they are likely to fail are when 
it pays more to create problems than to solve them.
The many discussions and cost/benefit analyses of market vs. bank-based 
systems and equity vs. debt-based economies face one basic question: why is the 
means of financing relevant? This is not so much an application of Modigliani-Miller 
capital structure irrelevance, but an extension of Merton’s observation: financial 
instruments can be replicated by other financial instruments (thus rendering regulation 
ineffectual). (Merton 1995) One of the key differences between debt and equity comes 
down to control rights. However, it is possible to construct debt arrangements that 
work very much like equity. The equity-like qualities of control and upside sharing 
can be replicated in a debt arrangement: a company with long-term ties with a main
207
bank could have an arrangement where loans have strong covenants, are relatively 
short-term (one to three years) and interest adjusted to match the operating 
performance of the company. It is also possible for equity structures to look similar to 
debt, e.g. non-voting shares with a dividend promise, possibly with a shareholders’ 
agreement. We must keep in mind that arguments against poor corporate governance 
are actually warnings against the dangers of inefficient investment: either 
underinvestment due to undervaluation or inefficient investment due to rent-seeking.
Transactions Costs
I propose here that it is not very useful to characterize systems as debt or 
equity-centric. We should instead on concentrate on the important factor here: 
transaction costs. What separates so-called bank/market economies or debt/equity 
economies is the avenues the corporations in these economies have to obtain 
financing. This is reliant on the means investors have to recoup their investments. We 
can separate the types of control into three layers: 1) extra-legal control, 2) private 
contractual control and 3) public securities control.
It has been noted that in jurisdictions where the rule of law is weak, financing 
relations have to be based on extra-legal control. This includes short-term loans (so 
that the debtor is continuously reliant on the creditor and does not dare default), 
personal connections and just plain threat of force. There doesn’t seem to be any 
reason why one form of financing would be preferred over another in this type of 
system; as all forms of financing require some kind of personal contact, however, 
financing would be relatively difficult and transaction costs would be very high.
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The second type of system is where public securities markets are weak 
(perhaps not even because the regulators are weak, but simply because the market is 
too small and illiquid), but rule of law in general is functional. What this implies is 
that we have a situation where contracts work, but enforcement is not “automated”, as 
it were. Financing is therefore predominantly internal, or through a reliable 
intermediary, in most cases banks. It would appear we are left in a situation where 
only big banks are able to provide financing as they have the means to engage in 
extensive negotiation and monitoring, however, we should also ask: why can’t equity 
arrangements be similarly negotiated? If the impediments to an equity culture are 
primarily information and control, it should still be possible to use shareholders’ 
contracts to establish both information and control. Arguably, this is what venture 
capitalists do in risky equity transactions in the United States. Perhaps the way to view 
the situation is not that privately contracting economies are bank-centric, but that the 
means of financing comes through two ways: banks and conglomerates. Another 
feature of non-US and European economies is that there is no diversification discount 
(in some cases there is a premium) and the economy tends to be dominated by a 
handful of large conglomerates. One way to view these conglomerates is that they 
function as financiers (especially if we consider these groups unlikely to have special 
expertise in operating diverse businesses). In other words, because individual 
investors have a hard time guaranteeing their returns, most financing would be 
through intermediaries, whether banks or indirect shareholding through a 
conglomerate. Investment through intermediaries should not be problem provided 
there is sufficient competition among the intermediaries to create efficiency.
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Unfortunately, in small or young economies and due to economies of scale, 
intermediaries in these economies tend to be few.
The third type of system is where arms-length investment by individual 
investors is now possible. This would imply that securities regulators are sufficiently 
reliable to support confidence in these investments. From a political economy 
perspective, the pressure to institute regulators to enable public investment should 
come when individual savings are high enough so that investors demand different 
ways to invest.
Viewed from this perspective, the problem isn’t one of legal protection of debt 
or equity, but one of transaction costs and standardization. (In other words, there is 
private equity and private debt and public equity and public debt.) As long as an 
enforcement mechanism can be found, any suitable control structure can be replicated. 
However, transaction costs to contract and enforce that structure can be very high. 
Given the benefits of having standardized institutions that lower transaction costs, 
though, why don’t businesses create them, even without government intervention?
Impediments to Arms-Length Capital Markets
There are three reasons why companies may not be able to develop their own 
finance-enabling institutions: 1) asymmetric information, or credibility, problems, 2) 
collective action problems and 3) rent-seeking or monopoly problems. The first two 
are related problems, as they are both commitment problems- companies can
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strengthen their credibility by committing to an standard, but this requires collective 
action.
1) Asymmetric information (adverse selection). External financing, whether 
debt (bonds) or equity, requires that the investor be able to trust the 
company. This applies to all steps of the investment process: the revelation 
of information, continued honest operation of the company, and the 
payment of returns (whether in the form of interest, dividends or future 
divestment of securities). However, if  the investors have no means to 
verify the trustworthiness of the companies, the investors will rationally 
discount all companies to take account of the risk that the company may 
prove dishonest. Companies have to find a mechanism to commit- such as 
verification by a third party.
2) Collective action. One way of lowering transaction costs is by establishing 
standardized contracts. Having shares traded on a reputable exchange is a 
way of engaging in a standard contract with external investors; the investor 
is vouchsafed certain standards in information revelation and good 
conduct.
3) Rent-seeking. The most pernicious problem, however, is when certain 
groups in a community use its control over financing to influence 
industries, such as to maintain monopolies or oligopolies. At the turn of the 
20th century, both JP Morgan and JD Rockefeller were rightly accused of
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using their control over a significant portion of American finances to 
perpetuate monopolies (Chemow 1998: 390). In general, capital markets 
do not care which products they finance, they care only about the return, 
however, in cases where capital providers have a vested interest in the 
product market, such as cases where creditors have a quasi-equity interest 
in the monopolist, then the control over capital can be used to control 
competition (Mokyr 2002: 256).
Who Should We Trust?
As has been argued throughout this thesis, any given state of corporate 
governance favors one controlling group over others: if  shareholders are dispersed, 
this gives managers de facto control over firms, if  there is a controlling shareholder, 
the controlling shareholder can extract a control premium, in companies with a main 
bank, the bank can extract rents from the firm. This leads to a general question of 
whether regulators should choose to favor any particular group. Or, to put it another 
way, which group should regulators favor? The question would then become: which 
group, if given control, would be most given to efficiency? From an economic 
perspective, we should ask which group would have the best incentives to put its 
efforts into improving the performance of the firm and not into rent-seeking. This 
question is hard to answer generally. Any answer would have to rely on the 
divergence between ownership and control. This is because rent-seeking ultimately 
has to have a victim. The rents have to come from someone. Viewed from this angle, 
the divergence is strongest for managers of firms, as they may not be owners at all 
(although arguably managers have the least scope for tunneling). Another way to
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approach this problem is to ask which group is easier to monitor given limited investor 
and government resources? This would rely a great deal on local circumstance and the 
state of current regulations in that jurisdiction.
It is important to emphasize that the shifting of power to managers, a 
controlling shareholder or banks happens “naturally”, as it were. Corporate 
governance arrangements tend to settle into one of these forms. The problem with 
choosing a regulatory structure is that it limits the forms corporate governance 
arrangements can take. As in the discussion above, banks can be regulated such that 
they cannot take a strong governance stake in companies. Similarly, by lowering the 
control premium, it makes it less likely that a controlling shareholder will appear in 
firms (or as argued in chapter 2, the firm will have only one shareholder). The result 
of limiting corporate governance arrangements is that the result may be inefficient.
We are faced with a tradeoff between abuse and flexibility.
You could say it is a choice between regulating and legislating: should firms 
be allowed to choose their own governance arrangements (and therefore run the risk 
that a group may end up controlling the firm beyond its ownership stake) or should 
firms be constrained in their governance arrangements (and therefore face situations 
where the governance structure is inefficient)? We might also note that transaction 
costs appear to be lower in situations where the capital market is actively regulated, 
rather than protected through legislation. Perhaps it is more efficient pooling costs into 
a single regulatory body than to rely on post-facto collective legal action (no matter 
how facilitated).
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It is possible to mention here a rather odd phenomenon. In economies where 
external equity is weak, strict regulations of banks could create a financing gap. If 
banks are not allowed to take quasi-equity stakes in companies (e.g. shareholding and 
board representation limits, interest rate regulation that disallows intertemporal 
smoothing), the only other source of financing will be internal. The standard paradigm 
of banking regulation, which focuses on bank illiquidity, moral hazard and consumer 
protection (see Goodhart et al 1998), could therefore be inappropriate for economies 
that rely on bank-financing as its sole source of external financing.
Corporate Governance in the Long-Run
Rent-seeking in corporate governance arrangements assume there is a victim. 
The rents must be paid by a party that should be receiving more. In repeated 
transactions, therefore, the rent-paying parties should become reluctant to finance. 
This, particularly coupled with asymmetric information, means that countries with 
poor corporate governance are faced with expensive funding, whether because of risk- 
discounting or increased transaction costs. One possible phenomenon is that, in newly 
liberalized economies or new securities markets, investors have not obtained enough 
information to discount the corporate governance risk correctly. Firms would have an 
incentive to keep corporate governance regimes weak in order to facilitate 
expropriation. However, note that the expropriation should only happen once (or at 
least just the first few times) before investors learn.
This should mean that corporate governance standards should improve when 
companies in that country require more external capital. In a way, we could expect
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significant expropriation when a country first liberalizes financially or has its first IPO 
wave; from that point on, the firms themselves, especially faced with expanding 
markets, should have an incentive to improve their corporate governance in order to 
obtain financing. Poor corporate governance, therefore, should not be a persistent 
problem, except in the case where financiers have an incentive to limit the level of 
public financing in an economy. This has the potential to be a persistent source of 
corporate governance weakening, as would be the case if  financing limitation is used 
as an aid to monopoly as discussed earlier. This danger has to strongly regulated 
against.
We can therefore speculate that, excepting the forces that want to limit 
financing, corporate governance should tend to improve due to two forces. On the 
supply side, as companies require growth financing and can no longer expropriate 
investors, companies should look to create a credible system for investor confidence. 
On the demand side, as countries become wealthier and citizens look for methods of 
savings, two things should happen: the market for intermediaries should deepen (as 
was the case in New England banks- Lamoreaux 1996) and savers should look for 
more direct forms of investment, i.e. creating an environment for an active equity and 
bond market.
The Role of History
Sweeping comments on corporate financing structures (and implications 
thereof) suffer from a fundamental problem: these structures often change and the 
causes of these changes are various. Take the “law matters” LLSV hypothesis. The
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import of legal systems is largely a legacy of colonialism, which is a contested topic in 
its own right, with an extensive literature. Causation then becomes troublingly 
tangled: a) colonies were selected by imperialist states (with naval powers, like 
England, presumably getting the cream of the crop) and b) different colonial masters, 
sometimes with widely differing agendas, implement different infrastructural changes. 
More recent historical events also have a huge impact. The two world wars obviously 
have effects felt to the present day.
Take for example Japan and France. Japan had a vibrant capital market before 
the Second World War. However, post-WWII, in a condition of scarce capital, the 
Japanese government decided that: “[r]elying on stock and equity seemed risky, [...] 
since the government might have different priorities from individual investors; it 
would be better to use the banks to push capital around the economy, since this could 
be controlled.” (Tett 2004: 9, italics in original) As for France, the French government 
spent the decades after the wars systematically nationalizing large portions of the 
French economy. As late as 1982, the Mitterand government pushed through 
programs of nationalization that “[a]t its conclusion, the state owned 100% of 13 of 
the 20 largest French industrial firms and held a controlling block in many others. It 
was also in control of the country’s largest financial enterprises as well as a large 
number of smaller French banks.” (O’Sullivan 2005: 357) Given that such structures 
are likely to be path-dependant, it is difficult to argue for purely economic causes for 
current corporate structures. (Bebchuk and Roe 1999)
Even Rajan and Zingales’s (2003: 226-246) argument that progress from 
relationship capitalism to arm’s length capitalism has been impeded by vested
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interests who use their established power to prevent new entrants is open to historical 
challenge. Banks in New England did not change from relationship lending to arm’s 
length lending as a response to external forces breaking up old, cozy relationships, but 
rather because the amount of capital available in the system became too much for a 
relationship system to handle. (Lamoreaux 1996: 89-118)
We should not forget that, at the end of the day, “[wjhether we look at the 
comic attempts of economists to explain randomness or the tragic vulnerability of the 
poor, luck is a constant influence on the quest for growth”. (Easterly 2001: 214)
The Pretence of Knowledge
Can we engineer a financial system? Should national policy makers attempt to 
nudge their financial systems in certain directions- for example, should developing 
countries specifically try to deepen their equity markets and develop bond markets or 
should the US or UK encourage institutional investor activism? These are important 
questions, unfortunately, the answers we currently have are not very satisfactory. 
Given path-dependence in financing, creating an equity-culture might require the 
weakening of bank ties (as has been argued is the case in Germany and Japan). Should 
developing countries really take steps as extreme as this? In the US and UK, 
institutional investors are being seen as guardians against greedy managers, but what 
of the institutional managers themselves? Are their incentives (timing returns for 
fund-termination) really the most efficient for the economy? The danger in attempting 
to guide an entire financial system is that the tools we have are crude and our 
understanding tenuous at best. As Hayek said in his Nobel lecture, regarding
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economic theory: . the effects on policy of the more ambitious constructions have
not been very fortunate and I confess that I prefer true but imperfect knowledge, even 
if it leaves much undetermined and unpredictable, to a pretence of exact knowledge 
that is likely to be false... To act on the belief that we possess the knowledge and the 
power which enable us to shape the processes of society entirely to our liking, 
knowledge which in fact we do not possess, is likely to make us do much harm.”
The history of financial regulations and corporate governance standards is the 
history of reactions to crises and scandals. The problem of legislating in the wake of 
manias, panics and crashes is that the reaction to irrational exuberance is often 
irrational paranoia. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US is misguided in many of its 
basic principles (Romano 2005) and is proving to be costly to the point of driving 
many companies private (Carney 2006). Placing too much emphasis on the negative 
consequences of corporate governance could distract from the role of corporate 
governance- to ensure the proper utilization of corporate assets. Perhaps the regulation 
of corporate governance should be approached similarly to monetary policy: 
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